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As part of the effort to supply “brainpower” for the American cold war effort, the 
National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958 provided a loan program to aid under-
resourced postsecondary students.  Elements of the NDEA story—the increased federal 
financial support for higher education; the rhetorical and practical affiliation of schooling, 
national security, and patriotism; and the easy relationship between an irresistible 
military-industrial complex and a compliant academic culture—seem to support 
conventional narratives of post-World War II society and higher education.  These 
narratives hold that the combined forces of research funding and a cold war discourse 




Rejecting the shorthand that “higher education” in the twentieth century was synonymous 
with the experience of elite research universities, and that significant American 
institutions generally complied with and even promoted cold war security and defense 
policies, allows stories unaccounted for in traditional historical narratives to emerge.   
In the case of the NDEA, two small liberal arts colleges—Swarthmore and Haverford—
took a leading role in refusing federal monies offered by the legislation, in protest of an 
attached disclaimer affidavit.  This affidavit was part of a loyalty provision in the 
legislation which required aid recipients to disclaim membership in or support of 
“subversive” organizations.  From the first, this provision was a point of controversy 
among collegiate faculties and administrators, who saw in the affidavit a political test that 
imperiled nascent concepts of academic freedom, and also established dangerous 
precedent that could influence the direction of future education bills. While resistance 
eventually galvanized among many schools nationwide—and though higher profile 
institutions such as Harvard and Yale would ultimately emerge as its public faces—much 
of the initial example of dissent was promulgated by the non-participation of Swarthmore 
and Haverford.   
The example of the purpose and community identity articulated by these two schools 
during the NDEA controversy suggests the possibility of reclaiming narrative space for 
the residential liberal arts college in the history of cold war higher education, and perhaps 
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profoundly thankful for the generosity of this collective.   
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her little but the promise that, one day, I would finish.  I am not proud of this asymmetry, 
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Introduction:  Liberal Arts Colleges and the Bounds of Historiography 
     This dissertation tells the story of Swarthmore and Haverford, two Quaker liberal arts 
colleges in suburban Philadelphia, both of whom resisted the loyalty provisions of the 
National Defense Education Act (NDEA) of 1958.  During a period of American history 
marked by institutional commitments to cold war rhetoric and uncertainty surrounding 
the concept of academic freedom, both Swarthmore and Haverford drew upon clearly 
articulated collegiate missions, strong senses of community, and traditions of ethical 
discourse to oppose the tests of belief required by the NDEA.  In so doing, the two 
colleges enacted a vision of institutional purpose, moral identity, and democratic practice 
that was too often inaccessible, ignored, or dormant in the American higher education 
community throughout the cold war period.   
     The history of American higher education has engaged writers since the eighteenth 
century.  From Thomas Jefferson’s arguments in favor of a national university for an 
intellectual aristocracy, to nineteenth-century polemics by university presidents on the 
need for funding, to post-bellum memoirs of collegiate life, publications on the subject 
were broad in scope, purpose, and quality.
1
  The true roots of the historiography of 
American higher education, however, can indeed be discovered in the first half of the past 
century, with the publication of works that did not simply celebrate college life or lobby 
alumni and philanthropies for financial support, but instead offered a critical examination 
of the historical antecedents and philosophical underpinnings of postsecondary learning 
in the United States.  In 1918, for example, Thorstein Veblen offered a satirical yet 
trenchant look at “the higher learning,” while twelve years later Abraham Flexner 
                                                 
1 For a collection of representative works, see Richard Hofstader and Wilson Smith, eds., American Higher 
Education: A Documentary History, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961).   
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published his comparative study of contemporary university systems.  Robert Maynard 
Hutchins followed both of these in 1936 with a thorough defense of liberal education at 
the collegiate level.
2
  These authors were attempting to address a more serious audience, 
one that craved something more than voyeuristic accounts of campus life, naïve 
hagiography, or appeals to support the alma mater.   
     It was on the foundation of these early scholarly efforts that later academics began a 
truly committed, systematic inquiry into the nation’s history and system of higher 
education in the decades after World War II.  There was growing interest in the field, an 
interest doubtless spurred on by the increased presence that collegiate and university 
attendance had claimed in American life and conversation; with the GI Bill (1944), the 
Truman Commission Report on Higher Education (1947), and the National Defense 
Education Act (1958), postsecondary education was making its journey from elite 
institution to mass phenomenon in the popular mindset, and it experienced a concomitant 
increase in academic attention.  As two analysts observed in 1968:  “When we began 
studying higher education more than a decade ago, the number of scholars in the field 
was small enough so that we could know almost all of them personally and keep up a 
correspondence with them.  Today this is no longer possible.”
3
 
     As interest and participation in the field broadened, however, the scope of its 
argument did not necessarily follow suit.  Historians and analysts working at mid-century 
and shortly after tended to articulate a shared sensibility, one which described the two 
                                                 
2
Thorstein Veblen, The Higher Learning in America:  A Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities by 
Business Men (New York:  B.W. Huebsch, 1918); Abraham Flexner, Universities:  American, British, 
German (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1930); Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Higher Learning in 
America (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1936). 
3




decades before and after the coming of the twentieth century as a period of crucial 
transition and growth in American higher education.
4
  The hero of this emerging narrative 
was the turn-of-the-century university, an institution launched by benefactors to 
champion research and create new knowledge.  To historians, the dissimilarity between 
the dominant school type of the antebellum period, the small (and often denominational) 
college, and the modern research university was striking; indeed, in contrast to the 
perceived parochialism, paternalism, and crude vocationalism that historians saw in the 
nineteenth-century college, the modern research university seemed an epiphany of 
scholarly advancement, academic freedom, and administrative innovation.  Schools like 
the University of Chicago, Johns Hopkins, Stanford, and Cornell, born into this zeitgeist, 
joined older yet modernizing schools such as Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and Columbia in 
leading the “university movement,” with an attendant emphasis on advanced study, 
faculty autonomy, non-sectarian missions, and curricular expansion.
5
  In the writings of 
mid-century historians, the schools leading, participating in, and inheriting this 
movement became the central actors in what would become the traditional narrative—the 
“conventional wisdom”—of American higher education history.  This wisdom 
proclaimed the early twentieth century the “Age of the University,” a great leap forward 
from the retrograde nineteenth-century intellectual landscape and its parochial, anti-
academic colleges. 
                                                 
4
 For representative works, see Richard Hofstadter and Walter Metzger, The Development of Academic 
Freedom in the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955); Frederick Rudolph, The 
American College and University:  A History (Athens:  University of Georgia Press, 1962); and Laurence 
R. Veysey, The Emergence of the American University (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1965). 
5
 Hofstadter, “The Revolution in Higher Education,” in Paths of American Thought, ed. Arthur M. 
Schlesinger, Jr. and Morton White (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), 269-90. 
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       The mid-century fascination with research universities also generally involved a 
dismissal of earlier small liberal arts colleges as sites of meaningful historical inquiry; 
indeed, the traditional narrative increasingly saw such schools through one of two 
interpretive lenses.  First, the nineteenth-century college was, in general, presented as an 
unsophisticated, anti-intellectual, and archaically moralistic place, especially when 
compared to the progressive, scholarly, and professional ethos embodied by post-bellum 
universities.  Second, a very select few liberal arts institutions remained within the 
historical conversation, but these schools were outliers distinguished both by their period 
of founding (the Colonial, rather than the Jacksonian) and their ability to express the 
progressive and academic values of the nascent universities.  While marginally more 
inclusive, this theme nonetheless made the tacit assertion that a school could only embed 
itself in the higher educational mainstream by resisting the liberal arts model central to 
most nineteenth-century small colleges.   
     Taken together, these two themes have tended to point historians in a very 
understandable research direction:  toward the modern university.  The most influential 
scholars and works of the two decades after World War II had pronounced the small 
liberal arts college model either a nineteenth-century relic or an institution made relevant 
by only a handful of “prestigious” schools.  While those inheriting this narrative tradition 
were not as critical of the twentieth-century version of the “old time college”—the 
modern liberal arts college is seldom held up as anti-intellectual or sectarian, per se—
neither did they stray from the assumption that the experience of research universities 
best relayed the meaning of American higher education.  This fidelity to the traditional 
narrative was likely galvanized by an explosion of activity in the middle of the twentieth 
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century, whereby new legislation, resource allocation, and campus construction helped 
inaugurate what many have termed the “golden age” of the university.
6
  Within such a 
context, the “old time college” model, even updated from its nineteenth-century roots, 
must have seemed shockingly extraneous as politicians and educationists clamored for 
more laboratories, new research, and sprawling campuses to produce human capital for 
modern world.  In short, most historians have asserted that themes of expanded access, 
government funding, research orientation, credentialism, and student activism told the 
story of American higher education in the twentieth century, and assumed that the 
campuses and the archives of large, comprehensive research universities, be they public 
or private, were best places to investigate this story.
7
   
     While this approach has inspired thoughtful and provocative narrative, it has also 
exiled the modern liberal arts college to the margins of historiographical conversation.  
To be sure, there have been attempts to revise understandings of this institutional model, 
both in its nineteenth- and twentieth-century forms.
8
  As the revisionist historians 
demonstrated, the liberal arts college during the “Age of the University” was actually not 
                                                 
6
 Louis Menand, The Marketplace of Ideas:  Reform and Resistance in the American University (New 
York:  W.W. Norton, 2010), 63-70, 73-77. 
7
 For representative works, see Jacques Barzun, The American University: How It Runs, Where It is Going 
(Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1968); Roger L. Geiger, To Advance Knowledge: The Growth of 
Research Universities, 1900-1940 (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1986); Jaroslav Pelikan, The Idea 
of the University:  A Reexamination ( New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1992); Roger L. Geiger, 
Research and Relevant Knowledge:  American Research Universities Since World War II (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 1993); Jonathan R. Cole, Elinor G Barber, and Stephen R. Graubard, The 
Research University in a Time of Discontent (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994); Hugh 
Graham and Nancy Diamond, The Rise of American Research Universities: Elites and Challengers in the 
Postwar Era (Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); John A. Douglass, The California Idea 
and American Higher Education: 1850 to the 1960 Master Plan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2000); Wilson Smith and Thomas Bender, eds., American Higher Education Transformed, 1940-2005. 
(Baltimore:  Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); Jonathan R. Cole, The Great American University 
(New York:  Public Affairs, 2009). 
8
 For representative works, see James Axtell, “The Death of the Liberal Arts College,” History of 
Education Quarterly 11, no 4 (Winter 1971); Colin Burke, American Collegiate Populations:  A Test of the 
Traditional View (New York:  New York University, 1983); W. Bruce Leslie, Gentlemen & Scholars:  
Colleges and Community in the “Age of the University,” 1865-1917 (University Park:  Penn State 
University Press, 1993). 
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a fixed entity, but rather a creative, vibrant institution that continually reinterpreted how 
best to enact its project within historically-contingent circumstances.  The place of such 
schools in the traditional historiographical narrative, however, has been confounded by 
analytical lassitude; indeed, the conventional story has generally imputed stasis and 
intractability to the antebellum college, ignored the continuities between the liberal arts 
college model and the new research institutions of the time, and overstated the small 
college’s fidelity to a narrow sectarianism and outmoded pedagogy.
9
    
     Despite the efforts of revisionists seeking to save the historical reputation of the small 
college, however, theirs has been a limited scholarly revolution; indeed, no “Age of the 
College” or “Golden Age of the College” narrative has emerged to supersede or 
challenge the prominence of the conventional historiographical approach.  As a 
consequence, the historical account of American higher education in the past century 
tends to exclude the possibility of small, residential liberal arts colleges as sites of 
meaningful inquiry or experience. What scholarly consideration the twentieth-century 
iteration of such schools does receive from historians tends to come in the form of 
institutional or “house” histories, which many analysts see as academically slight.
10
  In 
addition, those social scientists which have analyzed the small liberal arts college in the 
                                                 
9
 Axtell, “The Death of the Liberal Arts College,” 341, 346, 347. 
10
 In circles of educational historians, institutional or “house histories” have often been dismissed as facile 
“love letters” to chosen campuses.  To be sure, some have been poorly written or insufficiently critical, and 
prominent historians have tended toward more comprehensive or synthetic histories of policies, social 
trends, curricular developments, and the like.  There is, however, nothing necessary about this condition.  
Far from being vapid and of dubious utility, a thoughtful house history—particularly in an under-
researched field—can inform contemporary policy, encourage the generation and preservation of historical 
records, promote more creative methodologies, and, most importantly, provide narrative elements crucial to 
the writing of more general, thematic histories of higher education.   At present, though, entries in this 
genre are not sufficiently robust or respected to support meaningful inquiry into the twentieth-century 
liberal arts college.  For exploration on the limits and possibilities of institutional histories, see Richard 
Angelo, “Review:  A House is Not a Home,” History of Education Quarterly 24, no. 4 (Winter 1984):  609-
618, and W. Bruce Leslie, “Writing Postwar Institutional Histories,” History of Higher Education Annual 
20 (2000):  79-93. 
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post-World War II context most often proclaim the inexorable decline of the institution, 
with schools previously identifying as “liberal arts” increasingly incorporating more 
professional and practical curricula into their programs.
11
 
     Both types of analysis—those which see post-World War II liberal arts colleges as 
either irrelevant or in decay—have  neglected the lessons of the revisionists; that is, they 
generally ignore the possibility that these schools, like their turn-of-the-century forebears, 
function as dynamic, creative entities, not sites of passive ineffectuality or mindless, 
insipid aping of university examples.  To be sure, universities in the “Golden Age” were 
profoundly affected by expanded enrollment, the growth of government-sponsored “Big 
Science,” and student activists championing civil rights and anti-war causes; at the same 
time, however, other institutions, including small liberal arts colleges, engaged with these 
trends and issues in ways which helped shape the meaning and practice of American 
higher education for significant numbers of students, faculty, and administrators.  When 
these stories go untold, scholars miss opportunities to expand the bounds of the 
traditional historiographical narrative. 
     Scholarship surrounding the GI Bill’s encounter with American higher educational 
institutions provides a useful case in point.  The 1944 law encouraged the development of 
human capital, stimulated expansion of higher education and, perhaps most importantly, 
popularized the idea that higher education was both a necessary and reachable tool of 
economic mobility for postwar Americans; accordingly, it has inspired three decades of 
historical review, with most of these studies having focused on legislative processes, 
                                                 
11
 David W. Breneman, Liberal Arts Colleges: Thriving, Surviving, or Endangered?  (Washington, DC:  
Brookings Institution, 1994); Michael Delucchi, “‘Liberal Arts’ Colleges and the Myth of Uniqueness,” 
The Journal of Higher Education 68, no. 4 (July-August 1984):  414-426. 
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administration, and civic ramifications of the bill.
12
  Attention was also paid to its effects 
on the nation’s higher education, however, and while these pieces did not always share 
the same tone—though most heralded the law as a revolutionary social program, some 
argued that the myth of the GI Bill has outpaced its reality
13
—almost all articulated a 
core group of narrative themes: the veterans on campus were motivated and high 
academic achievers, took a range of classes but preferred those with a 
vocational/professional orientation, overwhelmed schools with unanticipated numbers, 
and refused to subscribe to traditional “collegiate way” mores.  A typical example 
captured the perceived watershed nature of the program:        
In many ways the impact of the successful college veteran drastically altered the 
traditional perceptions of the nature of the college experience, guiding the 
curriculum even more than in prewar years towards more practical and vocational 
applications. Due to these democratizing influences and the impressive attention 
they received, college appeared to be more accessible in the public imagination….  
The common man had invaded the aristocratic campuses, not only changing the 




     Historians thus built a conventional interpretation which described the GI Bill as 
shaping the educational, political, and social discourse on campuses across the country.  
                                                 
12
 For representative works, see Davis R. B. Ross, Preparing for Ulysses:  Politics and Veterans During 
World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Michael J. Bennett, When Dreams Came 
True: The GI Bill and the Making of Modern America (Washington:  Brassey's, 1996); Suzanne Mettler, 
Soldiers to Citizens:  The GI Bill and the Making of the Greatest Generation (New York:  Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
13
 Keith W. Olson, The G.I. Bill, the Veterans, and the Colleges (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 
1974), 109-110. 
14
 Daniel A. Clark, “‘The Two Joes Meet—Joe College, Joe Veteran’:  The G.I. Bill, College Education, 
and Postwar American Culture,” History of Education Quarterly 38 (Summer 1998): 177. 
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In the hands of historians, however, these “campuses” included research universities, 
comprehensive state schools, or prestigious university colleges, but rarely residential 
liberal arts schools; indeed, of the considerable space dedicated to photographs of 
Quonset huts, surging enrollment figures, and analysis of curriculum adjustment, almost 
none of it involved the small college.  For instance, in 1974 Keith Olson’s The G.I. Bill, 
the Veterans, and the Colleges emerged as a concise and oft-cited description of the 
relationship between soldiers and higher education, but sections exploring on-campus 
effects were limited to institutional and social challenges faced at comprehensive state 
universities such as Rutgers, Syracuse and, most prominently, Wisconsin.  Similarly, 
Helen L. Horowitz’s groundbreaking look at postsecondary student culture, Campus Life, 
used the venue of a larger university like Michigan and Northwestern, or a prestigious 
technical institution like Lehigh, to explore the outsized demographic influence of 
veterans on campus.  Horowitz noted that “especially at the larger universities,” the 
former soldiers had “left institutions substantially different from the ones they had 
found;” the cultural effects of veterans at smaller liberal arts colleges, though, remained 
unexplored.
15
  Finally, Kathleen Frydl’s voluminous and assiduously researched The GI 
Bill dedicated its final chapter to the interplay between bill beneficiaries, campus culture, 
and higher educational leadership.  More than her predecessors, Frydl folded the 
experience of the liberal arts college into her narrative, albeit with cursory discussions of 
the manner in which both Oberlin and Williams confronted the opportunities and 
challenges of veteran college attendance.  In general, however, The GI Bill recapitulated 
the traditional approach of historians by illuminating the postwar obstacles faced not at 
                                                 
15
 Horowitz, Campus Life:  Undergraduate Cultures from the End of the Eighteenth Century to the Present 
(New York:  Knopf, 1987), 187. 
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smaller colleges, but at Illinois, Rutgers, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, New York 
University, California and, most thoroughly, Chicago and Harvard.
16
     
     That these scholars wrote significant history is not in question; each broke new ground 
within the discipline.  At the same time, each hewed to a neo-conventional narrative of 
the GI Bill’s effects, one which generally ignored the liberal arts college.  If the GI Bill 
was indeed responsible for widespread institutional, curricular, and cultural shifts, 
thoroughgoing historiography must account for these shifts in a variety of higher 
educational contexts.  The answers supplied about the interaction of the GI Bill and the 
university certainly occasioned related questions about veterans and the liberal arts 
college.  Dickinson College, for example, doubled in size between 1941 and 1946. How 
did it and other colleges committed to a small scale and institutional intimacy deal with 
veterans spilling onto campus?  At Holy Cross, the war effort brought recruits to campus 
for education as naval officers as part of the nationwide V-12 training program. How was 
the culture of this and like-minded small schools permanently reshaped by an 
environment of military discipline, a majority enlisted student body, and the first 
presence of non-Catholic students?    In the wake of World War II, public relations 
materials issued by Mt. Holyoke, Smith, and Wellesley recommitted the schools to their 
tradition of single-sex education.
17
  How did other private colleges unlikely to experience 
an enrollment boom from the GI Bill attempt to adapt to their less propitious 
circumstances?  These questions do not assert an argument for supplementing the extant 
                                                 
16
 Frydl, The GI Bill (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2009), 303-349. 
17
 Michael J. Aquilina, The Edel Years at Dickinson College (Canonsberg, PA: Wise Eagle Publishing, 
1990), 4; James Dempsey, “When the Navy Docked on the Hill,” Holy Cross Magazine 41, no. 4 (Fall 
2007): 20-25; Deborah M. Olsen, “Remaking the Image:  Promotional Literature of Mount Holyoke, Smith, 




narrative; rather, fuller study of the GI Bill necessitates a discursive shift, one which 
constructs the liberal arts college as a meaningful site of inquiry.   
     The point again is not that conventional historiography has done a poor job telling the 
story of American higher education in the twentieth century; rather, it is to recognize that 
interactions between liberal arts colleges and the century’s significant political, social, 
and cultural movements provide a compelling rationale for expanding the boundaries of 
this narrative.  Most histories of higher education during the cold war in America have 
focused either on the expansion of the military-industrial complex to include university 
research, or the impact of McCarthyism on the academic freedom of university faculty.  
While worthy areas of inquiry and analysis, leaning too heavily on such themes—and on 
such institutions—risks missing potentially valuable accounts of other issues and schools 
during the period.  This research presented here attempts to expand the bounds of the 





Chapter 1:  The National Defense Education Act—Beginnings and Ends 
     The National Defense Education Act of 1958 is conventionally described as emerging 
in response to Soviet aeronautical achievements. On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union 
launched Sputnik, the first artificial satellite to successfully orbit the earth, a triumph that 
was thrust into the American consciousness by frenzied media coverage.
18
  Life 
magazine, an exemplar of mid-century mainstream print journalism, devoted the cover of 
its October 21, 1957 issue to the Soviet launch, under the headline, “The Satellite:  Why 
the Reds Got It First, What Happens Next.”  Inside, some twenty pages of photos and 
analysis were devoted to the Soviet space shot, pages which expressed despair, anger, and 
disbelief at the nation’s public shaming. The perceived “loss” to the Soviets was 
exacerbated by press reports regarding America’s competing Project Vanguard satellite, 
itself not scheduled to launch until the following year.  Vanguard was reportedly 
decidedly inferior to Sputnik: it was eight times lighter, and had rocket boosters that were 
twenty times less powerful than Sputnik’s three-stage rocket.  Furthermore, on November 
3, the Soviets launched another satellite, Sputnik II, which was significantly heavier and 
not only measured the atmosphere’s radiation levels, but also carried a passenger, a dog 
named Laika, for medical monitoring.
19
  In the wake of this development, concern and 
pessimism about American ability to compete against its cold war enemy deepened.  If 
the United States trailed the USSR in the realm of space, perhaps Communists would 
soon leave Americans behind on earth, as well—if they had not already. 
                                                 
18
 For an excellent recent treatment of the intersection between governmental policy, educational 
philosophy, and national culture in the cold war era, see Andrew Hartman, Education and the Cold War:  
The Battle for the American School (New York:  Palgrave MacMillan, 2008).   
19
 Barbara Barksdale Clowse, Brainpower for the Cold War:  The Sputnik Crisis and the National Defense 
Education Act of 1958 (Westport, CT:  Greenwood Press, 1981), 7-14. 
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     In his first news conference after the initial Sputnik launch, however, Dwight 
Eisenhower displayed relative indifference toward the Soviet achievement.  While 
acknowledging the satellite as a feat of science and engineering, the President steadfastly 
refused to attach greater symbolic or military significance to the event.  “Now, so far as 
the satellite itself is concerned,” said Eisenhower, regarding potential security concerns, 
“that does not raise my apprehensions, not one iota.”  Eisenhower thus attempted a 
muted, commonsensical response to Sputnik—a later scholar would note that the satellite 
had both “the size and lethal potential of a beach ball”—but the propaganda defeat the 
nation had endured simply could not be ignored.  In his immediate, low-key reaction, the 
President failed to assure a disconcerted nation that it was safe from Soviet military 
might.
20
  The mood of the nation’s media and citizenry was not reflected in Ike’s cool, 
detached demeanor; rather, the overriding sentiment seemed to be captured by C.C. 
Furnas, a leading scientist and the president of the State University of New York at 
Buffalo, who mused, “Let us not pretend that Sputnik is anything but a defeat for the 
U.S.”  Furnas also suggested a method for assuring there would be no such defeats in the 
future:   “We must give more aid and encouragement to our educational institutions in 
turning out more engineers and scientists.”
21
   
     In the wake of the Sputnik launch, Furnas was not the only analyst to draw a 
connection between international competition and national security on the one hand, and 
American education on the other.  For those who had long argued that the national 
                                                 
20
 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The President's News Conference, October 9, 1957,” in The American 
Presidency Project, ed. Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=10924; Menand, The Marketplace of Ideas:  Reform and 
Resistance in the American University (New York:  W.W. Norton, 2010), 66; Robert A. Divine, The 
Sputnik Challenge: Eisenhower’s Response to the Soviet Challenge (New York:  Oxford University Press, 
1993), 183-205. 
21
 Furnas, “Why Did the U.S. Lose the Race?  Critics Speak Up," Life, October 21, 1957, 23. 
14 
 
education system was a shambles—the year Sputnik took flight, fewer than half of 
American high school students could be expected to graduate, and only 16 percent of 
high school graduates were even enrolled in college—the contrast between Soviet 
technical prowess and the lack of American scholastic attainment was both stark and 
frightening.
22
  This anxiety was felt in Washington; indeed, within two months, four 
separate House and Senate subcommittee hearings to study, among other matters, the 
apparent deficiencies in the way in which the United States trained students to become 
scientists and engineers.  Not to be outdone, the governing board of the National Science 
Foundation sounded a strident tone in its statement on the initial Sputnik launch:    
This event is dramatic evidence of the rapidly accelerating pace in the advance of 
science and technology.  As such it challenges this nation’s determination to 
strengthen its present scientific position, and to make provision for future 
scientific progress….  We must recognize that our nation’s future rests in major 
degree based upon the soundness of our system of education and our people’s 




     Similarly, Carnegie Corporation president John W. Gardner—who had long asserted 
the importance of education to American political and moral aims in the pre-Sputnik 
period—issued remarks of striking urgency in the wake of the Soviet satellite success.  
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Surveying the state of cold war competition and education, Gardner concluded that the 
“plain fact is that never in our history have we stood in such desperate need of men and 
women of intelligence…  The challenge is there—greater than any generation has ever 
faced.”
24
  Among experts both governmental and private, then, the link between 
American survival and federal investment in its education system was clear; moreover, 
expert opinion had coalesced with a public expectation that the federal government act to 
correct the educational shortfall that had shamed Americans in the face of Soviet 
engineering and scientific prowess.  
     Aware of both expert and public belief, legislative leaders—some of whom had been 
advocating federal financial aid to education, including higher education, since the 
previous decade—used  the rhetorical power of the security-education connection to 
drive passage of the NDEA.  Alabama Democrats Lister Hill and Carl Elliott, building 
upon an agenda suggested by the Eisenhower Administration and HEW, put together bills 
for the Senate and House, respectively, that would authorize federal grant-in-aid at all 
rungs on the education ladder, from graduate and undergraduate study down to 
elementary schools.  Monies would be allocated to strengthen elementary and secondary 
science, math, and foreign language instruction, and college and graduate students would 
receive funds to better develop intellectual capital for national security purposes. To 
justify such historically ambitious appropriations, supporters of the bill repeatedly and 
powerfully invoked the specter of the Soviet threat and the concomitant necessity of 
developing American brainpower for self-defense.  In a typical rhetorical gesture, Hill’s 
bill proposition made explicit the national security imperative it carried:  
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Recent events…have dramatically demonstrated that the education of our youth is 
a matter of grave concern to all... [including the federal government, which has] 
the responsibility, under the Constitution, for providing for the national defense.  
The needs of national defense require that the Federal Government act at this time 
to stimulate and encourage local and State agencies in efforts to increase the depth 
and broaden the scope of their educational programs.
25
  
  While the Sputnik setbacks had opened the door for action on American educational 
policy, however, such action was far from an accomplished fact.  As powerful and 
pervasive as national security anxiety was, it was by no means certain that it could 
provide the push necessary to surmount the obstacles which had traditionally blocked 
federal aid to education.  Any federal legislation would fly in the face of the longstanding 
convention of localism in education; indeed, defenders of local autonomy had effectively 
blocked efforts to extend federal aid to American education for decades.  Against Hill 
and Elliot, those who sympathized with localism, including President Eisenhower, would 
continue to contend that any aid from Washington would entail some sort of centralized 
control and planning, and thus threaten the very liberty that distinguished Americans 
from the Soviet enemy.
26
  An offshoot of this concern for local control was centered on 
racial politics.  Segregationists, still smarting after the Brown v. Board of Education 
                                                 
25




 sess., Congressional Record 104, pt. 1 
(January 30, 1958): S 1322. 
26
 Clowse, 45-60, 91-92.  While generally heralded for his pragmatic style of leadership as President, 
Eisenhower took office as an implacable opponent to federal aid for education.  Even when serving as 
president of Columbia University in the years following World War II, he used his position to decry the 
specter of national government intrusion into public schooling.  In commenting on a federal aid bill before 
Congress, Eisenhower marshaled the cold war language typical of the day and warned that “unless we are 
careful, even the great and necessary educational processes in our country will become yet another vehicle 
by which the believers in paternalism, if not outright socialism, will gain still additional power for the 
central government.” Philip A. Grant, Jr. “Catholic Congressmen, Cardinal Spellman, Eleanor Roosevelt 
and the 1949-1950 Federal Aid to Education Controversy,” American Catholic Historical Society of 
Philadelphia 90 (December 1979): 3-13.  
17 
 
setback in 1954, viewed federal aid to education as a Trojan horse through which forced 
racial integration could be smuggled into the South.
27
  In short, even in the face of an 
overweening cold war anxiety about the Soviet threat, those holding onto the tradition of 
local control were determined to stave off any attempts at establishing federal aid, which 
they saw as a bridge to federal domination. 
     During the Eighty-fifth Congress, the battle between the proponents of the ambitious 
education bills and the ideologues of localism ultimately produced a compromise 
between the warring factions.  Conservatives resistant to federal control won a victory 
with the wording of the Act’s Title I, which stated that despite the source of financial aid, 
no national agency or employee could “exercise any direction, supervision, or control” 
over any school or system’s curriculum, instruction, or administration.
28
  As a 
consequence, supporters of localism could celebrate a victory that would stand as a 
bulwark against progressive educational agendas, the establishment of content standards, 
or attempts to desegregate Southern schools, particularly colleges and universities.   In 
addition, some of the most forward-thinking elements of the proposed bills were 
eliminated, including merit-based scholarships for higher education.  Such scholarships 
were rejected as granting too much authority to the federal government; instead, the Act’s 
Title II provided colleges and universities with 90 percent of necessary funds to 
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guarantee low-interest loans to under-resourced students.  Finally, the length of most 
programs was pared down to four years from a proposed six, as opponents of federal 
influence symbolically asserted that any governmental aid was a temporary measure. 
With these policy concessions, however, proponents of reform won passage of a major 
education bill.  Never before had the national government provided such considerable 
financial assistance to a variety of realms within the American education system, nor had 
it ever extended categorical aid—in this case, money for enhancing national security—to 
higher education.  When President Eisenhower signed the NDEA into law on September 
2, 1958, he authorized a mechanism that would provide a billion dollars in loans and 
grants to American teachers and students.
29
           
     On its face, then, the NDEA seems a rather revolutionary statute, one which used the 
energy of cold war anxiety to create a significantly different educational landscape.  A 
more sober analysis, however, may call this conclusion into question.  One might note 
that while occasioned by the launch of Sputnik, the NDEA was not really a drastic, 
reflexive policy reaction to Soviet space achievements; rather, the law may actually 
represent the logical culmination of more than a decade’s worth of legislative 
maneuvering and compromise, policy analysis, and expert discussion.
30
  After all, 
following the conclusion of World War II, both individual and institutional stakeholders 
from both private and academic sectors had pressed for the passage of comprehensive 
federal educational legislation, often with an eye toward higher education.  Some figures, 
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like Carnegie’s Vannevar Bush, demanded increased financial support for science and 
basic research in the name of international competition, a demand which helped create 
the National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1950.
31
  In the same vein, groups such as 
President Truman’s 1947 Commission on Higher Education proposed a national goal of 
having one-third of American men and women graduate from four-year colleges.
32
  
Similarly, though anxiety over the nation’s educational achievement was amplified in the 
wake of Sputnik’s success, it may be said that the satellite did not inaugurate this anxiety; 
indeed, all significant initiatives that would form the NDEA bill had been proposed 
separately prior to the Eighty-fifth Congress in 1958.   For legislators and educationists 
alike, concerns about shortfalls in mathematics and science, inconsistent and tepid 
progressive pedagogy, and the inability of American schoolchildren to preserve the 
nation’s intellectual hegemony all antedated the Sputnik launch.
33
  Finally, it might be 
contended that the bombast surrounding the passage of the NDEA—in terms of perceived 
threats both from the Soviet Union and from creeping federal control over education—
hid the degree to which the law followed the model of its predecessor in support of higher 
learning, the GI Bill.  Even the concern from the Soviet menace would not allow 
proponents of federal aid to higher education to overturn the long-standing tradition of 
local control.  Rather than attempting to create a permanent flow of funds to American 
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colleges in the name of social welfare, NDEA advocates assumed the approach of the GI 
Bill by arguing for aid as a national security imperative.  In this way, the NDEA—like its 
predecessor—permitted the deferral of complaints about federal aid without actually 
dethroning them.
34
  For a variety of government and collegiate constituencies, then, it 
could be argued that the passage of the NDEA in 1958 was not merely a sudden 
emergency measure, but rather the fulfillment of a protracted legislative campaign which 
built upon longstanding concerns and previous legislative techniques. 
     While both the legislative procedures and the policy roots of the NDEA may suggest 
that the law was, at bottom, the product of congressional “business as usual,” it would 
nonetheless be a mistake to downplay the fundamental importance of the law; to be sure, 
it carried fiscal, political, and symbolic importance that mark it as a significant episode in 
the nation’s educational, security, and cultural discourses.  Historians seeking to 
understand the implications of the Act in totality must look beyond the parliamentary 
horse-trading and legal ancestry that marked its origins and come to terms with the 
material results the NDEA produced, the policy options it framed, and—most crucially—
the political discussion it enlivened and sustained.  
     Often lost in the discussion of the process through which the NDEA came into being 
is consideration of what the law produced in terms of tangible consequences.  In the 
realm of undergraduate higher education, the NDEA’s Title II created the National 
Defense Student Loan (NDSL) Program, which represented the first federal effort at a 
type of merit-based financial aid, with “merit” being defined within the discourse of 
perceived cold war security needs.  The NDSL supplied low-interest loans to under-
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resourced students to open the doors of higher education, if the student wanted to enter 
the field of teaching—an area of supposed “manpower shortage”—or had demonstrated 
talent in the disciplines of science, mathematics, engineering, or modern world 
languages, all of which were deemed areas of American deficiency in its ongoing 
completion with the Soviet Union.
35
  Those students eligible for Title II support could 
receive up to $1,000 per year, and remained eligible for the program so long as they 
maintained good academic standing in their selected program.  At a time when the 
average annual college tuition cost around $1,500 for public schools and $2,000 for 
private ones—that is, 30 to 40 percent of the average household’s median income—the 
assistance offered by the NDSL was considerable.
36
  In fact, within two years of its 
creation, 40 percent of those utilizing NDSL funds came from families earning fewer 
than $4,000 per year, and five of every seven borrowers were from families earning 
$6,000 per year or less.
37
  For some capable students in need, then, the passage of the 
NDEA was relevant not chiefly as a national security measure, but as a bridge to a world 
of academic exploration that otherwise would have remained inaccessible.  On an 
institutional level, the Act proved popular as well.  Schools were generally eager to 
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partner with the government’s program:  by 1963, over 1,500 institutions, approximately 
two-thirds of them private, were participating in the program, with NDSL Title II loans 
serving approximately 5 percent of these institutions’ students. Beyond accepting federal 
funds, schools also began to explore the viability of establishing their own loan programs 
on the model of the NDSL system.  The tangible successes of the NDEA in assisting 
individual students, encouraging institutional participation, and inspiring other loan 
programs can be seen in contrasting student borrowing immediately before and after the 
passage of the Act.  During the 1955-56 academic year, 83,000 students were loaned an 
aggregate of $13.5 million from all institutional sources, including private banks and the 
colleges themselves.  Immediately following the enactment of the Title II provisions, 
over 115,000 students borrowed roughly $55 million through the NDSL program alone.  
By 1962, NDSL loans were offered at about 700 schools which had previously refrained 
from any type of long-term student loans, while another 700 schools—who had 
previously made long-term loans available—were now more likely to offer an even 
broader array of financing options.
38
  Though born of national security concerns, the 
NDEA’s Title II was also, however insufficiently and unintentionally, an instrument of 
educational egalitarianism, as it supported previously neglected students in their college 
aspirations, and encouraged the colleges themselves to do likewise.          
     Where perceived policy influence is concerned, the GI Bill has traditionally been the 
cause célèbre of historians of twentieth century education, who have rightly observed the 
utility to which veterans put federal funds and the effects that the Bill had on both college 
enrollment and the academy’s conception of itself.  Compensating veterans for their 
service, however, was a necessarily limited policy venture, one that framed its purpose in 
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specific economic terms—returning soldiers could ostensibly use a college education 
chiefly to find a profitable place in the American economy—and thus supported 
individual students with tuition and fee vouchers, rather than extend direct funds to 
postsecondary institutions.
39
  The popularity of the GI Bill itself was not enough to 
catalyze additional legislative commitment.  In terms of financial support for civilian 
students, specific disciplines, and higher education as an institution, the federal 
government maintained its traditional reticence in the decade after World War II; 
moreover, the financial support it did grant was episodic and parochial.  As Robert 
Rosenzweig noted, even organizations such as the nascent NSF tended to allocate its 
funds to professors and graduate students at a narrow band of schools: 
Prior to Sputnik, the federal government had no educational policy worthy of the 
name. Post-war support of scientific research was focused on universities and 
included funding for research facilities and graduate fellowships in the sciences. 
The government had little interest in higher education outside of the research 
universities and Land Grant colleges, and its interest in research universities was 
limited to the handful that were major research performers.
40
 
The NDEA did not create wholesale reform of the national government’s pecuniary 
relationship to colleges and universities, but it did catalyze unparalleled government 
investment in American higher education and thus inaugurated the search for a federal 
policy “worthy of the name.”  Even in the wake of the improved higher educational 
access occasioned by the GI Bill, college attendance for non-veterans at mid-century was 
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largely governed by financial circumstance, as loan programs were often private, local 
affairs, and decidedly limited both in terms of funding and availability.  The NDSL 
program, however, helped broaden acceptance of student loans as a method of financing 
postsecondary schooling to improve higher education access for those in need.  This 
acceptance, in turn, increased the popularity of financial aid “packages” among 
individual schools, and offered a model for subsequent federal student loan and aid 
programs. More broadly, the NDEA’s attempt at financing specific academic initiatives 
and security needs—as opposed to the GI Bill’s rewarding the commitment of veterans—
not only encouraged the development of new scientific research, but also provided a 
rhetorical device through which higher education advocates could attempt to normalize 
the federal government-higher education association.  Though it neither dispelled the 
long-standing opposition to federal aid nor created permanent assistance to higher 
education, the NDEA did create political space and legal precedent for expanded federal 
policy actions, such as the Elementary and Secondary Education Act and the Higher 
Education Act, both passed in 1965.  In creating a firmer relationship between federal 
dollars and the American university, then, the NDEA played a crucial role in the 
development of federal educational policy, perhaps the most significant role since the one 
played by the Morrill Acts of 1862 and 1890.
41
   
     Finally, the NDEA revealed the continued potency of a highly charged manner of 
political discussion and exchange, particularly within conversations about higher 
education.   Debate over the law did not, of course, create cold war rhetoric; indeed, the 
language of Manichean moralizing that characterized so much of the era’s political 
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conversation borrowed heavily from the “democratic good v. fascist evil” that had 
animated the American World War II effort, and was updated to accommodate both a 
changed enemy and changed conditions.  While wariness of the Soviet Union can be 
traced to the first “Red Scare” in the wake of the Russian Revolution, true cold war 
discourse began in earnest in 1947, as the Truman Doctrine, George Kennan’s “X 
Article,” and the Marshall Plan announced the foreign policy imperative of 
“containment,” and thus effectively placed the United States in a state of perpetual (if 
rhetorical) war against the Communist enemy.  While technically at peace with the Soviet 
Union, the perceived existential threat it presented helped reinforce a manner of political 
talk—and, in turn, of thought—that sought to delegitimize anything that suggested a 
restriction on freedom or “American” values, that denied the possibility of compromise 
or diplomacy, that showed particular disdain for apostasy or dissension, and which 
couched ideological and practical disputes into an idiom of warfare.
42
  Subsequent events, 
both foreign and domestic, did little to inhibit this disposition of talk and practice.  If 
anything, the Communist threat seemed to burgeon into the 1950’s, with the “loss” of 
China to Maoism and the Korean conflict abroad, and the trial of alleged spies Julius and 
Ethel Rosenberg along with general suspicion of Soviet agents and sympathizers 
infiltrating  crucial governmental, academic, and cultural institutions at home.  The 
American response, which included NSC-68 (the National Security Council document 
which called for a peacetime military buildup in the name of containing global 
communism) and the expansion of the “Un-American” activity witch-hunting, 
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accelerated both the availability and the energy of cold war rhetoric within foreign and 
domestic policy debates.
43
   
     It is entirely conceivable that the Soviet threat described during this “Second Red 
Scare” by George Kennan, Paul Nitze, Joseph McCarthy and others was indeed insidious, 
and menaced American interests both distant and familiar.
44
 In terms of political practice, 
however, the actual veracity of the Communist danger was in many ways beside the 
point, for the force of the prevailing discourse made the absence of a Soviet threat 
unimaginable to the majority of policymakers and citizens alike.  Put another way, cold 
war rhetoric had become its own political reality, and American status simply could not 
be assessed absent a comparison with and a resistance to the Soviet Union.  As a 
consequence, the anti-Soviet trope pervaded the policy talk and practice of laws and 




     This tendency could be seen in the passage of the NDEA, the debate over which gave 
both advocates and opponents ample opportunity to flex their respective rhetorical 
muscles.  Absent the perceived national security imperative created by Sputnik, certainly, 
the bill put together by Hill, Elliott, and others  would not have been signed into law; 
indeed, the persistent marshaling of the language of crisis by reformers testifies to the 
power such verbiage brought to the legislative effort.  The House committee report on the 
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NDEA, in a typical example, urged passage of the bill in almost apocalyptic terms: 
“America is confronted with a serious and continuing challenge in many fields,” it 
cautioned, and noted that the challenge “stems from the forces of totalitarianism.”  In 
response, the report continued, “American education, therefore, bears a grave 
responsibility in our times,” and thus concluded “that America’s progress in many fields 
of endeavor in the years ahead—in fact, the very survival of our free country—may 
depend in large part upon the education we provide for our young people now.”
46
  It was, 
in part, on the wings of such weighty pronouncements that the NDEA ultimately 
ascended to the status of law. 
     The passage of the NDEA was a singular achievement for the Eighty-fifth Congress in 
a number of ways.  While it did not initiate the relationship between the federal 
government and higher education, the law dramatically altered this relationship in terms 
both tangible and recognizable.  Where once Washington provided aid in remuneration 
for service, or extended occasional grants to a select few research institutions, the NDEA 
now deepened the government’s material commitment to higher education through the 
extension of millions of dollars in merit-based, low-interest loans to “worthy” students.  
In the same vein, the law was a welcome sign to institutions of higher learning, many of 
which were contending with the challenges of an expanding appetite for their services.  It 
was hoped that the NDEA would not only permit stronger students to find their way to 
campus, but also allow the schools themselves to both restructure their own aid policies 
and to transform what had been a scattershot association with the Congress into 
something more consistent and durable.  In addition, the passage of the law provided a 
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symbolic step in further legitimating in the public mind the role that Washington could 
potentially play in assisting and shaping education in the United States, including its 
colleges and universities.  For all its successes, however, the NDEA was very much a 
compromised product, both in terms of its content and the manner in which the bill 
became law.   To give urgency to their legislation, of course, the authors and supporters 
of the NDEA had skillfully positioned the bill as part of the zero-sum game of the cold 
war:  failure to deliver the bill would mean an unacceptable victory for the Communist 
enemy.   In deploying such rhetoric, however, the supporters of education reform had 
made their political argument chiefly one about military defense, not education itself.  By 
setting these terms of debate, advocates of the NDEA were able to guide their bill 
through a contentious legislative process; at the same time, however, these terms made 
the law subject to concerns traditionally associated with national security.  Passage of the 
bill may have ultimately required loud proclamation of its instrumental necessity to 
defending the American way of life, but this proclamation, like so much anti-Communist 
rhetoric, would create unintended and, perhaps, undesirable consequences.
47
  In this 
instance, lawmakers (whose use of the lexicon of anti-Communism was, if anything, 
more aggressive than that of the NDEA champions) moved to incorporate security 
provision into the final draft of the bill.  The provision, Title X, introduced a loyalty oath 
and disclaimer affidavit for students receiving Title II funds.  It was this provision which 
would inextricably bind the law to the political rhetoric and discourse of the cold war, 
and set the stage for conflict between the federal government and certain institutions of 
higher education. 
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     This context for this conflict will be established in Chapter 2, which explores the state 
of American political and cultural discourse in the early cold war period, and the effects 
of that discourse on both the NDEA and the practice of higher education in the United 
States in the middle of the twentieth century.  Chapter 3 examines the degree to which 
popular and academic interpretations of “higher education” were fixated on the 
experiences of prestigious national and flagship research universities, and which thus left 
unexplored significant activity on other campuses, including those of residential liberal 
arts colleges.  Chapter 4 details how two such colleges, Swarthmore and Haverford, 
developed their institutional histories, values, and identities, from their nineteenth-
century roots through the end of World War II.  Chapter 5 reviews how these cultural 
qualities inspired the two schools lead resistance to the NDEA’s disclaimer affidavit, a 
cold war loyalty measure which violated the senses of mission and community at both 
colleges.  Chapter 6 describes how both schools operationalized this resistance on both a 
local and national scale, through conversation and collaboration within their campus 
communities, and by way of outreach campaigns to awaken latent support for the 
resistance movement in both educational and political institutions.  The efforts of 
Swarthmore and Haverford eventually catalyzed congressional action, which is illustrated 
in Chapter 7.  Chapter 8 tells both of the disclaimer affidavit’s nullification, and of the 
respective methods Swarthmore and Haverford employed to ratify participation in the 
redefined NDEA program.  Finally, Chapter 9 offers reflections upon what lessons the 
NDEA controversy might provide as we consider the place and purpose of the residential 




Chapter 2:  Cold War Consensus—Loyalty, Conformity, and Acceptance  
    On August 13, 1958, the Senate debated the proposed NDEA in a lengthy session that 
would last more than fourteen hours.  In the course of previous discussion, lawmakers 
had determined that the bill, which ultimately represented an attempt to bolster the 
American defense effort, would be subject to security provisions appropriate to such an 
endeavor; as a consequence, those students who would receive fellowships under what 
would become the Act’s Title IV were required both to sign an oath affirming their 
loyalty to the United States and file a disclaimer affidavit that they did not support 
organizations that would favor  or instruct the overthrow of the United States by anti-
constitutional methods.  During the August 13 marathon, Senator Karl Mundt, a 
Republican from South Dakota, proposed an amendment that would extend the loyalty 
and disclaimer requirements not only to graduate students—who had previously been 
subject to such oaths when taking direct aid from federal agencies—but also to 
undergraduates who would receive low-interest loans under Title II.  Such a security 
commitment, Mundt suggested, was “in line with good American practice,” and would 
serve as a guarantor that qualifying students “shall be good Americans and not involved 
in Communist or other subversive organizations.”
48
  Under Mundt’s proposal, the NDEA 
was furnished with its Title X, Section 1001 (f):   
 No part of any funds appropriated or otherwise made available for expenditure 
under authority of this Act shall be used to make payments or loans to any 
individual unless such individual (1) has executed and filed with the 
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Commissioner an affidavit that he does not believe in, and is not a member of and 
does not support any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the 
United States Government by force or violence or by any illegal or 
unconstitutional methods, and (2) has taken and subscribed to an oath or 
affirmation in the following form: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will bear 
true faith and allegiance to the United States of America and will support and 




Mundt’s amendment was passed without objection.  The entire bill was accepted shortly 
before midnight by a roll call vote of sixty-two to twenty-six, and handed over to the 
House for final approval.  While other elements of the Senate-approved bill were 
debated, no congressperson challenged the new security provisions.
50
  This lack of 
dissent was unsurprising, both for political and cultural reasons.  Those championing the 
bill saw its passage in the summer of 1958 as crucial, as the anxiety surrounding Sputnik 
had given them a long-sought opportunity, one which might not return in the near future.  
As a consequence, any lawmakers who might have had objections to the loyalty 
provisions viewed them as a necessary part of doing legislative business.
51
  Perhaps more 
significantly, there was nothing particularly abnormal about Mundt’s interest in 
galvanizing the loyalty provision within the NDEA; indeed, while anxiety about Sputnik 
may have opened the door for more substantial federal aid to education, government and 
popular demands for loyalty demonstration antedated the satellite’s launch by over a 
decade.    
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     Fear of “subversives” in American politics, education, and culture emerged 
immediately after the conclusion of World War II, as part of the shift from a “hot war” 
against the Axis powers to a cold one against the Soviet bloc.  This fear was fueled by 
several interrelated factors, including deterioration in American-Soviet post-war 
relations, perceptions of increasingly “hard-line” Communist posturing, massive 
economic inflation and subsequent labor strikes in 1946, and attempts by some domestic 
conservative elements within the FBI, Catholic Church, and Republican Party to 
challenge the anti-Communist bona fides of President Harry Truman.
52
  In 1947, Truman 
responded in part by issuing Executive Order 9835, which established the nation’s first 
general loyalty program.  Designed both to mute the criticism of national security 
conservatives and to root Communists out of government, the program screened all 
federal employees for indications of pro-Communist leanings or activities.  The Truman 
order did not only help legitimate the idea of political tests as a condition of employment; 
in addition, it established at the federal level a loyalty-security model that could be 
emulated both by lower levels of government and also by private businesses.  Soon after 
Order 9835, a variety of institutions, from Hollywood studios and local school systems to 
newspapers and universities, had established mechanisms to preclude Communists and 
their sympathizers from “destabilizing” their organizations. By the time the NDEA had 
been signed into law, in fact, one in five American employees was subject to some sort of 
loyalty-security review.
53
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     Within academe, use of the loyalty oath and disclaimer affidavit control apparatus 
appeared as early as 1949, at the University of California’s flagship institution at 
Berkeley.  Here, it was not the government but the Board of Regents who demanded that 
all University employees not only affirm loyalty to the state constitution, but also deny 
membership or belief in organizations advocating overthrow of the United States 
government. The matter prompted a firestorm of debate about academic tenure, self-
governance, employment criteria, and the necessity of national security, all of which 
turned the University system into a battlefield of cold war concerns. The issue was 
ultimately resolved through a compromise between the Board and faculty, but not before 
over thirty faculty members and a number of other University employees had been 
dismissed for refusing to participate in the loyalty program.  In the summer of 1950, 
thirty-one "non-signer" professors—including internationally distinguished scholars, not 
one of whom had been charged of professional unfitness or personal disloyalty—and 
many other University employees were dismissed. In 1952, the California Supreme Court 
struck down the loyalty oath and ordered the reinstatement of the fired professors, but 
controversy persisted.  Those who had resisted the oath on campus were far from 
vindicated by the court ruling, as many non-signers, university administrators, Regents, 
and California residents saw both the judicial decision and its beneficiaries as deleterious 
to the national security cause.
54
 
     At about the same time, the federal government demonstrated its own willingness to 
demand the loyalty of those within higher education.  Urged on by Vannevar Bush and 
other supporters of post-World War II science research, Harry Truman created the 
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National Science Foundation (NSF) in 1950, for the principal purpose of promoting 
science research, especially that which would aid in national defense.  Any applicants for 
federal grant money, however, had to take an oath of loyalty to the United States, and file 
a disclaimer affidavit similar to the one that had roiled the University of California 
system.  Unlike the Berkeley program, however, the NSF oaths did not result in a 
widespread show of dissent. The government justified these security measures by noting 
that the NSF would award fellowships that regularly involved specialized research in the 
defense industry, and throughout most of the 1950s the measures went unchallenged by 
either researchers or lawmakers.
55
 
     It is notable that in neither the Berkeley case nor the creation of the NSF was there 
general public outcry against the use of oaths.  By the time the NDEA was passed into 
law, loyalty oaths and security tests had become de rigueur throughout the nation, and 
particularly in educational institutions.  At the end of the 1950s, in fact, nearly two-thirds 
of state governments demanded that its teachers proclaim their loyalty through some sort 
of oath or test.
56
  Over the course of a decade, the use of such security measures had 
become normalized. 
     It was not just prior use of loyalty oaths and disclaimer affidavits, however, that 
legitimated Mundt’s amendment to the NDEA.  For ten years before the law’s passage, 
other congressional activity had worked alongside loyalty tests to embed anti-Communist 
rhetoric and an all-encompassing concern with national security within mainstream 
political and cultural discourse.  Part of this activity included legislation.  The 1940 Smith 
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Act had criminalized advocating the violent subversion of the United States government, 
but as cold war concerns deepened, more laws were enacted both to root out Communists 
and to quell public anxiety.  In 1950, Congress passed the Internal Security (McCarran) 
Act.  This act established the Subversive Activities Control Board to investigate persons 
suspected of engaging in subversive activities, and also required all organizations and 
groups tangentially related to Communism to register with the attorney general.  Four 
years later, with most Americans still persuaded that subversives were undermining their 
country, Congress established the Communist Control Act, which outlawed the 
Communist Party in the United States, and thus criminalized all membership in or 
support for the Party. 
     These acts of Congress gave momentum to—or perhaps simply tried to keep pace 
with—a consensus anti-Communism that Truman’s loyalty program had not quelled, but 
rather reaffirmed and galvanized.  The 1947 decision of the federal government to 
involve itself in such tactics did not create the post-war Red Scare, of course, but it 
nonetheless leant plausibility to a phenomenon that would soon take on a life of its own.  
With a cue from the executive branch, a legion of government actors began to pursue 
more and more aggressive measures in the name of security, loyalty, and patriotism.  
Steadily and inexorably, anti-Communism was entrenched as the nation’s consensus and 
quasi-official ideology.
57
  It was not simply oaths and legislation but increasingly 
inquisitorial investigations and hearings that characterized this period, and these methods 
would target education—particularly higher education—in a manner that put the academy 
on the defensive for the better part of a decade. 
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     The attack upon higher education was propelled to prominence through a widespread 
attempt to investigate “un-American activities.”  The national model for such efforts was 
established by the Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) of the U.S. House.  
Created in the 1930s to investigate subversive individuals and organizations, HUAC had 
led the way in exploring Communist infiltration in the days immediately after World War 
II; indeed, HUAC truly came of age in the post-war era through a series of dramatic, 
high-profile investigations and hearings into potential Communist activities among, 
especially, liberal intellectuals and elites.  The committee’s coup de grace was the trial of 
Alger Hiss, a patrician New Dealer who had served in the upper echelons of Truman’s 
State Department until 1946.  While not convicted of espionage, Hiss was convicted of 
perjuring himself in front of HUAC, and was sentenced to five years in prison in early 
1950.  When set against a series of contemporary foreign policy anxieties—including the 
end of the American monopoly on atomic weaponry, the “loss” of China to Maoism, and 
Communist incursions on the Korean peninsula—the Hiss trial served multiple functions.   
It represented a symbolic victory against the Red menace that threatened American 
interests everywhere, granted popular legitimacy to the methods of the government 
investigators, and helped galvanize the liberal intellectual as an archetypal subversive 
within the constructs of anti-Communist rhetoric and practice.
58
   
     As the national un-American effort was realizing its coup in the prosecution of Hiss, 
the state of Washington attempted to achieve its own success by targeting an equal 
“suspicious” constituency—professors at the University of Washington.  In 1948, 
Republican Albert Canwell’s Un-American Activities Committee began investigations of 
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alleged subversive conspiracies at the state’s flagship university; in this effort, he had the 
support of university president Raymond Allen, who announced his agreement with the 
burgeoning anti-Communist consensus:   
The classroom has been called "the chapel of democracy." As the priests of the 
temple of education, members of the teaching profession have a sacred duty to 
remove from their ranks the false and robot prophets of Communism or of any 




Canwell’s investigation led the University of Washington to bring charges of subversion 
against six tenured professors, three of whom were ultimately dismissed by the 
university’s Board of Regents.
60
  Overall, the action taken against the Washington 
professors was an important step in further legitimating not only the investigations of 
anti-subversive groups, but also their targets:  left-leaning, intellectual “elites,” who were 
in ready supply on the nation’s college campuses.  The Washington case was the first 
significant clash between higher education’s construct of academic freedom and the 
discourse of consensus anti-Communism, a clash in which the latter was the clear victor.  
Like HUAC’s Hiss triumph, this victory is best understood not simply in terms of 
individual dismissals, but of propaganda.  The Washington inquiry made heroes of 
Canwell and Allen among the broadening constituency of cold war hawks, and stimulated 
a national concern regarding—and, increasingly, a national dismissal of—the fitness of 
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Communists to serve as college teachers in particular, and as American educators in 
general.
61
    
     The rhetorical position of Canwell and Allen was not supported only by politicians 
and college administrators; indeed, it was also echoed by practicing academics.  One of 
the clearest reverberations was offered during the crucial 1949 year, when noted Harvard 
historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. published The Vital Center, an apologia for liberal 
democracy that incorporated a robust anti-Communist argument and further legitimated 
the hawkish point of view among center-left intellectuals.  Though Schlesinger took pains 
to advocate for a moderate and pragmatic democratic liberalism, and was himself no 
witch-hunter, his idioms bore the stamp of the era’s obsession with internal security.  For 
example, while notionally defending the right of academics to dissent, for example, 
Schlesinger also mused that “[n]o university administration in its sense would knowingly 
hire a Communist, any more than they would knowingly hire an anti-Semite or a Nazi.”
62
  
Other precincts of the American academy were even less congenial to the prospect of 
dissension from within.  The same year that Schlesinger offered his remarks, the 
University of Pennsylvania’s Conyers Read cautioned his fellow professionals at the 
annual gathering of the American Historical Association that they were called upon “to 
fight an enemy whose value system is deliberately simplified in order to achieve quick 
decisions,” and concluded that the “liberal neutral attitude” would “no longer suffice….  
Total war, whether it be hot or cold, enlists everyone and calls upon everyone to assume 
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his part. The historian is no freer from this obligation than the physicist."
63
  By 
analogizing those with Communist sympathies to anti-Semitic fascists or by simply 
dismissing them as an aspect of a morally obtuse “enemy,” the cases of both Schlesinger 
and Read exemplify the readiness with which many academicians, however well-
meaning, were drafted into the binary worldview that informed cold war culture.
64
 
     Both the momentum and the targets of the various un-American activities 
investigations that prevailed in the late 1940s and early 1950s were, of course, captured, 
utilized, and ultimately extended by Senator Joseph McCarthy, the junior Republican 
senator from Wisconsin.  Shortly after the Hiss verdict, McCarthy made his notorious 
statement in Wheeling, West Virginia that he possessed the names of 205 Communists 
employed by the State Department.  With this flourish, McCarthy announced himself as 
the nation’s preeminent investigator of suspected subversives, a place he would hold until 
his censure by the Senate in 1954.
65
  Though his name has in many ways become 
synonymous with anti-Communism, it is important to distinguish McCarthy’s eponymous 
movement from the efforts that immediately preceded it.  The hunt for subversives in the 
post-war era was certainly normalized by the loyalty programs of Truman and the 
endeavors of various un-American activities committees, but McCarthy freighted this 
hunt with additional gravity by relentlessly couching national security concerns in terms 
of a traditional, almost Manichean moral worldview—subversives were not simply 
threats to be located, but evils to be eradicated.
66
  During McCarthy’s ascendancy, the 
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search for Communist influence in domestic spheres became more ardent through this 
language of “political demonology,” whereby the subversive threat was consistently 
embellished and dehumanized.  Under such conditions, the range of legitimate political 
opinion, already narrowed by mainstream anti-Communism, became even more 
constricted, and footing for discursive resistance became harder to find.  By reframing 
national security rhetoric in this fashion, McCarthy not only inflated both the significance 
and the immanence of the Red Menace, but also enabled a political context in which both 
the practices of genuine democratic debate and the institutions which supported them 
seemed progressively more like extravagances the American cold war effort could not 
afford.
67
        
     Under such conditions, concerns about potentially subversive actors within the 
academy were magnified.  Though McCarthy gained his notoriety chiefly in seeking 
Communists within the national government and armed forces, the mood of inquisition 
he championed was co-opted by those probing the nation’s colleges and universities.  In 
the early 1950s, congressional investigators and local politicians alike drew from the 
script authored by Canwell and Allen locally and enlarged upon by McCarthy nationally 
to take aim at campus infiltrators that threatened the American way of life with the 
godless immorality of Communism.  This furor generally took the form of congressional 
inquiries by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (SISS) in 1951, and the 
redoubtable HUAC in 1953.  Unsatisfied with the now commonplace hiring screens and 
loyalty oaths, these agencies held public hearings to identify which instructors had 
slipped past institutional safeguards and displayed pernicious sympathies that would 
mark them as deviants unfit for campus teaching.  As part of this activity, both SISS and 
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HUAC subpoenaed hundreds of college teachers both to face questioning and to identify 
Communist colleagues; this process would continue throughout the decade, five years 




     Perhaps the greatest testimony to the irresistibility of the anti-Communist discourse 
comes from the reaction of academe to the McCarthy-era investigations.  While their 
assailants rushed to portray colleges and universities as redoubts of leftism and 
subversion, their practices suggested that they were anything but; indeed, when faced 
with political investigation, the great majority of higher educational institutions 
demonstrated a greater interest in protecting their own reputation and financial viability 
according to terms set by cold war rhetoric than in defending individual faculty members 
and their right—both democratic and professional—to dissent.  Time and again, the 
academic system legitimized the methods of congressional investigators through its ready 
collaboration.  Outside of a fringe group of nonconformists, few faculty members 
actively challenged the eagerness of colleges to subject their employees to interrogation 
by the increasingly strident SISS and HUAC, to demand cooperation in unearthing 
subversive influences in their ranks, and to terminate the employment of scholars who 
were either associated with Communism or unwilling to provide information about 
Communist activity on campus.
69
  The degree to which the higher education 
establishment acquiesced to the norms of anti-Communist discourse, including its 
insidious McCarthy-era manifestation, was best revealed by a collective statement 
offered by thirty-seven university presidents in 1953.  After Rutgers University fired two 
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tenured professors for invoking the Fifth Amendment in front of SISS—though the 
subcommittee itself had cleared the two men—the presidents explained that traditional 
academic freedom also carried the “obligation of candor.”  Put another way, any 
professors called by congressional investigators had a professional duty to answer 
candidly, to “name names;” doing otherwise would stand as prima facie evidence that the 
teacher being questioned was suspect and unfit to teach.
70
  In short, neither college 
faculty nor their administrators in the 1950s demonstrated a resolute interest in 
challenging the assumptions of consensus anti-Communism, or even those of its more 
pernicious cousin, McCarthyism.  Faculty, who may have feared for their job security, 
supported the idea that Communists were a danger to the academy and the nation alike, or 
both, made little more than feeble efforts at resistance when their autonomy was 
imperiled by investigations; moreover,  those who did challenge the increasingly 
authoritarian mores of their institutions encountered professional hostility and financial 
threat.
 
Administrators, for their part, often chose patriotism and financial reward over 
intellectual independence.  In a time of heightened political tension and with an interest 
in research patronage from the federal government, the academic administrative 
community often surrendered the integrity of academic freedom and democratic 
process.
71
  And if administrators gave their assistance, either grudgingly or readily, to a 
climate of investigation and suspicion, their trustees and governors did little to disabuse 
them of the idea.  In seeking donations from alumni, boards found it advantageous to 
acclaim campus stability, convention, and patriotic unity.  Similarly, most major schools 
had direct links to corporations which provided grants to the institutions.  These 
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institutions were, in turn, encouraged to share the traditionalism of the business 
community, a goal easily articulated and met, as collegiate board members often held 
executive positions at the same companies giving money to the schools.  With these 
multiple pressures and incentives felt on every level of institutional participation, campus 
after campus capitulated to a popular mindset of distrust in an effort to accommodate 




     If the adults of colleges and universities did not distinguish themselves as opponents 
of anti-Communist and McCarthyite aggression, neither did the students in their charge; 
indeed, the inquisition of the American academy in the 1950s dovetailed with (and 
perhaps relied upon) a campus mood which when not politically apathetic tended toward 
a detached conservatism.  While post-war American historical narratives often explore 
the idea of college students as activist and engaged, such activity and engagement lay 
dormant during the first decade of the cold war.  On small private campuses and at large 
state universities alike, most full-time college students of the period showed little interest 
in challenging the political status quo, either locally or at a governmental level.  Rather 
than exploring rule changes at school or attempting to influence legislation in 
Washington, the great majority of student government groups spent most of their policy 
energies concentrating on social event planning and organizing sports activities.  When 
there were intramurals to run and dances to organize, policy issues related to civil 
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liberties, student rights, or free speech tended to fall by the wayside.
73
  Even issues of 
anti-Communism (or concerns about the tactics of the anti-Communists themselves) 
proved incapable of engaging student populations.  Although there were campus rallies in 
support of the Hungarian uprising against the Soviets in 1956, they were sporadic and 
short-lived.  Similarly, expressions of concern about the loyalty oaths and security tests 
increasingly required in national life in general, and academic life in particular, were 
muted; moreover, those who did raise such worries were almost always faculty or 
administrators, not the students themselves. Though student energy would become 
indispensable to the civil rights, feminist, anti-war, and counter-cultural movements of 
the next decade, by the end of the 1950s such enthusiasm was still latent.  It was an era of 
relative prosperity and deference to the cold war consensus, both in the society at large 
and on the campuses that society produced; accordingly, rather than see urgency in issues 
of civic responsibility, political freedom, and social justice, the great majority of 
American college students in the late 1950s seemed content with more leisurely pastimes.   
In a typical piece about undergraduate concerns at the time, Life ran a feature on the fad 
of discovering how many of their number could be stuffed into a standard telephone 
booth.
74
  With campus life governed largely by such social priorities, it is no surprise that 
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     Because of the bombast and archness of some cold war hawks, the broadened 
consensus regarding the necessity of increased national security measures, and the 
creation of so many government policies and activities to serve these purposes, at first 
blush the decades following World War II in the United States seem an era irretrievably 
hostile to individual conscience, expression, and difference.  It would be a mistake, of 
course, to imagine that any era in the nation’s history was neatly monolithic, devoid of 
countering voices, and run-through with blindly obeisant automatons in every corner of 
society; to be sure, the idea that anti-Communist discourse captured every American 
voice is overly facile and erroneous.  Such a description leaves little room for nuance, 
and ought to be resisted.
76
  During the Truman and Eisenhower years, the United States 
was not a totalitarian nightmare ripped from the pages of George Orwell.  While the anti-
Communist discourse and its particularly McCarthyist iteration provided dominant ways 
of political thought, talk, and practice, it did not render alternative conceptions 
impossible.  To be sure, the prevailing cold war rhetoric was increasingly organized and 
institutionalized, and thus routinized, during the first two decades after World War II; 
still, discursive dominance is seldom absolute, and counter-narratives tend to persist.77  
Such was the case during the 1950s, where pockets of non-conformity endured in variety 
of realms in American life.  This was an era where Beat poetry, rock ‘n roll music, and 
Abstract Expressionism offered new patterns of cultural witness; Edward R. Murrow and 
Arthur Miller spoke (both directly and metaphorically) against political demonology; 
Playboy magazine and the birth control pill interrogated traditional social mores; and 
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both the civil rights and labor movements organized and challenged a prevailing mindset 
which privileged traditional understandings of racial and corporate power.
78
   
     And yet initial intuitions—the ideas that this period was peculiarly antagonistic to 
those who would break from orthodoxy, especially where issues of anti-Communism 
were concerned—cannot be readily abandoned.  With its overweening concern with 
security (and the concomitant loyalty tests this concern demanded), the easy acquiescence 
of the academic mainstream to narrow cold war political norms, and the inefficacy and 
disinterest of campus actors in resisting the consensus point of view, the 1950s 
represented a nadir in the tradition of American political dissent.  Cold war conservatives 
were generally more adroit than their liberal counterparts in using anti-Communist 
verbiage and tactics, and thus may be charged with responsibility for the increasingly 
virulent tone of McCarthyism, but the concern with loyalty and security during the period 
was not the sole province of conservatives.  Truman’s loyalty program, though prompted 
by concerns over political attacks on his right, represented a crucial step in the 
normalization of anti-Communism, a step that was in time with the “consensus” view of 
cold war liberals like Arthur Schlesinger.  Intellectuals, traditionally the alienated critics 
of culture and politics, increasingly came to view American cold war imperatives as 
worthy projects, and thus lent their imprimatur (however tacitly) to the demands for 
conformity and acquiescence required by conventional political institutions and 
entrenched security interests.
79
  With support from both conservatives and liberals, from 
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politicians and academics, and from populists and elites, the mainstream anti-Communist 
discourse created a rhetorical tenor that gave its endorsement to coercive methods and 
severe policies rooted in fear of subversion.  Such a context gave succor to the champions 
of political conformity and authoritarianism, and alienated and imperiled those who 
would seek to enact legitimate democratic dissent.  Even with the repudiation of 
McCarthy in 1954, the allure of anti-Communism as a mindset persisted, and its 
concomitant assumptions about the desirability of loyalty, uniformity, and the necessary 
commitment of American institutions to national security endured.  The Army-McCarthy 
hearings which ultimately disgraced the senator only demonstrated that the virulence of 
later McCarthyism had transgressed the baseline of acceptable civility in American 
politics; they did not demonstrate popular determination to reappraise anti-Communism 
in more realistic terms.  While McCarthy ultimately passed from the scene, the residue of 
both his tactics and the aggressive anti-Communist agenda he galvanized continued to 
operate throughout the decade.  
     Under such conditions, then, the relative lack of opposition in 1958 to the NDEA Title 
X loyalty provisions was unsurprising.  The lack of demurral by Mundt’s colleague in the 
Senate was mirrored by the acquiescence of American colleges and universities.  Long 
denied steady government assistance, higher education in the main sought funds, not 
controversy, through NDEA and its Title II:  after the bill’s passage, over 1,300 schools 
applied for NDSL funds without registering formal opposition to the loyalty oath and 
disclaimer affidavit.  There were, however, a tiny handful of schools—almost all liberal 
arts institutions—who immediately recorded their discomfiture with tying educational 
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funds and institutional missions to cold war political tests.
80
  Most of the institutions who 
publically opposed the loyalty measures elected to apply for funds provisionally, while 
also formally lobbying for an appeal of the Title X provisions.  Three schools in 
Pennsylvania, however, declined to participate in the NDEA at all.  While the vast, vast 
majority of America colleges and universities either ignored the implications for free 
inquiry embedded in Title X or simply saw them as a legitimate tool of the cold war 
security apparatus, Swarthmore, Haverford, and Bryn Mawr Colleges resisted the strong 
financial and political incentives to join in the program.  In refusing participation, these 
Pennsylvania colleges enacted a vision of the very meaning of college education—one 
which yoked together academic freedom, institutional purpose, and democratic 
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Chapter 3:  Defending the Liberal Arts College  
    While it had become accustomed to aligning itself with the quasi-official ideology of 
anti-Communism in the 1950s, by decade’s end some elements of the American academy 
had rediscovered, however haltingly, an interest in dissent.  In the main, higher 
education’s accommodation of some McCarthy era goals and tactics, its uncertain 
defenses of concepts like institutional autonomy and academic freedom, and its desire for 
federal financial support had radically curtailed its capacity for assuming the position of 
institutional gadfly in debate over national goals and priorities; still, while cold war 
consensus may have muted the critical power of colleges and universities as a whole, 
segments of academia demonstrated an increased willingness to challenge, at least 
rhetorically, the nation’s anti-subversive and loyalty norms.  If colleges and universities 
did not shout their opposition to political tests and intrusive security measures as the 50s 
drew to a close, neither were they completely silent.   
     This increased, if tentative, willingness to push back against the assumptions of the 
national security state was revealed shortly after the passage of the NDEA.  Despite the 
general enthusiasm for the government’s willingness to deliver unprecedented resources 
to university campuses, Section 1001 (f) of Title X was not met with universal 
approbation in higher educational circles.  After the Act’s passage in late 1958, the 
loyalty oath and disclaimer were debated throughout the following year at dozens of 
schools from Oregon to Massachusetts. The debate was entered with some urgency, as 
most institutions understood that the NDEA was potentially the model and foundation for 
any subsequent governmental aid to education, and thus saw the Section 1001 (f) loyalty 
provisions as having dire implications for academic freedom on campus.  Under the 
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conditions of Titles II and X, institutions would provide one-tenth of the money for 
student tuition and would administer the disclaimer affidavit.  Beyond providing criminal 
penalties for a false statement on questions of belief or opinion, the disclaimer affidavit 
both threatened to turn schools into arms of the government responsible for enforcing 
normative cold war beliefs while also tacitly endorsing the idea that student and faculty 
members of the academic community merited suspicion.  Mindful of this, the faculty and 
administration at numerous institutions shook themselves from the slumber that had 
marked so much of academic politics during the decade and began to question the 
presuppositions of NDEA Title X and, perhaps, the entire cold war consensus. 
     Eventually, in 1962, the Mundt loyalty provisions would be stricken from the NDEA 
by a voice vote in the Senate.  By then, thirty-one colleges and universities had either 
withdrawn or never entered into participation in the Title II loan programs; in addition, 
some 147 schools, through their leadership and boards, had stated their formal 
disapproval of the disclaimer affidavit requirements.
82
  It is thus tempting to view the 
rejection of both the disclaimer affidavit and the anti-Communist ideology as mass 
cultural movements in which all participants were equally active.  One might also 
extrapolate that this movement was inevitable, which supposes that the end of the 1950s 
was the time when higher education as a whole was simply “due” to discover its voice.  
This voice, in turn, would find increasing expression in the tumult over civil rights, 
warfare, and lifestyle in the coming decade.   
     To adopt this viewpoint, however, both frames higher education as a monolith while 
also ignoring the difficulty involved in leading a community’s resistance to popular 
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policy, especially after a decade where that community’s most prominent voices were 
silent. While dozens of schools eventually deemed Section 1001 (f) an actionable threat 
to academic integrity, and though a handful of schools reversed their initial course of 
participation almost immediately, these developments should not obfuscate the reality 
that, for however brief a period of time, two small, private, Quaker liberal arts colleges 
on Philadelphia’s tony Main Line were at the vanguard of resistance to the prevailing 
cold war discourse and its associated loyalty-security policies. 
     Such a point may seem nugatory; after all, does it really matter if two boutique 
schools arrived at a position of opposition a few weeks or months before other 
institutions with greater prestige and higher profiles?  Contemporary media accounts 
suggest that it did not.  In covering opposition to the anti-subversion provision of the 
NDEA, The New York Times began its narrative in January 22, 1959 with the story of the 
formal protest by the three Philadelphia schools along with three liberal arts institutions 
(Bates, Bowdoin, and Colby) in Maine; the piece also noted that Swarthmore and 
Haverford had taken the additionally step of refusing to participate in the federal program 
at all.
83
  In related articles soon afterward, however, the paper gave little focus to the 
leadership position established by the Philadelphia schools, and instead emphasized the 
rhetorical role played by the presidents at more recognizable institutions.  On January 25, 
though their schools themselves had not yet withdrawn from the Title II program, the 
verbal protests of the presidents at Harvard, Yale, and Princeton were described at length; 
the activity of the Pennsylvania schools went unmentioned.
84
 Five days later, in 
describing the nascent campaign by legislators to eliminate the Mundt provisions, the 
                                                 
83
 New York Times, “Colleges Oppose U.S. Non-Red Oath,” January 22, 1959. 
84
 New York Times, “University Heads Hit Loyalty Oath,” January 25, 1959. 
52 
 
Times again downplayed the initial protest step and instead gave the Ivy schools the lead, 
at least in appearance, by stating that “[a] number of educators have criticized the oath 
requirement, among them the presidents of Yale, Harvard, and Princeton Universities and 
Bryn Mawr, Haverford, Swarthmore, Bates, Bowdoin, and Colby Colleges.”
85
  Harvard 
and Yale Universities formally withdrew from Title II on November 17, 1959, a full ten 
months after the Philadelphia schools; still, a month later the Times entrusted A. Whitney 
Griswold, Yale’s president, to explain to the larger public why loyalty affidavits were 
anathema to academic freedom.
86
  Around the same time, The Nation magazine explored 
the growing murmur against the Mundt amendment on college campuses—and an 
increasing unrested with an “oathism” that targeted higher education.  The piece did 
acknowledge that several “smaller liberal arts colleges” had taken the lead in the protest 
though only Swarthmore was mentioned, alongside Amherst and Oberlin, who had 
withdrawn after the Philadelphia school.  Nonetheless, the author also suggested that it 
was the refusal of Harvard and Yale to accept the funds they had been allocated that gave 
the protest real significance.
87
     
     The treatment of Swarthmore and Haverford by outlets of print journalism during 
1959 was almost certainly the result of the nation’s market-based approach to news; to be 
sure, though these two small schools were not unknown by print media which were 
largely eastern-based (and, perhaps, eastern-centric), they simply could not sell 
periodicals as effectively as “national” universities such as Harvard, Yale, and Princeton.  
In addition, it is difficult to quibble with awarding a rhetorical platform to the erudite 
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Whitney Griswold.  (The Main Line liberal arts presidents did include a Rhodes Scholar 
and one of the nation’s foremost academic experts on East Asia.)  Though these 
approaches can be legitimated on economic or credential grounds, they may also reveal 
something about the manner in which popular writers in the middle of the twentieth 
century viewed liberal arts colleges.  In relegating Swarthmore and Haverford to the 
margins of the NDEA resistance narrative, major media organizations like The New York 
Times and The Nation effectively mirrored a sensibility that contemporary analysts of 
higher education had developed, a sensibility which suggested that the “significant” 
institutional actors in American academe were almost always large public research and 
prestigious private universities. 
     By the time of the cold war, the United States had entered into a so-called “Golden 
Age” of higher education, an age which began roughly with the passage of the GI Bill 
and which would extend until 1970.  This period was marked by profound expansion in 
terms of student populations—the number of undergraduates and graduate students grew 
by 500 and 900 percent, respectively—the acceleration of public and private investment 
in research, and increased enthusiasm for the practical achievements such investment 
could realize, particularly in the realms of science and technology that could be used to 
wage the cold war.
88
  Though the collision between McCarthyism and academic freedom 
brought attention, as did the continuing cultural importance of college football, the most 
remarkable element of the cold war academy for writers in the national media was the 
expansion of the military-industrial complex to include university research.  The NDEA 
was part of a revolution in financial support of higher education in the post-World War II 
era, with support coming from public and private sources alike.  In particular, federal 
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funding for university-based research jumped from one hundred sixty-nine million dollars 
in 1955 to around two billion dollars in 1968, and these federal dollars fueled the growth 
of institutional prestige and faculty prominence at the nation’s signal research 
universities.  In such a context, both private schools with outsized faculty resources and 
traditions of research scholarship (Harvard, the University of Chicago, MIT, Johns 
Hopkins, etc) and large public universities with booming student populations and 
taxpayer-supported facilities were poised to claim the preponderance of federal largesse, 
private donations, and popular attention.  Outside of a good anti-Communist witch-hunt 
or a Rose Bowl-winning football team, it was participation in research useful to both the 
defense industry and the American consumer that conferred upon institutions of higher 
education popular and positive relevance.
89
   
     Not all commentators were smitten with the American academy, of course, no matter 
what Promethean promise it seemed to hold.  The hardiness of the anti-
Communist/McCarthyist discourse should not be underestimated, and throughout the cold 
war there remained strains of anti-intellectualism and anti-elitism that sought to frame the 
professoriate as alien, weak, impractical, aloof, and effete.
90
  This tendency 
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notwithstanding, the cold war concern for international competition and a growing faith 
in science and technology gave a prominence and seeming importance to campus activity 
than in previous generations, and media observers and analysts thought the story of 
academia in the middle of the twentieth century one worth telling.  In so doing, however, 
these scribes typically offered a tale of intersection between federal policy, student 
activity, and the campuses of public or “national” private universities.  Within this 
narrative arc, its authors left little room for the small liberal arts school as an important 
character. 
     Such journalistic framing was not unreasonable; indeed, in terms of enrollments, 
resources, and visibility, public and “national” private universities in the post-war context 
seemed to tell the story of the American academy.  Beginning with 1944’s GI Bill and 
through subsequent, unprecedented direct funding that facilitated student access and 
sponsored research in the middle part of the twentieth century, the federal government 
had committed to broadening both educational opportunities and knowledge applicable to 
the burgeoning military-industrial complex.  While some of this commitment was made 
manifest in the spectacular growth of community college enrollment during the period, 
most obvious changes were registered on the campuses of large universities, both private 
and public, which experienced heretofore unseen enrollment surges, campus expansion, 
and research funding.  Journalists readily told the tale of the returning GI whose presence 
was shaping the educational, political, and social discourse on campuses across the 
country.  Most of these hagiographic narratives of service rewarded and revolutionary 
social mobility were situated on the grounds of research universities, comprehensive state 
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schools, or prestigious university colleges.
91
  Harry Truman’s Commission on Higher 
Education reaffirmed the sensibility that university campuses told the story of the post-
World War II enrollment most fully and satisfactorily.  The so-called “Zook 
Commission” declared in 1946 that postsecondary institutions should refrain from the 
purported intellectual elitism that marked the traditional liberal arts college to undermine 
its “original aristocratic intent” and create a modern university system that would provide 
more general, practical education crucial to “the service of democracy.”
92
   
     It was not only in the areas of curriculum and enrollments, however, that the federal 
government encouraged the national media to view the liberal arts college as marginal.  
In making the American university its partner in the business of scientific research—the 
rise of so-called “Big Science”—the government helped assure that the large college 
campus would enjoy greater social and media prominence than ever before.
93
  While 
media outlets noted the apparently democratizing effects of the GI Bill and the 
ascendance of “Big Science” (and its attendant funding) on the nation’s large public 
research and prestigious private universities, they also described the small liberal arts 
school as an institution that increasingly recognized the necessity of altering its mission, 
lest it risk irrelevance; indeed, many journalists and social commentators went from 
paying the residential liberal arts college comparatively little mind to reporting on 
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anxious internal conversations within the institution.
94
  A 1963 admonition in the pages 
of Time typified the conventional reporting wisdom: 
The Displaced Pedagogue of U.S. education is the liberal arts college. Good high 
schools have improved so much in the last half dozen years that they turn out 
graduates who already know what they once would have learned as college 
freshmen. At the same time, many more college students go on to graduate 
schools—80% of all B.A.s at many a prestige campus—and they want specialized 
preparation for advanced work. The task of the liberal arts college, traditionally 
that of giving the common core of humane and scientific training that befits an 
educated man, is being undermined at both ends of the college time span….  
Colleges all over the country are now redefining themselves in ingenious ways to 
meet the new circumstances. Their problem in essence is to defend humanities 
and arts from the space-age trend toward scientific specialization.
95
 
     Whether getting caught up in “Golden Age” university triumphalism, taking their cue 
from obvious demographic and financial shifts, or simply assuming that large campuses 
were more likely to yield stories of interest to news consumers, the contemporary 
chroniclers of the post-war era generally did not make the small college a principal actor 
in their narratives of dynamism and progress in higher education.        
     To be sure, the purported marginality of the liberal arts college was not a phenomenon 
that had emerged solely from the pens and typewriters of journalists and opinion-makers 
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during the cold war; indeed, academics themselves had interrogated the utility, relevance, 
and viability of the small college for decades, as the rapidly modernizing, industrializing, 
and professionalizing United States sprinted into the twentieth century.  Small, often 
sectarian liberal arts colleges had stood as the paradigmatic higher educational 
institutions for almost 250 years, and by 1900 two-thirds of all students attending college 
were enrolled in such schools.  With the founding of the Johns Hopkins University in 
1876, however, the American version of the research university had been introduced, an 
introduction that would have significant consequences for the academic landscape.  A 
rival postsecondary option was made available, and this option—with its emphases on a 
more professional faculty, the creation of new knowledge, and the specialization of 
graduate study—appeared to many observers vibrant and exciting, and the liberal arts 
college moribund and amateurish by comparison.
96
  In an assessment typical of the 
period, the president of Stanford University, David Starr Jordan, in 1903 boldly predicted 
that “‘[a]s time goes on the college will disappear, in fact, if not in name.  The best will 
become universities, the others will return to their place as academies.’”
97
  While 
Jordan’s prognosis was decidedly overstated, he nonetheless offered an archetype of the 
sort of assessment that would become conventional wisdom among analysts and 
chroniclers of higher education in the twentieth century, a conventional wisdom which 
invariably shoehorned the liberal arts college into some form of declension narrative.
98
  
In the hands of various authors the nature and extent of the decline may have differed, but 
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few—whether mid-century or today—deviated from the idea that liberal arts colleges had 
become decadent, hypocritical, and/or unviable in the brave new world of the twentieth 
century.  As a consequence, the liberal arts college was not wholly ignored in either 
scholarly accounts, but neither has it been seen as an institution with anything truly 
meaningful to contribute to educational and social discourse.  For the lion’s share of the 
past century, the small liberal arts college has been read by a legion of professional 
academics as a social cipher at best, a misplaced dinosaur at worst. 
     This outlook began to gain especial momentum during the so-called “Golden Age” of 
academia during the quarter-century after World War II, particularly as leading scholars 
of higher education sought to define the twentieth century as the “Age of the University.”  
It was during this period that intellectual titans like Richard Hofstadter, Frederick 
Rudolph, and Laurence Veysey produced seminal works which would establish an 
enduring narrative regarding the comparative value of the liberal arts college.
99
 In these 
canonical texts, one can see the genesis of the conventional historical wisdom which 
proclaims the “Age of the University.” This period was drawn in contrast to the 
purportedly retrograde nineteenth-century intellectual landscape and its small colleges, 
which were seen as parochial and anti-academic.  Certainly, these writers did not blindly 
venerate all universities, nor did they cast a blanket condemnation on all small colleges.  
(The older schools of the Northeast, for example, tended to meet with their approval.)  
What they did help inaugurate, however, was a “darkness-to-light framework” that 
suggested the mores and practices of the nineteenth-century residential college were, at 
best, mere “foils to dramatize” the dynamism of the modern university and could  thus be 
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“dismissed as subjects for serious inquiry.”
100
  In this telling, the seventeenth, eighteenth,  
and early nineteenth centuries were the higher educational Dark Ages, and the institutions 
that dominated the period—the liberal arts colleges—mere anachronisms that had 
become hopelessly out of place in a dynamic era of educational modernity.  Such an 
approach employed the small private college not so much as a subject of scrutiny as an 
outmoded association disdained for its archaism—a buggy whip in an automotive culture, 
a geocentric model in a Copernican universe.  American higher education’s mid-century 
historiography thus tended to resemble “a morality play written in two acts,” with the 
backward and out-of-step liberal arts college finally being dragged off the stage with the 
turn of the twentieth century.
101
    
     The supposition of small liberal arts college obsolescence by scholars and observers 
was at least partially grounded in a sense that its traditional subject matter, and the 
mission that the subject matter purported to support, was hopelessly out of date.  By 
stubbornly insisting upon teaching the broad, foundational curriculum that had been 
defined by the “Yale Report of 1828” [my italics], liberal arts colleges hamstrung 
themselves by committing to studies incongruent with an era that required scientific 
research, technological development, and international competition.  For academics, this 
argument was best demonstrated in Laurence Veysey’s The Emergence of the American 
University.  Writing in the first half of the 1960s, Veysey built upon the “darkness-to-
light” metaphor Richard Hofstadter had inaugurated the decade before by tracing the 
ascent of the American university (and the concomitant decline of the small college) to 
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curricular changes in the half-century after the Civil War.  For Veysey, as colleges and 
universities began to break their ties to religious bodies and denominations in the late 
nineteenth century, embrace the secular principles of science, and adopt practices of 
research and academic freedom, they took an important step forward in redefining the 
purpose of higher education.  Ultimately, this purpose was expressed in tripartite terms 
under the ideals of “utility,” “research,” and “liberal culture,” which sought to emphasize 
practical professionalism, the creation of new knowledge, and virtuous humanism, 
respectively.  A fourth aim, that of “piety and discipline” and heretofore associated with 
collegiate institutional missions, was a relic of a previous age and inexorably perished 
during this period.
102
  Of the three ideas, liberal culture—the traditional bailiwick of 
small college curricula and teaching—was clearly the bête noire in the progressive idiom 
of modern higher education, for 
it could not survive at the center of the academic map.  It could flourish only on 
those campuses which possessed the traditions (or lack of resources) that enabled 
them to resist the clamor for the useful and the scientific.  Concretely, this meant 
Yale, Princeton, and a scattering of the more prominent and vigorous small 
colleges…  In a major university the advocate of liberal culture found himself 
protected to a certain extent by the prestige of the institution… [b]ut the small 
colleges lacked the buffer of security which could allow this kind of 
independence.
103
   
     While Veysey did not overtly disdain the educational project of the small college, he 
was adamant that its influence on higher education had been decidedly co-opted by the 
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new national universities.  Save for some of the “more prominent and vigorous small 
colleges,” the teaching of liberal culture now belonged to universities, where—
importantly—it stood third in line behind training for societal leadership and exploration 
of scientific research in terms of institutional priorities.  In this milieu, the vast majority 
of small colleges were being made redundant and irrelevant, and “the only course of 
action which [college boosters] could urge was to hold on, perhaps making minor 
concessions, and hope that their institutions would survive.”
104
  Historical revisionists in 
the decades following would eventually demonstrate that Veysey’s analysis had been a 
bit unfair to the small college, an institution which proved hardier, more dynamic, and 
socially responsive than he had assumed.
105
  Still, these voices of reinterpretation were 
challenged by thoughtful academic efforts which amplified and elaborated upon Veysey’s 
principal arguments in subsequent decades; indeed, later historians noted the manner in 
which research universities gobbled up government dollars to lead the educational 
vanguard against Soviet competition during the cold war, and also reaffirmed the notion 
that such schools demonstrated their utility by creating new scientific applications 
throughout the twentieth century.  By comparison, it seemed that the twentieth century 
had left the liberal arts college behind.  From the point of even latter-day historians, the 
liberal arts college had become the “luxury good” of the higher educational marketplace, 
an elitist terrain on which materialistic families would elect to run their status 
competitions.
106
  As The Emergence of the American University ensconced itself as 
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conventional academic wisdom, then, by and large scholarly writers acceded to Veysey’s 
assertion that higher education had been the purview of the modern university, not the 
outdated college, since the turn of the twentieth century.  From the orthodox academic 
viewpoint of university triumphalism, the best small liberal arts colleges could seemingly 
do in the middle of the twentieth century was hope that the historical forces driving 




      Having been built for half a century and cresting during the cold war, the 
conventional wisdom that liberal arts colleges were being locked into societal and 
educational irrelevance found favor with the preponderance of analysts and writers, both 
academic and popular alike.  In an era increasingly concerned with the modern, the 
measurable, and the competitive, it was the large public or prestigious national university 
that was poised to stand at center stage.  This tendency to describe and think about higher 
education during the cold war in shorthand terms, with those schools that enjoyed the 
lion’s share of federal funding, GI enrollment, and media attention serving as stand-ins 
for the American academy as a whole, pushed the small liberal arts college to the margins 
of scholarly and popular discussion.  Such an assumption, however, tends to make 
resource allocation the sine qua non of higher education, and thus ignores the degree to 
which multiple missions both existed and succeeded on American campuses during the 
cold war era.   
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     From the beginning of the twentieth century, the conventional wisdom of scholars and 
journalists had either tacitly or overtly described the liberal arts school as an intellectual 
wasteland out of step with the demands for curricular utility and knowledge creation in 
the “Age of the University;” similarly, most chroniclers and historians of the post-war era 
suggested that because few small colleges had sought and fewer still had acquired federal 
research dollars, such schools were locked into insignificance during the age of “Big 
Science.”  By the cold war, it appeared that the story of American higher education was 
marked by themes of expanded access, government funding, and research orientation, and 
that these themes were best investigated on the campuses and in the laboratories of large, 
comprehensive research universities, be they public or private.  But just as the “Age of 
the University” in the early 1900s did not ultimately obviate either the need or the 
demand for liberal arts colleges, neither did the research funding revolution force small 
colleges to abandon their institutional missions and simply establish themselves as 
boutique halfway-houses for the intellectually pedestrian and the socially privileged. 
Though the function of the small liberal arts college may have differed from that of its 
bigger, wider-ranging brethren, that function was not made extraneous by the arrival of 
“Big Science” and the cold war; rather, the traditional goals and mores of the liberal arts 
colleges remained useful to the nation’s enduring (if challenged) understandings of 
democracy, freedom, and citizenship. 
     This usefulness was maintained through an institutional dynamism that the prevailing 
historical and media narrative too often ignored.  Even in the early days of the “Age of 
the University,” the liberal arts college was resisting its identity as sectarian, paternalistic, 
and intellectually stultifying.  While some small schools did hold fast to old mores, 
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methods, and missions, other liberal arts colleges of the early twentieth were not calcified 
relics of a bygone era, but protean, resourceful institutions that reoriented themselves 
according to the needs of a modernizing society.  Rather than cling to old denominational 
ties and a rigid curriculum, small liberal arts schools like Swarthmore and Haverford 
broadened their appeal by embracing an ecumenical brand of their founding religious 
understandings, incorporating electives while retaining a focus on liberal undergraduate 
education, and forging social connections with wealthy benefactors who supported 
education of the “whole man” and the concept of a collegiate social life.  The historical 
consensus that framed all fin de siècle small colleges as playgrounds of an intellectually 
vapid “collegiate way,” as narrowly sectarian factories of retrograde moralism, or as 
academically limited sites of unprofessional teaching and profane vocationalism thus 
drew upon too narrow a reading of the institution; indeed, this reading missed the degree 
to which early twentieth century liberal arts colleges resisted the university model and its 
governing emphasis on research, and instead settled upon a hybrid mission that promoted 
both utility and liberal learning.  To be sure, the liberal arts college between the Civil and 
First World Wars was not an ideologically pure child of the antebellum model—to 
survive, it had accommodated some curricular moves toward professionalism, traded 
denominational identity for upper-middle class respectability, and emphasized its role as 
an arbiter of social distinction.
108
  At the same time, however, these colleges fiercely 
protected a core sensibility regarding the identity of the residential liberal arts college.  
Whatever accommodations it made to retain its relevance, the institution continued to 
insist that integrated educational experiences, intimate communities of scholars and 
learners, and the social value of residential arrangements were essential to the principles 
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of liberal education:  creative and critical thought, reflective wisdom, and the 
transmission of situated social and cultural norms.
109
  In failing to recognize this balance 
between institutional development and obeisance to traditional mission, those who 
framed the liberal arts college as either capitulating wholly to university norms or dying a 
dishonorable death at the turn of the twentieth century ignored the capacity of these 
schools to chart their own courses in specific social and cultural milieus.  From the 
beginnings of the “Age of the University,” liberal arts colleges could and did define 
themselves as more intellectually robust, more innovative, and more assertive institutions 
than the “darkness to light” scholars had imagined.   
     This capacity for intellectual growth, tinkering, and institutional advancement could 
also be seen during the mid-century years, when the GI Bill and the rise of “Big Science” 
seemed to guarantee the synonymy of “higher education” and “large university 
campuses.”  Contemporary media accounts, the Zook Commission, and subsequent 
historical analysis suggested that liberal arts colleges could offer little to returning 
servicemen, who had little patience either for learning’s intrinsic values or the rites and 
rituals (athletics, Greek social organizations, dormitory life) that informed the campus 
social scene.  Just as post-war “higher education” could not be described solely by the 
experiences of private universities like Harvard and Chicago, or flagship public 
institutions like Michigan and Berkeley, neither was the veteran fully explained by a 
narrative stressing a pragmatic and utilitarian outlook which could only be satisfied by 
the instrumental ethos of the modern university.  Though GI Joes found homes at large 
state universities, they also repaired to selective residential liberal arts colleges, as 
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veterans sought entry to the strongest institutions their academic records would permit.
110
  
These colleges, in turn, welcomed the new influx of adult students by tweaking their 
course offerings (in a replay of the turn-of-the-century gesture toward professionalism) 
and restructuring their facilities to accommodate their new, more mature enrollees.  This 
dialectic not only familiarized servicemen with the values and norms of the residential 
liberal arts college; it also made the residential liberal arts college a participant in a 
societal process of greater democratic inclusion and upward social mobility, participation 
which further troubled the conventional reading of these schools as anachronistic 
purveyors of a retrograde elitism and moralism. The adjustments realized by liberal arts 
colleges enabled their emergence as attractive options for veterans of World War II and 
the Korean War, and reaffirmed for administrators and trustees the importance of 
harmonizing their traditional intellectual and social missions with changing 
demographics.111   
     If the liberal arts college’s relationship with the GI Bill was misunderstood (or at least 
underexplored), so too was the school’s encounter with “Big Science.”  Just as small 
residential colleges brought in their share of veterans, these schools also benefited from 
the burgeoning research relationship between national government and higher education.  
While federal funding was undeniably salutary in educational, social, and financial terms 
at schools such as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Stanford, resource 
allocation did not tell the entire story of cold war learning.  The conventional discourse 
that privileged the place of “Big Science” on university campuses neglected the crucial 
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elements of liberal arts colleges—smaller classes, emphasis on teaching, opportunities for 
undergraduate research—that larger institutions could not replicate.
112
  Adherence to this 
mission of liberal undergraduate education allowed smaller schools to produce the type of 
students who later took advantage of the explosion in financing once they enrolled in 
graduate school.113  Though “Big Science” did not shape smaller colleges in the profound 
ways in which it marked the nation’s most prominent research universities, it nonetheless 
did encourage the type of robust intellectual preparation that the small-scale liberal arts 
college identity was positioned to encourage.     
     Participation in the GI Bill and “Big Science” was not the principal means through 
which the liberal arts college established its relevance within higher education during the 
cold war; rather, this participation illuminated the specific approach to postsecondary 
learning that these small residential schools deemed crucial to their institutional identity.  
Through the first half of the twentieth century, the liberal arts model had established and 
retained an important character as an arena of civic-mindedness, creative teaching, and 
normative conversation in an educational context that too often privileged specialization, 
scientism, and instrumentalism.  It may be suggested that the liberal arts college actually 
lacks coherence or has betrayed its mission because of its willingness to countenance a 
creeping professionalism in its curriculum.
114
  Such a contention is misleading, however, 
for while what is taught at an institution is certainly germane to its mission, those 
scholars who would describe liberal arts schools solely in terms of the courses offered 
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engage in a sort of curricular determinism that reduces such schools to sites of content 
delivery.  This reductive tendency would further suggest that the “liberal arts experience” 
could just as easily be achieved on the campus of a large research university if the 
curriculum did not abandon “the continuance of the liberal and humane tradition.”115  
Such outlooks ignore what distinguishes the small liberal arts college from its university 
brethren, both in historical and contemporary terms: a commitment to undergraduate 
teaching in an interconnected residential community.  While the course of study has been 
a crucial element of small college projects, especially in an age marked by the emergence 
of the research university, the particular practices and relationships found on campus 
cannot be decoupled from curriculum.  As one scholar has noted, the liberal arts college 
has always been, at bottom, a philosophy, one which has used the curriculum as a tool for 
building interpersonal associations, cultivating senses of social responsibility and 
leadership, and encouraging habits of mind and appropriately skeptical dispositions.
116
   
     These small schools, then, have been comprised not just of curricula to pass on 
“liberal learning,” but also of particular social dynamics, pedagogical practices, and 
philosophies of interaction.  They are structured not principally to attend to “utility” or to 
produce research, but instead retain a human scale to promote community involvement, 
conversation, and relationships; indeed, bringing students to live and work alongside 
faculty in a small, residential context encourages the “linkage of educational ends and 
means” and asks the student body to serve as curator of “the ongoing civic life of its 
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  Under such conditions, these institutions can define and defend a strong 
sense of educational purpose and vision that enjoys almost unanimous support among 
participants, be they students, faculty, or administration.
118
  In this way, the small liberal 
arts school seeks not to ape the norms of the large research university, but instead self-
consciously describes itself as a community of learning.
119
 
     This capacity for institutional self-description, to which all community members could 
make a contribution, was what truly made the liberal arts college, in the assignation of 
sociologist Burton Clark, “distinctive.”  At the same time that scholars were constructing 
the prevailing conventional wisdom about the primacy of the university in academic life, 
Clark asserted that the liberal arts college had retained (throughout the twentieth century 
and into the cold war era) an “impressive status in American society” and thereby 
remained “the romantic element in the educational system.”
120
 Where a generation of 
historians had tended to dismiss the liberal arts college as an outmoded, static idiom, 
Clark saw such schools as vibrant communities possessed of a “saga,” an enduring and 
endearing narrative that represented an internalized mission that linked serial generations 
of students and faculty alike.  For Clark, the saga offered “an educationally relevant 
definition of the difference” between a specific liberal arts school and all other learning 
communities, enhanced senses of institutional purpose, and created a sense of community 




                                                 
117
 Schuman, 51. 
118
 Ibid., 112-117. 
119
 Francis Oakley, Community of Learning:  The American College and the Liberal Arts Tradition (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 125. 
120 Burton E. Clark, The Distinctive College:  Antioch, Reed, and Swarthmore (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 
1970), 4. 
121
 Ibid., 256. 
71 
 
     The tendency to describe and think about higher education during the cold war in 
shorthand terms, with those schools that enjoyed the lion’s share of federal funding 
serving as stand-ins for the American academy as a whole, pushed the small liberal arts 
college to the margins of scholarly and popular discussion.  As we have seen, however, 
this assumption tends to make resource allocation the sine qua non of higher education, 
and thus ignores the degree to which multiple missions both existed and succeeded on 
American campuses during the cold war era.  From the beginning of the twentieth 
century, the conventional wisdom of scholars and journalists had either tacitly or overtly 
described the liberal arts school as an intellectual wasteland; similarly, most chroniclers 
and historians of the post-war era suggested that because few small colleges had sought 
and fewer still had acquired federal research dollars, such schools were locked into 
insignificance during the age of “Big Science.”  By the cold war, it appeared that the 
story of American higher education was marked by themes of expanded access, 
government funding, and research orientation, and that these themes were best 
investigated on the campuses and in the archives of large, comprehensive research 
universities, be they public or private.  But just as the “Age of the University” in the early 
decades of the twentieth century did not ultimately obviate either the need or the demand 
for liberal arts colleges, neither did the research funding revolution force small colleges 
to abandon their institutional missions and simply establish themselves as boutique 
halfway-houses for the intellectually pedestrian and the socially privileged. Though the 
function of the small liberal arts college may have differed from that of its bigger, wider-
ranging compatriots in higher education, this function was not made extraneous by the 
arrival of the GI Bill, “Big Science,” and the cold war; indeed, the abiding relevance of 
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the institution’s purpose finds demonstration in the story of the NDEA disclaimer 
affidavit.  The interplay between liberal arts colleges like Swarthmore and Haverford on 
the one hand,  and the discourse of McCarthyism that informed the NDEA on the other, 
articulates important historical suggestions: that notions of student freedom could be 
appreciated in significant terms on campuses dedicated principally to teaching 
undergraduates;  that a special sense of cultural purpose and historical memory—Clark’s 
“saga”—could inform and enable resistance to an anti-intellectual ethos; and that the 
discursive community of the small, intimate campus offers a site whereby collective 
discussion can most readily be translated into action in support of common purpose.  The 
established aims and norms of the liberal arts colleges were not rendered irrelevant to the 
nation’s appreciable (yet tested) conception of shared governance, liberty, and civic 
engagement during the cold war period; rather, these goals and mores retained profound 
utility, as the NDEA disclaimer affidavit controversy would illuminate. 
 
 






Chapter 4:  Swarthmore and Haverford—Senses of Place, Roots of Resistance  
     Understanding the potential influence available to the residential liberal arts college 
during the NDEA affidavit episode demands comprehension of the function, mission, and 
identity of such schools in general; appreciating the actions of those schools which did 
resist the disclaimer affidavit requires deeper consideration of the traditions, leadership, 
and cultural presence of those institutions in particular.  Today, Swarthmore and 
Haverford Colleges both sit as wealthy, highly selective, academically renowned jewels 
in the crown of American higher education.  In 2013, Swarthmore claimed an endowment 
of $1.6 billion, placed thirteenth on Forbes’ list of the nation’s finest colleges, ranked 
third on US News’ annual ranking of national liberal arts colleges, and admitted only 13 
percent of its applicants.
122
  Similarly, in 2012 Haverford enjoyed an endowment of 
nearly $400 million, and the following year placed forty-third on the Forbes list and ninth 
on the US News ballot, while admitting under one-quarter of those applicants who sought 
entry to the school.
123
  Over the past century, Swarthmore alumni have claimed more than 
30 Rhodes Scholarships, sixteen MacArthur “genius” grants, and five Nobel prizes, and 
nearly one in five alumni of graduating classes between 1995 and 2004 earned a 
doctorate.
124
  Haverford boasts four Nobel laureates and twenty Rhodes Scholars of its 
own, and nearly 10 percent of the graduating classes between 1988 and 1997 claimed 
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doctorates in science and engineering.
125
  In terms of financial resources, institutional 
reputation, and academic achievement, Swarthmore and Haverford have emerged as 
industry leaders, designer labels in the marketplace of American higher education.  They 
are internationally-known colleges whose talented student bodies, accomplished faculty, 
highly selective admissions rates, verdant Main Line campuses, and hefty endowments 
might suggest that their histories have been as grand and as protected as their present 
circumstances; the reality, however, is that this “brand name” status is comparatively new 
for both schools.  While the present-day Swarthmore and Haverford have assumed a 
place near the front of the line in almost all quantitative and qualitative assessments of 
American postsecondary institutions, in 1958 this place—and the political and financial 
security it entails—was far from guaranteed. 
     Both Swarthmore and Haverford were founded in the nineteenth century by Quakers 
who were uncomfortable with both the missions and practices of local Pennsylvania 
colleges and universities in the mid-eighteen hundreds.  Colleges such as Dickinson, 
Franklin & Marshall, and Gettysburg had been founded—some in the previous century—
to educate ministers and clergy of various other religions, and had gradually enlarged 
their missions to include the children of upper class society in their student bodies; 
Quakers, on the other hand, believed neither in proselytizing nor in ordained clerics, and 
thus lagged far behind other denominations in establishing colleges.  By the early part of 
the nineteenth century, however, Friends in rapidly transforming urban areas such as 
Baltimore, New York, and Philadelphia worried that both denominational and common 
                                                 
125
 “Haverford College at a Glance,” Haverford College, 
http://www.haverford.edu/abouthaverford/facts_and_statistics.php; Joan Burrelli, Alan Rapoport, Rolf 




schooling (hastened by immigration and industrialization) threatened the Quaker way of 
life.  Fearing the pressure to assimilate and concerned that their children would be 
educated by those outside their tradition, Quakers came to seek the establishment of 
schools to defend their particular customs.  These schools would include postsecondary 
institutions, which were deemed necessary both to train Quaker teachers for primary and 
secondary schools, and to offer more sophisticated learning for those Friends whose 
secular pursuits would require it.
126
  Swarthmore and Haverford, then, were born not out 
of an evangelistic fervor, but out of a tentative, uncertain disposition toward formal, 
institutionalized schooling.  By the nineteenth century, Quakers valued education for its 
instrumental uses, but also feared its capacity—particularly in higher education—to 
threaten the values and mores of their distinctive way of life.  Learning was to have 
utility in the modern world, but also had to be “guarded,” that is, it would protect students 
from the influences of broader society.  For many within the faith, this demanded that all 
Friends’ schools admit and employ Quakers, and Quakers alone.
127
  
      Complicating these halting steps towards formal embrace of higher education was the 
“civil war” roiling within Quaker ranks in the opening decades of the nineteenth century.  
In 1827, the “Great Separation” divided the American Friends, and the Society split into 
two competing groups, the Hicksites and the Orthodox.  This fissure was the result of 
theological, cultural and political disagreement between the more liberal Hicksites—who 
emphasized the authenticity of inward spirituality and, in suburban Philadelphia, were 
generally resentful of what they considered the hypocritical inaction and complacent 
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“nouveau riche” attitudes of Philadelphian Quaker leadership—and the Orthodox, who 
were wealthy urbanites interested in imposing the doctrinal authority of scripture on the 
American Friends.
128
  It was this divide which informed the founding of separate Quaker 
colleges on the outskirts of the city, with Haverford established as a secondary boarding 
school by Orthodox Friends in 1833 (and becoming a college in 1856), and Swarthmore 
created fewer than ten miles away by the Hicksites in 1864. 
     Unsurprisingly, the initial identity of both schools was shaped almost exclusively by 
the discourse of “guarded” education.  At Hicksite Swarthmore—named for the home of 
George Fox, the English founder of Quakerism—liberal arts and natural sciences were 
taught in a coeducational setting, but this commitment to equal intellectual opportunity 
seemed to be the sole concession to “progressive” modernity, as the school’s projects of 
moral development, behavioral standards, and appropriate dress all hewed to traditional 
Quaker teachings.  Weekly Friends Meetings were mandatory for Swarthmore students, 
and these meetings were shaped largely by the participation of the school’s faculty and 
administration.  Safeguarding this academic, moral, and cultural program was 
Swarthmore’s Board of Managers, which for the first four decades of the school’s 
existence was composed entirely of Friends.  In its early history, to be sure, Swarthmore 
was almost entirely “an agency of its parental religious body.”
 129
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     As the twentieth century approached, however, there were indications that 
Swarthmore could and would assimilate some of the influences of the wider culture.  The 
Hicksite Friends, who from the beginning had described themselves as more tolerant and 
open to religious questioning than their Orthodox counterparts, began to liberalize slowly 
in the years following 1870, and Swarthmore generally (if gradually) followed this 
pattern of doctrinal relaxation over the course of two decades.  On campus, both sports 
and fraternities arrived, restrictions on student conduct were relaxed, and an early “Joe 
College” mindset began to compete with traditional Friends’ values as the college had 
increasing difficulty attracting and retaining Hicksite students.  The faculty, for their part, 
showed greater interest in academic excellence for its own sake, not in the service of 
Quaker morality, and two-thirds of the junior and senior year curriculum was fully 
elective.  While conservative members of the Board of Managers continued to advocate a 
“guarded” education, by the end of the nineteenth century Swarthmore was a school 
being pushed by social and economic forces to reconsider the meaning of its Friends 
identity.
130
       
     This reconsideration was carried on in earnest both before and after the turn of the 
twentieth century; indeed, at Swarthmore the twenty-year period surrounding the arrival 
of the 1900s was particularly vibrant.  While the Board of Managers remained fully 
Hicksite until just prior to World War I, the school faced increasing difficulty in 
maintaining a rigorous Quaker presence in the school’s student profile and academic 
program.  The membership of the Hicksite Meeting in Philadelphia suffered huge 
denominational losses from the time of the “Great Separation” onward, and by 1900 its 
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population had dwindled by 40 percent; moreover, these remaining Hicksites were not as 
wealthy as their Orthodox counterparts.  As a consequence, the institutional tension 
between “guarded” education and modern liberal arts was exacerbated by financial 
constraints, and retaining a strong Quaker majority in faculty and student precincts 
became practically impossible.  Swarthmore alleviated this tension through continued 
adjustment of the identity that gave it distinction among colleges, with a step again 
toward academic modernity and a gradual relaxation in its embrace of a thoroughgoing 
Quaker culture on campus.  In order to keep enrollment strong and facilities updated, the 
Board of Managers placed less of an emphasis on attracting Hicksite students and 
successfully increased its efforts to attract moneyed elements in Philadelphia who saw 
college as a means to serve ends that were principally educational and social, rather than 
moral.  While this shift in focus reduced the number of Quaker students—by 1907, only 
one in three students was a Friend—it also provided both a more secure enrollment 
pattern and improved momentum for fundraising.  These changes at Swarthmore were in 
harmony with a general movement within Hicksite Quakerism to replace traditional 
insularity and simplicity with a dynamic approach to modern life, an approach which 
again sought to maintain denominational principles while reducing cultural defensiveness 
in encounters with all things secular. At the same time, Quakerism at Swarthmore was 
not abandoned, but instead channeled into emphases on service and dialogue.  By the 
second decade of the twentieth century, the school’s willingness to reconsider and revise 
its institutional aims had given it financial security, made it more appealing to wealthy 
families in Pennsylvania and beyond, and elevated the school’s national academic profile 
while retaining both its small class sizes and elements of the Friends ethos.
131
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     Swarthmore undertook further reconsideration and revision through the appointment 
of Frank Aydelotte, who began his ambitious twenty-year presidency in 1921.  Outgoing 
president Joseph Swain, charged with finding his successor, was determined to find an 
educational leader who continue Swarthmore’s emergence as a place of intellectual rigor.  
Swain thus selected as president a non-Quaker—a first for Swarthmore—who had made 
his reputation as an English professor at both Indiana University and the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, and Aydelotte immediately moved to continue the college’s 
more toward greater academic purpose.  While Swarthmore had expanded its institutional 
mission beyond “guarded” education in the fifty years since its founding, in 1922 
Aydelotte set off in an even bolder direction by reining in the emphasis on “Joe College” 
elements of Greek social life and intercollegiate athletics (especially “big-time” football) 
that had emerged with easing of a traditional Quaker presence on campus.  Rather than let 
Swarthmore’s academic gains stagnate and see the school become what one student 
termed an “educational country club,” Aydelotte reasserted the necessity of scholastic 
seriousness and intellectual independence at the school.  A Rhodes Scholar himself, 
Aydelotte gave even greater emphasis to intellectual and scholarly pursuits on campus 
through the implementation of a celebrated honors program patterned on the tutorial 
system at Oxford.  By devoting financial and faculty resources in this direction—and 
with the deep-pocketed support of the Rockefeller family’s General Education Board—
Aydelotte created a laboratory of Oxonian teaching and learning in suburban 
Philadelphia, and the school’s reputation as a home for the academic elite swelled 
through the two decades of his presidency.
132
  Where the school had originally 
distinguished itself principally through its Quaker identity, by 1940 Swarthmore had—
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under Aydelotte’s direction and initiative— become publicly recognized as a college that 
had been founded by local Friends, but was now home to intellectually gifted students 
from across the country.
133
   
     Many of the same elements expressed in Swarthmore’s saga could also be seen in the 
story of its collegiate neighbor, Haverford.  Like Swarthmore, Haverford was a school 
that, over time, would gradually shed its insular denominational understandings for a 
more capacious articulation of liberal arts higher education in a modern age.  Beginning 
life as “Haverford School,” a boarding program for boys ages twelve and up, Haverford’s 
educational philosophy initially emphasized a curriculum that was both traditional and 
humanistic, but delivered in “guarded” terms.  Even when a Pennsylvania State Charter 
transformed the school into Haverford College in 1856, the academic mission of the 
school’s leadership remained decidedly conservative, with the aim of providing to young 
men a higher education of liberal arts and a reaffirmation of Orthodox Quaker values.  
This required  a commitment to a single-sex environment, plain dress, daily study of 
scripture, prohibitions against student trips into “secular” Philadelphia, and the aggressive 
oversight of an all-Quaker, all-male Board of Managers.  All of these were integrated into 
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an attempt to bind Haverford men to the Orthodox branch of the Friends, and to prepare 
them to lead its distinctive society.
134
  
     As had been the case at Swarthmore, at Haverford “guarded” education was 
increasingly challenged by social and intellectual worldliness in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.  The 1856 decision to award baccalaureate degrees fueled a new 
scholarly ambition among students and faculty alike.  New living quarters were built 
which allowed the young men of Haverford to live “on their own”—away from the 
supervision of residential faculty—for the first time in the school’s history.  The language 
requirements for admission were relaxed (French and German were allowed, alongside 
the traditional Greek), and the liberal arts and natural sciences were given greater 
prominence in the required course of study.  Finally, the school’s orthodoxy was eased as 
the divide between Hicksite and Orthodox Friends diminished in the late nineteenth 
century.  Though still informed by Quaker principles, Haverford’s first fifty years 
revealed that it was not implacably opposed to assimilating certain influences from the 
broader intellectual and social world.
135
   
      Like its Main Line neighbor, Haverford found itself attempting to balance accelerated 
institutional development with Quaker tradition as the twentieth century approached.  Just 
as Swarthmore continued to reinterpret the meaning of a Friends liberal arts college 
during this period, so too did Haverford persist in readjusting its orientation to “guarded” 
education and Quaker orthodoxy.  This readjustment, which had gained momentum in the 
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decades after the 1856 decision to award baccalaureate degrees, found a stalwart ally in 
Isaac Sharpless, a mathematics professor and dean who assumed the presidency of 
Haverford in 1887.  Though he did not develop a signature program like Aydelotte’s 
honors curriculum, Sharpless presided over a period during which Haverford’s academic 
reputation burgeoned.  He prioritized the hiring of a first-rate faculty committed to 
teaching undergraduates in the spirit of liberal humanism,  and established a system of 
entrance examinations which both improved the academic quality of incoming classes 
and enhanced Haverford’s admissions selectivity.  While Sharpless did not go as far as 
Swarthmore in liberalizing curricular choice among students, the Haverford course of 
study was adjusted to allow for elective courses in the final two years of study.  Beyond 
these structural adjustments, the president also took some potentially risky steps to 
minimize the climate of partying and big-time football that threatened the character of 
small colleges seeking to remain intellectually relevant in the climate of scholarly 
seriousness and innovation that marked the “Age of the University.”  To this end, 
Sharpless expelled a number of wealthy yet under-motivated students, and—two decades 
before its neighbor, Swarthmore—refused to schedule football games against the era’s 
large private university teams. Finally, though there was a brief period in the 1890’s 
during which Haverford had a program for graduate students, Sharpless reemphasized the 
possibility of young people acquiring a valuable collegiate education on a small campus.  
In the emerging “Age of the University,” Sharpless helped Haverford consolidate its 
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     As with Swarthmore, these movements towards academic prominence were carried on 
within the context of Quaker tradition.  Haverford relaxed the pursuit of Orthodox 
Quakerism in both its curriculum and its campus practices prior to and during the 
Sharpless presidency, but this did not imply a complete capitulation to secular norms.  
The Board of Managers was composed exclusively of Friends, the weekly Quaker 
meeting remained a compulsory part of student life, and Sharpless himself was a 
committed Friend.  Sharpless’s interpretation of the central principles of his faith, 
however, drew him to emphasize the Quaker concept of the value of each individual, and 
it was this emphasis that informed the campus climate he helped Haverford students 
create during his tenure.  Having taken measures to improve the quality of the student 
body, Sharpless took the concomitant step of offering them greater responsibility for 
governing their own behavior.  After several years of student debate regarding self-
government, Haverford created an honor system for academic affairs in 1897, and elected 
its first president of the student body in 1901.
137
   Though Haverford was certainly not the 
first school to introduce these elements into its academic and cultural programming, their 
inclusion is illustrative of both the college’s fidelity to, and reinterpretation of, Friends’ 
precepts.  Having moved from the strictures of “guarded” education, Haverford’s Quaker 
tradition was preserved by Sharpless’ move to describe honor and student self-
governance as the natural emanations of an institutional emphasis on the value of 
individual conscience and communal moral responsibility.         
     By the end of Sharpless’ thirty-year term as president in 1917, Haverford stood as one 
the most prestigious colleges in the nation.  In both its academic reputation and its 
financial resources, the school scarcely resembled the institution Sharpless had taken over 
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in 1887.  The school’s endowment had increased tenfold, its enrollment had doubled 
while growing more selective in the admissions office, the physical plant had improved, 
and its faculty was staffed with first-rate professionals. In 1911, the federal government 
published an evaluation of the nation’s colleges and universities, and Haverford was 
recognized as one of the 59 placed into the most select category of schools.  The trends 
toward academic seriousness, financial stability, and refined Quaker practice that 
Sharpless either accelerated or developed during his tenure were maintained by 
subsequent school leadership as Haverford weathered two world wars and a Great 
Depression.  By mid-century, the school—like Swarthmore—had transcended its regional 
roots and strict denominational origins to become a Friends institution that enjoyed a 
prominent place in the world of modern higher education.
138
    
     It is important to recognize, of course, that Swarthmore and Haverford did not 
experience the same narratives from their respective geneses into the twentieth century.  
There are important differences between the two schools, differences which certainly 
informed their institutional missions and practices.  Swarthmore was founded as a college 
alone, took its institutional cue from Hicksite tendencies toward the primacy of practice 
over doctrine, embraced coeducation, had a dalliance with “big-time” intercollegiate 
sports, and modeled its signature academic program on intense Oxford-style tutorials.  
Haverford, conversely, began as a preparatory school, experimented with graduate 
education, remained strictly a men’s college, favored the more conservative Orthodox 
understanding of Quakerism, and ignored honors tracking in favor of general academic 
excellence for all Haverfordians.  While both were founded by Friends and occupied the 
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same geographic region, these two schools did not march in lockstep in their 
development from founding to the middle of the twentieth century.  On the eve of the 
NDEA disclaimer affidavit episode, Swarthmore and Haverford were not the same 
college.   
     That said, the similarities between both the journeys made and the destinations 
reached in the school’s institutional sagas are instructive.  Within decades of being 
established, both Swarthmore and Haverford had demonstrated a willingness to reconcile 
their denominational educational purposes with shifting understandings regarding the 
aims of higher education as the “Age of the University” burgeoned.  Initially expressed 
through incremental acceptance of curricular innovation and social elements of the wider 
culture, these institutional interests in harmonizing academic modernity, economic 
reality, and traditional mission continued apace as the schools moved into the twentieth 
century.  As a consequence, both schools were able to move from their origins as citadels 
of “guarded” Quaker education, negotiate a pathway between an emphasis on graduate 
research on the one hand and “Joe College” sociability on the other, and emerge as 
schools of serious intellectual and moral contemplation with student bodies, faculty, and 
national reputations to match.  Within this largely shared story of advancement, a handful 
of themes common to both schools warrant further exploration. 
     First, the manner in which both schools managed the possible tension between Quaker 
tradition and secular progress was notable.  The notion that the increasing emphasis on 
science and research around the turn of the twentieth century led to irresistible 
secularization within American higher education, particularly in its flagship universities 
and prestigious private schools often attends the “Age of the University” trope prevalent 
86 
 
in contemporary historiography.  This thesis generally asserts that the Christian leaders of 
higher education ceded influence in curriculum and on campus in the name of 
educational modernity, with instruction in the humanities and social sciences being 
counted on to supply encounters with the moral and religious ideals which once animated 
institutional missions.
139
  It is tempting to read the development of Swarthmore and 
Haverford in such terms, and certainly such an interpretation captures a great deal of 
these schools’ stories:  both schools were far more ecumenical in the twentieth century 
than they were in the nineteenth, had embraced a liberal curriculum that was increasingly 
elective and decoupled from scriptural reinforcement, and gradually articulated identities 
predicated on academic excellence rather than Quaker affiliation.  What must not be lost, 
however, is the degree to which the discourse and practice of Friends tradition continued 
to inhere on both campuses throughout the first half of the twentieth century.  While the 
presence of Quaker students diminished and the faculty found its principal function in 
cultivating intellectual dispositions, the influence of the founding religion could be seen 
in the leadership, organization, and publications of the two schools. At Swarthmore, for 
example, the Board of Managers would remain exclusively Quaker until 1938, and of all 
the school’s presidents from its founding through 1969, only one—Frank Aydelotte—
was not a Friend.  (Aydelotte would later join the Society after leaving Swarthmore.) 
Additionally, throughout the century decisions of governance continued to be made 
within the Quaker tradition of consensus embraced by Swarthmore’s founders.  On 
campus, the Quaker meeting—while optional—claimed considerable cultural space for 
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students and faculty of the “modern age,” and until 1952 the college calendar followed 
the Quaker tradition of refusing to call the days of the week and months of the year 
names derived from “heathen” Norse and Roman gods.  (Friends custom instead assigned 
numbers to days and months:  Wednesday was Fourth Day, June was Sixth Month, and 
so forth.)  Finally, even with the enthusiasm associated with Aydelotte’s honors program 
and its implication of primacy of secular learning, the Quaker emphasis on the 
importance of the individual conscience and the significance of hearing all sides of an 
argument continued to abide.  This, in turn, provided a campus dialectic between 
community and non-conformity that enriched the intellectual and social climate for its 
students by reinforcing the necessity of open inquiry.  This commitment, long the aim of 
non-sectarian academic projects, was qualitatively enhanced by the Quaker spirit that 
informed Swarthmore’s residential learning experience.
140
  Though by the twentieth 
century the place of Quakerism was not as prominent as in the days of Hicksite 
“guarded” education, it retained a significant role in campus life throughout the twentieth 
century, and even into the present day, as Swarthmore’s course catalog indicates:  
[Swarthmore] still values highly many of the principles of [the Friends].  
Foremost among these principles is the individual’s responsibility for seeking and 
applying truth and for testing whatever truth one believes one has found….  The 
College does not seek to impose on its students this Quaker view of life or any 
other specific set of convictions about the nature of things and the duties of 
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human beings. It does, however, encourage ethical and religious concern about 




     The stamp of Quakerism was, if anything, more indelible at Haverford.  Like 
Swarthmore, the school was committed to a strong Friends presence in the ranks of its 
leadership; indeed, the college maintained an entirely Quaker board until 1930, and 
would not have a non-Friend president until 1967, with the inauguration of John 
Coleman.  (Later, Coleman would himself join the Society of Friends.)  Also, Haverford 
employed consensus decision processes in its meetings of the Board of Managers, 
faculty, and student organizations.  Student encounter with Quakerism could be seen in 
obvious ways such as organizational meetings (as well as the Fifth Day Meeting, which 
was required until 1966), but also in more subtle manifestations, such as the creation and 
development of the college’s Honor Code.  As has been seen, the origins of the Code in 
the late nineteenth century were informed by Quaker themes such as the necessity of an 
honest conscience, personal integrity, and obeisance to one’s “inner light” rather than 
unthinking conformity to societal trends.  In the extension of the Code to include 
elements of social behavior in the 1940s—an extension promulgated by administration 
and students alike—Haverford continued its tradition of moderating its once-Orthodox 
Quakerism to encompass concerns for practical justice and communal responsibility.
142
  
As with Swarthmore, by the middle of the twentieth century Haverford was no longer 
committed to “guarded” education and the ranks of Friends students and faculty had 
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thinned; nonetheless, the school retained an ethos which suggested that a Quaker spirit 
and an intellectual disposition served as cooperative elements in the school’s 
understanding of higher education.  As a philosophy professor observed in the 1930s: 
The religious atmosphere at Haverford has been as much a quiet normal feature of 
its life as the beauty of the campus.  Religion has been thought of not as 
something apart from life, something injected from the outside, but rather as 
complete spiritual health.  It has been a simple pervasive spirit of reverence, of 
sincerity, and of aspiration for the highest values of life….  The college has aimed 
to bring the new learning of the age into vital relation with religion.
143
 
     In short, despite their ascension to national prominence as schools of admirable 
intellectual character, neither Swarthmore nor Haverford lost connection with projects of 
their respective founders, projects that were largely moral in their orientation.  While no 
longer the strictly denominational entities of their first days, these two colleges retained 
significant cultural and intellectual space for Quaker thought and practice in institutional 
programs.      
     The shift in curricular discourse in higher education around the turn of the twentieth 
century from creedal morality to scientific neutrality has generally been viewed as 
dividing institutions into two primary camps during the following decades:  universities 
emphasizing graduate study and original research, and colleges evolving to meet growing 
demands for occupational training and acculturation necessary for social and economic 
mobility.
144
  In addition, both sides of this institutional typology would have found 
themselves ill-equipped to address the day’s moral and civic issues, as neither the 
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research focus of the university or the credentializing function of the college was readily 
compatible with social and political engagement beyond the campus.  It was in this area 
of civic and moral obligation, however, that both Swarthmore and Haverford located 
space within the observed university-college dichotomy.  In moving beyond the rhetorical 
embrace of Quakerism to enact real political commitments, the schools articulated a 
second commonality in their narratives. 
     Throughout the twentieth century, both Swarthmore and Haverford demonstrated that 
important qualities of their schools—an ethos animated by Quaker principles, small-scale 
residential communities, and seriousness of intellectual purpose—leant themselves to 
concern for, deliberation about, and engagement with political and moral issues both 
within and beyond their campus gates.  Though there was student activity in Progressive 
Era social movements at Swarthmore, the century’s first major encounter with larger 
political contexts came during World War I.  As the war approached, traditional Quaker 
pacifism dominated campus discussion and the pages of the Phoenix student newspaper; 
gradually, however, student opinion rallied to defend liberal democracy.  The Board of 
Managers initially rejected student hopes for the arrival of a Student Army Training 
Corps (SATC) on campus, but later capitulated over worries that students would drop out 
to serve: the SATC was allowed on campus, though without guns for training.  While 
Swarthmore’s admission of the SATC may have seemed a craven capitulation to market 
forces—and, to be sure, some Friends publications described it as such—what should not 
be lost is the degree of on-campus conversation and deliberation which preceded it.  
Rather than simply articulate an institutional stance, Swarthmore allowed its students to 
explore the dictates of their consciences, and this exploration helped inspire a new 
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activist spirit at the school.
145
  This spirit could be seen in the willingness of Swarthmore 
students and faculty to attend to issues of larger political and moral concern, even if these 
issues were decades from capturing a popular mindset.  In the realm of civil rights, for 
example, the students struck a blow against anti-Semitism in 1934, when Swarthmore 
divested itself of sororities in the wake of student newspaper editorials and petitions to 
protesting, among other things, the discriminatory admissions policies of certain chapters. 
(Curiously, fraternities were allowed to remain, but their social significance waned 
considerably after the dissolution of Swarthmore’s sororities.)  Similarly, in 1940 a 
Student Committee on Racial Relations was organized in the name of pushing for the 
admission of black students to Swarthmore, and the Board of Managers responded in 
1945 by declaring that students should be admitted to the school irrespective of race or 
creed.
146
  World War II also catalyzed campus activism, as once again the Quaker 
emphasis on the primacy of the dictates of individual conscience was realized: a 
professor established a conscientious objector camp at Swarthmore, the eventual 
admission of future officers as part of the V-12 Navy College Training Program was 
roundly debated in faculty meetings, student editorials supported both the war effort and 
“helping to win the peace,” and faculty and students alike volunteered for war service by 
the dozens.
 147
  Neither blindly patriotic nor wholly pacific, the campus culture during the 
period was described by a student, who himself would later serve in the Navy, as “an 
oasis of civility” which humanely but assertively explored the connection between 
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intellectual debate, Friends morality, and political activity.
148
  From the turn of the 
century through World War II, then, the combination of the school’s Quaker heritage, its 
institutional emphasis on intellectual exploration, and a campus whose size provided 
opportunity for authentic communal dialogue helped make social activism fundamental to 
the Swarthmore experience.
149
   
     Haverford expressed a similar dynamic from the turn of the twentieth century through 
World War II.  Prior to American entry into World War I, campus conversation was 
robust, as befitted a community versed in both intellectual and Quaker norms which 
valued open exchange and deep consideration of varied perspectives.  Though always 
privileging the primacy of individual conscience, as an institution—perhaps owing to its 
roots in the Orthodox strain of Friends teaching—Haverford proved more willing to 
assert a definitive anti-war posture than its neighbor, Swarthmore.  Haverford faculty 
spoke out against the war in public and in the pages of Philadelphia newspapers, 
President Sharpless debated Army Chief of Staff General Leonard Wood on the necessity 
of rearmament, and the college elected to weather an enrollment downturn rather than 
host an SATC unit.  This non-violent posture did not, however, represent institutional 
quietism; indeed, upon American entry into the war Haverford began training its student 
to serve in ambulance units, and in 1917 the college helped found the American Friends 
Service Committee (AFSC), which trained students to enter into war areas and carry out 
alternative service.  At the same time, for a number of Haverford men loyalty to 
conscience necessitated active duty.  Their call to service was not obstructed by either the 
administration or their peers, as campus climate proved capacious enough to sincerely 
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accommodate (if not entirely harmonize) potentially antagonistic points of view.
150
  As 
had been the case at Swarthmore, the Haverford community captured the energy 
generated by political debate over World War I and carried it forward into subsequent 
decades.  Debates, petitions, and demonstrations over issues as varied as immigration 
policy, racial justice, the League of Nations, and free speech marked the 1920s and 30s.  
Once more, while the principles of Quakerism may have promoted a certain view of these 
issues, the antecedent principle—respect for differing opinion—continued to triumph in 
the interwar period.  This practice was further reified with the coming of World War II. 
President Felix Morley (1940-45)—mindful of potential student attrition—recommended 
that Haverford support on-campus training programs for noncombatant army 
assignments, which led to another series of debates over the tension between traditional 
Quaker pacifism and the value of serving the nation in wartime.  Members of the student 
body, faculty, and Board of Managers alike engaged in extended debate on the issue in 
meetings and on the pages of the school newspaper.   A cadet program for the army 
meteorological service was ultimately approved by the Board and applauded by many. 
(Ironically, Morley himself had deep reservations, as he noted that the unit represented 
“surrender to the steady advance of governmental encroachment on independent 
education.”)  Other Haverford men honored their convictions by applying for 
conscientious objector status, or by serving in a Friends-sponsored campus training 
program to prepare relief units to serve in areas torn apart by the war.
151
  Like Swarthmore, 
Haverford in the first forty-five years of the twentieth century was neither a temple of 
political leftism nor willing to affix all its institutional decisions to the dictates of 
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conservative Friends doctrine; rather, emphasis on intellectual seriousness joined with 
Quaker belief in translating individual conscience into action to create a campus environment 
that resisted political and moral complacency. 
     Defining one’s own Quaker practice and creating climates of free intellectual inquiry 
and political possibility demands a degree of institutional autonomy, and here a final 
commonality between Swarthmore and Haverford can be recognized.  From their 
founding, both of these schools enjoyed a degree of relative financial security, thanks to 
the generosity of their early Quaker supporters.  Because neither college had to rely on 
the yearly meeting of Philadelphia Friends as a whole for direct monetary aid, both were 
able to reduce the number of constituents to whom they had to answer, and thus were 
allowed, from the beginning, more freedom to explore and develop the meaning of their 
respective schools on their own terms.
152
  The narrative of conventional historiography—
the “darkness to light” trope—has suggested that the nineteenth century college was a 
static, hidebound institution whose adherence to outmoded curricula prompted large-scale 
failure of the model between 1850 and 1900.  Revisionists have since demonstrated that 
colleges did not, in fact, fail at a greater rate in this period than in any other.
153
  Still, even 
revisionists have noted that the period around 1890 seemed to represent a hinge point of 
change in the structure of higher education, after which the large majority of small 
colleges had to alter their fundamental approaches to postsecondary education if they 
were to compete with larger schools in the “Age of the University.”  In such 
circumstances, only the wealthiest of the residential liberal arts colleges would be able to 
retain something of their original denominational, curricular, and organizational 
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  Though there were assuredly periods of fiscal challenge for both colleges, 
both Swarthmore and Haverford were among the lucky coterie of schools whose financial 
well-being enabled them to maintain and refine their core sensibilities in the face of 
difficult market pressures. 
     At Swarthmore, the period from its founding through World War I was marked by a 
willingness of the Board of Managers (of the liberal, Hicksite cast) to refine the school’s 
original commitments to “guarded” education and a Friends clientele in order to promote 
financial sustainability.  In order to attract more students and guarantee institutional 
growth, the college’s Quaker leadership—as has been seen—demonstrated its willingness 
to compromise with the shifting cultural mores of the non-Quaker world.  While 
lamented by traditionalists, Swarthmore found ways to retain important commitments to 
Friends’ teaching while modernizing its curriculum and allowing for a more casual 
student life.  In relaxing its denominational distinctiveness, the school made itself 
attractive to a broader and deeper admissions pool, and was also able to connect to the 
philanthropy of the Carnegie and Rockefeller foundations.
155
   By the time of World War 
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I, Swarthmore sat on a sturdy financial base, and Frank Aydelotte used this base to refine 
the school’s institutional purpose, through the introduction of his Honors Program.  
While this innovation was enabled by traditional sources of such as alumni and the 
wealthier Quaker precincts in and around Philadelphia, it also attracted monies from 
outside agencies such as Rockefeller’s General Education Board.  Again, while the 
school continued to give Quakerism an important on-campus presence, willingness to 
once more find room for advancement—here, independent learning of the highest 
quality—ultimately strengthened the school’s financial position, and allowed the 
institution to explore further the potential nuances of its mission and meaning.
156
  By 
World War II, Swarthmore had proven itself adept at this cycle of pragmatic give-and-
take which did not necessitate abandonment of Quaker roots, but did reveal the long-term 
benefits of easing the requirements of denominational pursuits; as a consequence, the 
school was able to remain the principal descriptor of its own institutional identity. 
     During the same late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century period, Haverford was, 
perhaps owing to its more conservative Orthodox roots, less willing to redefine the 
meaning of its Quakerism to encourage financial growth.  While the school, like 
Swarthmore, ultimately relaxed its commitment to a strictly “guarded” education and a 
predominantly Quaker clientele during its first century, it remained more reliant upon 
tried and true sources of fiscal support than its more adventurous Main Line neighbor.  
To be sure, under the presidency of Isaac Sharpless, Haverford committed itself to 
institutional growth; indeed, during his thirty-year administration, the college pursued 
financial and architectural advancement to complement improvement in its academic 
profile.  By the eve of World War I, Haverford had increased its endowment tenfold and 
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tripled the number of campus buildings under Sharpless’s guiding hand.  This growth was 
accomplished principally through the largesse of alumni and independent Quaker 
benefactors, whose capital gifts enabled scholarships and building programs which aided 
in Sharpless’ project to improve the quality of teaching and learning at Haverford.  This 
academic improvement, in turn, attracted more giving, and by the end of the World War I 
the school had enhanced its reputation both in terms of scholarship and financial security.  
This security allowed the school to stand on principle in 1915, when the Carnegie 
Foundation offered to provide $150,000 if Haverford would demonstrate that it was a 
wholly secular college; however, the school’s tradition of limiting the Board of Managers 
to members of the Society of Friends remained unaltered.
157
  The decades after the war 
were not as successful in terms of financial growth, as the Great Depression hindered the 
capacity of traditional donors to maintain their level of generosity, and the Second World 
War prompted President Felix Morley to cooperate under controlled terms with the 
American war effort in order to protect the school’s financial status.  Though unpopular 
with some traditional constituencies, this compromise—when paired with the 1944 
initiation of Haverford’s formal alumni giving program—allowed Haverford to retain its 
place among the financially fortunate liberal arts colleges.  As World War II was drawing 
to a close, the school could not claim coffers as deep as those of Swarthmore, but its 
endowment of over $4 million would allow Haverford to express its institutional mission 
in the post-war climate with an authority approaching that which it had wielded during 
the Sharpless years.
158
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     What had once made these institutions unique was their adherence to their respective 
brands of Quakerism:  Haverford stood as the first Quaker college in the nation, and 
Swarthmore derived its animating ethos from its Hicksite understanding of Friends 
practice.  As the denominational college confronted the “Age of the University,” 
however, small schools wishing to retain their significance—or simply their 
enrollments—would need to revisit and, perhaps, re-describe their traditional missions. If 
“guarded” education could find little purchase in the increasingly secular context of 
academic modernity, successful schools would require a commanding and potent vision 
of what a good residential liberal arts college could be and do.  At both Swarthmore and 
Haverford, development of these visions began in the late nineteenth century, and 
continued apace into the middle of the twentieth.  Under the guidance of managers, 
deans, faculty, and—importantly—some dynamic presidents (such as Aydelotte at 
Swarthmore, and Sharpless at Haverford), the colleges were able to initiate innovations, 
both dramatic and incremental, that continued to define and redefine their organizations.  
Though there was inevitably resistance to proposed changes, both schools were able to 
use dedicated leadership and sufficient financial resources to overcome such opposition, 
and to institutionalize these visions into the structures of campus experience.  Where 
Friends denominationalism once stood as their defining characteristics, Swarthmore and 
Haverford both used modifications in curriculum, professionalization of faculty, and 
relaxation of social controls to reinterpret the very nature of their schools.  At the same 
time, they retained important aspects of their founding identities, such as a commitment 
to Quaker non-conformity and conscientiousness, a focus on undergraduate teaching, and 
dedication to small-scale residential community.  As a consequence, both colleges were 
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animated by an internal narrative that gave purpose to their campuses, the narrative that 
Clark termed an institutional “saga.”  For Clark, the saga 
offers an educationally relevant definition of the difference of the group from all 
others. And salient elements in the distinctiveness become foci of personal 
awareness and of a sense of things held in common with others currently on the 
scene, those who have been there before, and those yet to arrive.
159
     
Both Swarthmore and Haverford developed strong institutional cultures which, while not 
identical, shared emphases on the importance of intellectual seriousness, Quaker moral 
heritage, political engagement, and open community conversation.  These cultures were, 
in turn, reinforced by conditions specific to the residential liberal arts college, such as 
small size and an emphasis on undergraduate teaching and learning that was carried out 
not only in classrooms, but also in dormitories, student centers, and other social spaces.  
As a result, both colleges were able to resist capitulation to “Age of the University” 
norms, and instead assign important intellectual and civic purposes to the residential 
liberal arts college in the twentieth century.  While begun as emblems of moral 
paternalism, by the end of World War II both Swarthmore and Haverford had become 
places which offered opportunity for all its community members to engage in serious 
intellectual and ethical inquiry and conversation.  This opportunity, begotten by the 
particular narratives and contexts of each institution, would prove vital both to rejecting 
the consensus discourses of loyalty and conformity, and to enabling resistance to the 
NDEA’s disclaimer affidavit. 
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Chapter 5:  Fighting Oathism—Institutional Differences 
     In 1959, responses from colleges and universities to the NDEA loyalty provisions 
varied.  At the University of Chicago, for example, the school elected to participate in the 
Title II programs; however, the institution did not reprimand its twenty-four students who 
received federal funds, yet refused to sign the disclaimer affidavit.  At the University of 
Pennsylvania, the University Senate (comprised of faculty members) recommended that 
Penn decline to participate in the program while the disclaimer affidavit was in effect.  
Both the school’s administration and board of trustees opted instead for a stance of urging 
repeal of Section 1001 (f) while still remaining eligible for Title II funding. After initially 
enrolling in the federal program, Brigham Young University announced that it would 
refuse the aid it was granted; instead, the school established its own program that would 
extend 500 loans of between $100 and $500 to its students.  The regents of the University 
of Wisconsin declared the disclaimer affidavit “objectionable” and “purposeless,” but 
nonetheless believed that students with no personal opposition to the loyalty requirements 
of the NDEA should be free to receive what funds they merited.  President Julius Stratton 
of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology decried the political tests asserted by the 
law as “misguided” and “discriminatory,” but the Institute itself refused to take a stand on 
the matter. At Dartmouth, President John Dickey inveighed against the loyalty 
provisions, which he thought imprudent and ineffectual, but also refused to withdraw his 
school’s participation.  In terms that seemed to capture higher education’s ambiguous 
responsibility on the issue, Dickey admitted that he was “genuinely puzzled about 
whether it would be right for a college to deny this opportunity to those students who 
otherwise might be unable to obtain loans and are willing to sign the affidavit."   The less 
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equivocal Chancellor Robert Johnson of Temple University trenchantly observed that it 
was difficult for him to sympathize with “the controversy that is going on among some of 
our leaders in education as to whether or not young people borrowing money from the 
federal government should be required … to swear that they are not members of any 
organization striving to overthrow our country.”  Harvard and Yale, on the other hand, 
made a joint announcement on November 18 declaring their withdrawal from the federal 
funding program after several months of internal debate by their respective faculties and 
administrations.
160
   
     In the responses of these and other national universities and organizations to the 
NDEA disclaimer affidavit, three related themes can be identified.  First, schools and 
associations generally evinced some concern about the meaning of the loyalty provisions 
from the inception of the program.  The record does not allow for a neat, dichotomous 
narrative in which a small band of morally heroic schools reject the noxious overreaching 
of the government, while the great majority blithely accept whatever terms are necessary 
to acquire funds.
161
  In reality, college presidents and, in particular, faculties at numerous 
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institutions were troubled by the implications of the Mundt Amendment for the practice 
of academic freedom. This faculty discomfiture was both anticipated and, perhaps, most 
robustly expressed by the stance taken by the American Association of University 
Professors (AAUP) in the nascent days of the controversy.  Through the first half of the 
twentieth century, the modern university had increasingly distinguished itself from its 
collegiate forebears by emphasizing disciplinary attachments and departmental 
organization; as a consequence, it was unsurprising that many scholars looked to their 
professional organizations—rather than their institutional homes—to give voice to their 
concerns.
162
  As early as November of 1958, both the AAUP’s president and general 
secretary had jointly written to members of both the Senate Labor and Public Welfare 
                                                                                                                                                 
reported that “five insitutions have gone a step further than public statements and have refused to accept 
educational aid funds until the act has been amended.  This group includes Bryn Mawr, Haverford, 
Swarthmore, Princeton, and Reed.”  Two months later, however, Senators John F. Kennedy and Joseph 
Clark stated in subcommittee hearings that “[a]t least seven colleges have refused to participate in the 
student loan program solely because of the affidavit requirement,” and went on to list Reed, Antioch, 
Goucher, Wilmington (OH), Swarthmore, Haverford, Bryn Mawr, and Sarah Lawrence as the schools in 
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Committee and the House Education and Labor Committee to recommend removal of the 
loyalty provisions.  Their letter railed against the anti-subversive measures (calling them 
“vague,” “unconstitutional,” and “invidious”), and complained that teachers and students 
of higher education were being unfairly singled out as suspicious.  The AAUP effort 
would later achieve an even greater prominence with the general secretary’s appearance 
before the Senate’s education subcommittee, where he would announce that 112 local 
chapters of his organization had pledged their support in the repeal effort.
163
  Neither 
presidents nor faculty, then, were wholly or even largely passive when considering the 
repercussions of the NDEA’s test oath.  
      Second, though these general concerns about the Mundt Amendment were widely 
shared, they nonetheless did not prompt a consensus, assertive response from the flagship 
institutions and organizations of American higher education.  Schools like Chicago and 
Wisconsin left the choice of participation up to individual students, Pennsylvania and 
Dartmouth made public statements against the loyalty provisions while remaining 
enrolled in the Title II program, and Harvard, Yale, and BYU ultimately withdrew their 
grant requests and sought to supplement student aid from their own institutional means.  
In the same vein, the AAUP’s political campaign, though crucial in keeping the concerns 
of academe in front of legislators, ultimately saw its early rhetoric tempered by some 
tactical caution.  This reticence was best captured in a statement emerging from the 
association’s annual meeting in 1960: 
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The Forty-sixth Annual Meeting urges all chapters of the Association to intensify 
their efforts towards the elimination of the affidavit requirement of the Education 
Act.  It expresses the earnest hope that Congress will soon repeal it.  Since the 
needs of higher education are very great, it is most reluctant to suggest any 
drastic steps which will reduce the amount of available federal aid.  Our colleges 
and universities require more aid, not less [my italics]. Nevertheless, the 
Association cannot reconcile itself to this invasion of academic freedom.
164
 
In fairness to both flagship institutions and the AAUP alike, NDEA was passed during a 
period marked by anxiety about American intellectual preparedness to meet cold war 
challenges, persistent use of loyalty oaths and anti-communist tests in public discourse, 
uncertainties about the meaning of academic freedom, and evidence of an increasingly 
successful financial partnership between the federal government and research 
universities.  In such a context, the matter of how an academic institution or professional 
association could and should respond to the disclaimer affidavit was open to a breadth of 
interpretation, and that interpretive latitude allowed for more conservative expressions of 
resistance.        
     The absence of a consensus of assertion was the by-product of the third, and most 
significant, shared characteristic of these schools.  In all cases, the negotiation of the 
moral and practical murkiness surrounding the NDEA disclaimer affidavit was made 
more difficult by the transformation of institutional structures and purposes that had been 
inaugurated during the “Age of the University” and continued throughout the first half of 
the twentieth century.  By 1950, large universities, be they public or private, had 
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expanded their enrollments, their attachment to federal funding, and their missions, all of 
which conspired to slow and complicate their reactions to instances of ethical uncertainty.  
The monumental campuses built through land-grant dollars and private philanthropies at 
the turn of the twentieth century had prompted accelerated enrollment in the interwar 
years, and the GI Bill helped swell the campuses (and engender further construction) by 
mid-century; indeed, in 1950 flagship public universities and even Ivy League schools 
such as Harvard and Yale boasted campus enrollments of well over 5,000 students 
each.
165
  As these schools grew larger, they generally sought institutional prestige not 
only through the traditional means of selective admissions, but increasingly through the 
achievements of disciplinary research by their faculties.  As a result, attracting external 
grants—from both federal and private sources—emerged as a more significant priority in 
high-profile institutions.  This increasing reliance on federal research grants and private 
foundations, however, inevitably necessitated an expanded university administration, 
opened up the possibility of peripheral intrusion into campus concerns, divided faculty 
loyalties between institution and profession (the AAUP claimed 41,000 members by 
1959, for example), and invited headaches not endured by schools with more traditional 
means of support.
166
  By expanding their customary ambit, the highly visible schools (and 
the professional organizations which grew up around them) functionally described a 
discourse of higher education that bore little resemblance to either their denominational 
forebears or the contemporary small residential colleges at mid-century.   While schools 
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such as Swarthmore and Haverford continued to emphasize the undergraduate liberal arts 
tradition on a small scale, the physical and academic “largeness” of national private and 
flagship public universities was, however unintentionally, promoting the replacement of 
community with bureaucracy, common function with compartmentalized aims, and a 
coherent narrative of institutional mission with an emphasis on winning public prestige.  
These schools, which had relinquished sole authorship of their institutional narrative, 
were susceptible to what Ernest Boyer would later term a “crisis of purpose,” and the 
very size and variability of their enterprises rendered the process of engaging with 
questions of moral and professional propriety potentially unwieldy and ineffectual.
167
   
     In 1959, the year’s highest profile and most publicly documented encounters with the 
issue, perhaps unsurprisingly, were held at Harvard.  Then as now, Harvard University 
was the wealthiest and most culturally significant institution in American higher 
education; therefore, its experience should not be made to stand as surrogate for the 
entirety of major private and research universities at mid-century.  Nonetheless, the 
manner in which the school wrestled with the implications of the NDEA loyalty 
provisions can still offer a useful example of the challenges faced by educational 
institutions that were forced to reconcile difficult ethical choices with large-scale research 
and funding enterprises.  In 1958, Harvard had formally applied for $700,000 in Title II 
funds, and $385,000 was granted by the program in early 1959.  By the autumn of the 
same year, however, Harvard’s faculty and administration was wrestling with the 
implications of the loyalty provisions embedded in the program, and in late September 
the school froze the funds after the U.S. Senate refused to consider repealing the Mundt 
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Amendment.  The school’s Committee on Education Policy submitted a resolution to the 
faculty in mid-October of 1959 calling for withdrawal from NDEA participation, and in 
early November the full faculty voted to advise the Harvard Corporation (President 
Nathan Pusey and the executive board) to reject the Title II loan funds.  On November 




     Three years later, after the Senate repealed the Mundt Amendment by voice vote, the 
Harvard Crimson described the school’s leadership on the NDEA matter: 
Led by President Pusey's continued opposition to the loyalty provisions, the 
University has refused NDEA loans since November 18, 1959. At that time the 
Corporation [Pusey and the board of executives] voted to reject $357,873 of 
Federal funds assigned to Harvard. Following suit, Yale, Princeton, Haverford, 




By 1959, Pusey had indeed become a vigorous opponent of the disclaimer affidavit.  
Early in the year, he had been in correspondence with Senator John F. Kennedy, HEW 
Secretary Arthur Flemming, and President Dwight Eisenhower, and had urged them all to 
take a public stand against the disclaimer affidavit in the Title II language.  That 
November, Pusey shared his concerns with his presidential colleagues on the Association 
of American Universities (AAU), an invitation-only organization of the nation’s leading 
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doctorate-granting institutions, and followed up with a tour of Washington congressional 
offices to plead his case.  In 1960, Pusey would go on to testify before Congress on 
behalf of the AAU, where he would describe the disclaimer affidavit as "futile, 
ineffective and unnecessary" and contrary to "some of the basic elements" fundamental to 
the practice of democracy and emerging understandings of academic freedom in the 
United States. Using the bully pulpit of the Harvard presidency, Pusey ultimately 
emerged as an eloquent and persistent spokesperson for the values of open academic 
inquiry and student freedom from government-imposed political oaths.
170
 
     Pusey’s personal efforts notwithstanding, however, it is not wholly accurate to 
characterize Harvard as leading the vanguard of anti-NDEA resistance.  While Pusey had 
been a longstanding advocate for the protection of academic freedom—before coming to 
Harvard, he had stood against McCarthyism as president of Lawrence (WI) College—
when the NDEA became law in 1958, he applauded the law’s passage.  Though he 
established his disdain for the loyalty provisions immediately by terming them “rude” 
and “unworthy,” Pusey also commended the Congress for seeing the virtue of a general 
subsidy for higher education, and Harvard applied for nearly three-quarters of a million 
dollars in government funds.
171
  In applying for NDEA support, Harvard was hardly 
acting alone, certainly, but its application also contradicts later hagiography which 
suggested schools like Swarthmore and Haverford were “following suit” when they 
refused participation in the Title II program.  Like the great, great majority of American 
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colleges and universities, Harvard’s resistance to the Mundt Amendment was decidedly 
rhetorical in 1958 and 1959. 
     This gulf between the articulation and the practice of principles during the cold war 
era at Harvard University did not originate with the NDEA disclaimer affidavit.  During 
the McCarthy era, the school stood alongside its Ivy League compatriots and other 
distinguished universities in its willingness to cooperate with congressional investigations 
into their faculty ranks.  These high-profile schools often made public proclamations 
regarding the necessity of protecting faculty rights, only to give halting defense to 
dissenting colleagues when inquiries were made.  When Harvard physics professor 
Wendell Furry was indicted in 1950 for refusing to cooperate with a congressional 
subpoena, the school refused to fire him; at the same time, however, it refused to hire 
lawyers to assist in Furry’s defense.  While Furry enjoyed considerable support from his 
physics department colleagues, and though the government’s case against him was 
eventually dropped, Harvard did place the scientist on three-year probation for seeking 
protection under the Fifth Amendment during the investigation.  Shortly after the Furry 
episode, in 1954, Harvard was once again embroiled in issues of loyalty and dissent in 
the case of historian Raymond Ginger.  After having receiving an anonymous tip that the 
scholar and his wife were about to be brought before the Massachusetts Commission to 
Investigate Communism, school officials asked both the Gingers to sign an anti-
Communist loyalty oath.  When the pair refused, Ginger was quietly forced to resign. A 
colleague would later describe Harvard’s approach to the era’s loyalty witch hunts as 
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“discreet collaboration with McCarthyism with the primary concern of avoiding 
criticism.”
172
      
     As with its initial acquiescence to the stipulations of Title II, Harvard’s institutional 
association with the forces of McCarthyism represented a typical approach within a 
political discourse that had normalized the primacy of loyalty, consensus, and 
conformity.  In both episodes, that is, Harvard was not an outlier within the realm of 
American higher education, and thus should not be singled out for special reprimand; 
indeed, students and faculty throughout the 1950s, as with their contemporaries in the 
broader American polity, seemed content to avoid dispute of the potentially vital political 
issues of the day.
173
  At the same time, the school should not be commended for 
establishing resistance to these anti-academic crusades, for it did not provide original 
leadership in this regard.  In both instances, Harvard was something of a house divided, 
as various campus stakeholders took up contrary positions—often divided along faculty 
and Corporation lines—on matters of societal status, political obeisance, and academic 
freedom.  
     The school was not only split on how to engage politically, but also on the virtue of 
engaging at all.  Though Pusey established himself as an ally of the anti-NDEA position 
and Harvard’s faculty was generally active in its opposition to anti-Communist purges 
and political loyalty tests throughout the 1950s, the students themselves offered little in 
the way of dissent.  During the McCarthy area, Harvard undergraduates were described 
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as a “Silent Generation” who, like the majority of students nationwide, tended to refuse 
political commitments while their teachers were being put on trial.  Those who did 
choose a path of activism usually opted to affirm the period’s embrace of conformity and 
loyalty; indeed, in 1953 Harvard students rescinded a speaking invitation to Spartacus 
author and Communist Party member Howard Fast, with the declaration that to continue 
on with the program would “embarrass” the university.
174
  Five years later, the NDEA 
debate was met with similar student apathy, as the issue which had become a hot-button 
topic for faculty remained largely uninteresting to their charges.  Not all students were 
unconcerned: a heated Crimson editorial in late April of 1959, concluded that “[t]he 
affidavit requirement is not only ineffective. It is invidious, and Congress should repeal it 
without delay.”  Later, Harvard would report that a joint student-faculty letter-writing 
committee had moved some 2,000 students nationwide to join their campaign in sending 
cards and letters to their legislative representatives.
175
 In the main, however, the debate 
gained little footing in undergraduate precincts.  The paucity of student engagement with 
the issue is perhaps best captured by an article in the student paper written in the midst of 
the faculty uproar over the loyalty provision in the autumn of 1959.  Entitled “A Blow for 
Freedom,” the piece celebrated an act of student dissent—forgoing coffee and 
substituting an extra fruit juice, in violation of the school breakfast plan, at the Harkness 
Commons dining hall.
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     While Harvard ultimately found the costs of NDEA participation unacceptable and 
eventually used its high profile to oppose the loyalty provisions, in 1958 the school—
along with hundreds of others—enrolled in the program, at least for a short period of 
time.  This does not mean that academic freedom was an unimportant construct at 
Harvard and other participating schools, or that college administrators were so addled by 
the prospect of government subsidy that they rushed into agreement without thinking.  
The reality, at Harvard and at other ambitious, visible schools, was more complicated.  In 
the name of institutional growth (or merely institutional survival), both public and private 
universities had partnered with government offices and private foundations throughout 
the first half of the twentieth century; moreover, a number of schools had developed a 
working relationship with state and federal governments during the McCarthy period.  By 
1958, the notion of seeking reasonable compromise with external agencies in order to 
enhance or protect status, both financial and social, was hardly unknown in the circles of 
elite higher education.  To be sure, the nation’s universities did not walk in lockstep in 
the way that they responded to external pressures for conformity and internal drives for 
faculty autonomy; indeed, local pressures, degree of status anxiety, and type of campus 
leadership helped shape the manner in which schools encountered the discourse of loyalty 
and conformity that had been normalized in American cold war-era politics.
177
  The 
idiosyncrasies of individual schools notwithstanding, general acceptances of the Mundt 
Amendment were not a radical departure from standard administrative practice at the 
preponderance of research and high-profile universities during the cold war.       
     These standard practices, in turn, revealed the degree to which many universities were 
beset by confusion regarding the proper and legitimate responsibilities of academic 
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institutions to both its constituents and society at large. Though a great many were 
seemingly free of the financial peril that attended smaller, more parochial schools, “name 
brand” schools often found themselves in positions of philosophical incoherence 
regarding their principal aims and mission.  Clear, shared understandings regarding the 
purpose of higher learning had been eroded by the twentieth century pushes for research 
funding, campus expansion, and faculty autonomy, and further battered by the political 
pressures and financial opportunities specific to the cold war.  While the modernization 
of the American university had enabled higher-order research, expanded access, and 
reduced denominational parochialism, it failed to protect on-campus structures and 
cultures which could nurture and protect institutional missions shared by a community, or 
the “saga” specific to a given school.
178
  As a consequence, when institutions paused to 
reflect upon the meaning of the NDEA loyalty provisions, they often found themselves 
lost in a sea of competing narratives about the rights, obligations, and functions of 
various campus constituencies.  Under such strained conditions, institutions of higher 
education found it difficult both to articulate and to defend moral norms in a timely, 
decisive, and reliable fashion. 
      In contrast to the balkanized sense of mission and community that often prevailed at 
large-scale public and private research universities by 1958, Swarthmore and Haverford 
had retained a strong sense of identity and purpose to which the great majority of 
community members seemed to subscribe.  In general, the small size of residential 
colleges can enable more nimble, more visible responses to opportunities for change and 
action, as they are not burdened with the varied commitments and bureaucratic 
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infrastructure that attends large universities.
179
  In the case of Swarthmore and Haverford 
at mid-century, this rule was enacted in full.  As they had in the first half of the twentieth 
century, both schools had managed to retain a clear and understood appreciation of what 
made each institution distinctive within the world of American higher education, and it 
was this appreciation—along with the conditions which enabled it—that allowed the two 
Main Line colleges to react more quickly, assertively, and consistently when 
encountering the NDEA loyalty provisions.   
     Part of Swarthmore and Haverford’s success at defending an enduring and coherent 
institutional mission in the decades following World War II rested upon their 
commitment to remaining small-scale, residential campuses.  Immediately after the war, 
many small private colleges confronted uncertain financial times, as post-war inflation 
sent campus costs spiraling upward and traditional budgets were strained.  In the wake of 
the GI Bill, the relative accessibility of higher education had increased demand for it; 
accordingly, liberal arts colleges could seek to meet their fiscal needs simply by 
expanding enrollment and bringing in more tuition revenue.   Those colleges wishing to 
preserve both a sense of distinction and a scale compatible with their customary 
educational philosophies resisted this option, and instead chose a path of increasingly 
selective admissions within the expanded applicant pool in the post-war period.  While 
this solution did not directly help the schools’ balance sheets, it did reaffirm their 
commitment both to smallness and to a cohesive sense of community, and allowed them 
further discretion in choosing a student body compatible with their institutional norms.
180
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    Certainly, schools with healthy internal narratives and comparative wealth were best 
positioned to chart this course.  Rather than answering potential financial concerns with 
expanded enrollment, a revolutionized mission, or massive increases in tuition, 
reasonably secure schools like Swarthmore and Haverford were able to lean on private 
support from foundations, alumni, and Quaker donors.   For example, the capacity of 
small liberal arts schools to adhere to traditional missions was strengthened by the 
creation of the Ford Foundation’s Fund for the Advancement of Education (FAE) in 
1951.  Ford’s new enterprise was designed to combat trends toward narrowness and 
specialization in higher educational curriculum and teaching, as well to supply colleges 
with financial resources to aid more (or different kinds of) students.  Like the NDEA, the 
Ford monies were offered as part of a larger political project; rather than privileging 
national defense, however, the FAE articulated a connection between liberal arts learning, 
expanded access, and democratic citizenship.  To this end, Ford granted over $200 
million to more than 600 private liberal arts college in 1955.
181
  Both Swarthmore and 
Haverford applied for these Ford Foundation gifts, and the awards granted were used to 
enhance faculty salaries. Swarthmore received a grant of $707,000 from Ford, while the 
gift Haverford received helped the school raise faculty salaries by 40 percent from 1951 
to 1957. These foundational grants not only allowed the schools to retain quality teachers, 
but also freed those teachers to focus on liberal arts teaching and interaction with 
students, rather than the pursuit of research funding.
182
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     With the comparative financial security that these schools enjoyed and cultivated in 
the post-World War II period, both were able to maintain powerful institutional narratives 
that stressed deep involvement in the college community by its members, free intellectual 
inquiry, and pursuit of moral ideals rooted in the Quaker tradition.  For example, though 
it did not necessarily claim the popular profile that attended national universities such as 
Yale, Chicago, or Stanford, in the two decades after World War II, Swarthmore 
maintained its reputation in educational circles as a place of academic excellence, 
communal sensibility, and ethical purpose.  The honors tutorial program, inaugurated by 
Frank Aydelotte, continued to provide a singular intellectual experience to the school’s 
most ambitious men and women, an experience unavailable to the lion’s share of even the 
most talented undergraduates at the nation’s top research universities.  Beyond scholarly 
exploration, the arrangement promoted a collaborative approach between students and 
faculty, rather than the standard hierarchical (and sometimes adversarial) relationship that 
prevailed in typical undergraduate classes.
183
 Tutorial teaching was a mechanism that 
reaffirmed the notion that Swarthmore existed to serve the learning of its students, not the 
research of its faculty.  
     The sense of empowerment, partnership, and purpose that students felt in the 
Swarthmore classroom seemed to promote similar tendencies in the realm of socio-
political awareness and activism.  During a period often generalized as a time of student 
disengagement and complacency, Swarthmore was, by contrast, the site of considerable 
civic activity.  On campus, the 1950s saw movements of anti-McCarthy petitioning, 
support for the Vietnamese suffering under French imperialism, and even a challenge of 
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mandatory student attendance at Collection, a weekly gathering of the school 
community.
184
  With its involved undergraduates and its recurrent commitment to student 
political activity, Swarthmore stood out among institutions in American higher education 
in the era before the more widespread youth movements of the later 1960s.  The shared 
sense of civic virtue and political consciousness did not, of course, emerge by 
happenstance; rather, it was an intended outcome of a collegiate project that charged 
students “not only to search for hidden truths but, having found them, to assess them in 
terms of their moral implications.”
185
   
   For their part, Swarthmore faculty seemed to understand and welcome the role required 
of them by the institution’s saga.  While still devoted to their disciplines and to 
colleagues within academia, their principal community was that of the campus itself, and 
this community received their attention and support.  For example, Swarthmore 
professors embraced the mutual pursuit of knowledge required of the honors program; 
indeed, a 1963 survey showed that seven of eight faculty believed that the majority of 
their colleagues were interested in the academic problems of their students.  By contrast, 
only 34 percent of faculty at a top research university—the University of California, 
Berkeley—believed the same about their counterparts on campus.  In addition, 
Swarthmore faculty members were five times more likely to describe their colleagues as 




     The importance of a community mindset was further avowed for the faculty by the 
prevailing approach to decision-making on policy matters.  In committee and general 
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faculty meetings in the post-war period, the traditional Quaker practice of “the sense of 
the meeting” still obtained, with its assumption that solutions to concerns of the college 
would emerge from collective dialogue and deliberation.  The committee chair or faculty 
dean would not call for votes or balloting on particular issues, but rather guarantee a 
climate in which a shared explanation would emerge from individual self-examination 
and reasonable discussion.  Such an approach, of course, was, as now, exceedingly rare in 
American professional life, and stood in especial contrast to the method of policy-making 
in mid-century universities, where private or factional interests and parliamentary 
procedures reigned in faculty and administrative governance.  Where faculties of other, 
larger institutions tended to balkanize along disciplinary lines or according to 
bureaucratic functions, Swarthmore’s small group of professors tended to find unity, both 
in the context of the “sense of the meeting,” but also in the broader account of their 
school’s purpose, character, and virtues.
187
 
     Throughout the post-war period, then, Swarthmore continued to situate its students 
and faculty within a narrative that insisted upon both respect for individual conscience 
and truth-seeking, while also demanding mutual care for and interest in community 
members.  By foregrounding this mission in both cultural and rhetorical practice, 
Swarthmore maintained its traditional concern with social and moral issues at a time 
when the still-active forces of “academic revolution” continued to push larger schools 
toward increasingly utilitarian and/or research-focused missions.
188
  The sense of 
distinctiveness that Swarthmore retained throughout the period was captured nicely by a 
visiting committee which evaluated the school on behalf of the Middle States Association 
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of Colleges and Secondary Schools.  Remarking on its findings in the 1957-58 academic 
year, it noted: 
In the judgment of the Committee, Swarthmore is achieving its stated objectives 
with marked success.  Its reputation for superior academic training and 
wholesome student life is well deserved.  High goals of intellectual attainment, 
moral discipline, and bodily fitness are set and adhered to.  The College is 
characterized throughout by a concern for excellence.  The Committee finds it 
hard to name a friendlier or more unified institution.
189
   
     Like Swarthmore, Haverford had emerged in the first half of the twentieth century as 
an institution which allowed room for students and faculty alike to pursue weighty 
academic and moral issues, while still honoring Quaker traditions of respect for and 
obligations to community. The school continued to adhere to its time-honored 
institutional verities throughout the post-World War II period, both in the articulation of 
its vision and the practices which underpinned it.  For example, the Haverford College 
Bulletin proudly proclaimed in 1956 that  
[a]s a Quaker college, Haverford stresses in its educational policy the importance 
of personal and social ideals….  The College is not satisfied with scholarship and 
intellectual expertness alone, though it values highly these qualities…  Haverford 
will stress increasingly the importance of sound ethical judgment based upon 
clear perception of individual and social aims.
190
 
This pledge, given in the abstract, was supported in practice through a community 
marked by a dedication of all its members—administration, students, and faculty—to the 
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institution’s fundamental mission.  President Gilbert White, who led Haverford from 
1946 to 1955, proved himself a relentless champion of higher education that sought to 
harmonize intellectual achievement, social awareness, and moral application.  A devoted 
Quaker himself, White took several dramatic steps during his presidency that helped 
reaffirm the institutional identity that marked Haverford as its own kind of “counter-
culture” during a period of university expansion and political conformity.  One of 
White’s first actions upon assuming his office was the introduction of Friends’ business 
procedure—“the sense of the meeting”—to faculty and committee meetings on campus.  
Unlike Swarthmore, parliamentary procedure had been the rule in Haverford’s faculty 
gatherings for decades, and its professors expressed an initial reluctance to part with a 
known practice; after a trial period of a year, however, the faculty voted to make the 
Friends’ approach permanent, and White had won an important victory for the school’s 
senses of community and Quaker heritage.
191
   
     Such commitments were further strengthened through public stands White took on the 
behalf of both students and faculty during his tenure.  For example, he provided explicit 
and assertive backing for those undergraduates who selected the path of conscientious 
objection during the Korean War.  In January 1951, he appeared before the Senate 
Subcommittee on Preparedness as part of hearings on the Universal Military Training and 
Service Act.  During the height of cold war anxiety, White used his testimony to oppose 
the draft, and instead called for the leadership of educational institutions in developing 
moral and intellectual awareness, dispositions suited for a war against poverty and 
discrimination, not other nations and people.  Similarly, the president once eschewed a 
ceremonial program where he was to be lauded so that he could testify on behalf of a 
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student in front of the young man’s draft board.
192
   White also ardently defended faculty 
members subjected to the slander and tactics of McCarthyism, most notably Ira Reid, 
Haverford’s first black professor.   Reid, a sociologist and scholarly expert on racism, had 
been hired by White in 1947, and his activism for world peace often brought accusations 
of fellow-traveling.  When Reid’s passport was confiscated under suspicions of 
disloyalty, Haverford—led by White—refused to dismiss him, and instead fought 
successfully to have Reid’s right to travel restored.
193
   
     Like Swarthmore, Haverford sought to continue encouragement of a morally 
competent community not only through support of social and political engagement, but 
also by way of faculty-student interaction and attentive teaching.  Having reached a post-
war crest of nearly 560 students in 1948, the college assiduously worked to shrink its 
enrollment over the course of the next decade, while at the same time hiring more 
members of the faculty.  These steps, taken to create conditions congenial to meaningful 
teaching, learning, and dialogue, signaled a step resistance to the trend toward expansion 
and research that marked so much of mid-century higher education.  This resistance was 
further annealed by a post-World War II revision of the college’s curriculum, a revision 
emphasizing general courses, taught in small classes, in order to encourage "the breadth 
of outlook necessary to sound judgment."  This respect for student experience, rooted in 
the college’s self-understanding as a Quaker enterprise, helped sustain an undergraduate 
culture marked by enthusiastic self-government, concern for the welfare of the 
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institution’s members, and activity in pursuit of common goods.
194
  At Haverford, then, 
the tradition of taking students seriously as both moral and intellectual agents persisted, 
and was reinforced not only by the allocation of appropriate resources, but also by the 
participation of the students themselves.   
     The Haverford faculty members, like their Swarthmore counterparts, were also visible 
exponents of their institution’s cultural mores, even if these tenets did not fall 
comfortably within the nation’s larger political and educational discourse.  In 1954—
more than four years before the NDEA disclaimer affidavit controversy began in 
earnest—the school’s professors appointed a group to report on “the kind and the 
possible consequences of information regarding individual students at Haverford… 
which Government agencies have on several occasions sought from faculty members.”
195
   
This group produced a statement that would run in the pages of the AAUP Bulletin in 
1955, and was notable not only for its defense of free inquiry in the academy during an 
era of oaths and loyalty tests, and also its conception of this defense as a community 
issue, rather than merely a professorial one.  The declaration expressed support for the 
academic liberty of adults, to be sure, but pointedly focused on the intellectual needs and 
moral status of students as well, with its assertion that    
there must exist a special relationship among students and faculty in their 
professional association.  Members of the college community should feel 
confident that expression of their ideas will be regarded as a strictly professional 
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matter.  We believe that this relationship of trust is indispensable to a college 
community if it is to serve its proper function in society.
196
   
This was a view of higher education as an endeavor shared between students and faculty, 
a conversation demanding autonomy and respect for all its participants.  It was articulated 
at a time when the meaning of academic freedom was very much in question, and on the 
occasions when it was summoned, it was generally to protect the research interests of 
faculty, not the inquiries of undergraduates.  Haverford’s pronouncement reflected the 
spirit of a faculty that had, at mid-century, inherited a tradition of Quaker inclusion, 
privileged both the trust and the expectations that properly belong to members of a 
community, and which saw higher education’s fundamental purpose as affiliated with the 
exploration of the significance of ideas and the interrogation of values, and not merely 
with the creation of new knowledge through research. 
      In general, both Swarthmore and Haverford expressed a singularity and clarity of 
purpose at mid-century and beyond that schools of greater profile and prominence could 
not provide, and this difference was never more evident than in the ways various 
institutions tried to make sense of the NDEA loyalty requirements.  In October 1961, for 
example, the Harvard Crimson offered an acerbic interpretation of the role that had been 
played by the university in the resistance to Section 1001 (f).  It chided President Nathan 
Pusey for his equivocal approach to the law two years’ prior, when Pusey had both 
"applaud[ed] the high motives which prompted Congress to pass the... Act” while at the 
same time characterizing the attendant loyalty provision as "odious."  Likewise, a student 
editorial observed that while Harvard had erroneously fancied itself “as a glorious leader” 
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in the effort to lead “other, less powerful, less enlightened schools” in the fight against 
governmental overreach, a more honest assessment would see the university’s efforts as 
“quixotic” and tardier than those of the eleven schools that had opposed the program 
before Harvard had “made up its mind.”
197
  By the time of NDEA’s passage, Harvard—
like so many other universities—had become a site of competing purposes, and its 
student newspaper laid bare some of the difficulties the school had in juggling multiple 
identities—undergraduate college, research university, industry leader, profitable 
corporation, and so on.      
     In contrast, Swarthmore and Haverford occupied a humbler plane of American higher 
education, one which focused on reconciling a traditional collegiate mission—and also, 
for these two schools, a Quaker heritage—with the nation’s changing cultural and 
political circumstances. Their institutional missions were not, of course, somehow 
“better,” on some absolute moral scale, than those of larger, national research 
universities, and certainly the two colleges endured periods (both prior to and during the 
post-World War II era) where support for these missions was far from unanimous among 
key campus constituencies.  Nonetheless, both Swarthmore and Haverford had 
maintained campus cultures, structures, and narratives which made them distinctive 
within post-World War II American postsecondary education, and it was these very 
cultures, structures, and narratives which ineluctably shaped their distinctive response to 
the NDEA disclaimer affidavit.    
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Chapter 6:  “The College Has Confidence in Its Students”— Days of Dissent 
     By the late 1950s, Swarthmore and Haverford bore more than a passing resemblance 
to one another in terms of mission, culture, and heritage.  They were not identical 
institutions, of course: the former expressed Hicksite Quakerism, co-education, and a 
celebrated honors tutorial system; the latter favored the Orthodox Friends tradition, an 
all-male campus, and a more traditional (while still rigorous) approach to the liberal arts 
tradition.  The two schools were readily and obviously affiliated, however, in terms of the 
narratives they articulated regarding the centrality of community, engagement, and moral 
discourse to their institutions.  These institutional stories left Swarthmore and Haverford 
uncommonly well-prepared (when compared with other organizations in higher 
education) to resist the federal disclaimer affidavit, and this preparation was both 
encouraged and utilized by Courtney Smith and Hugh Borton, the presidents of 
Swarthmore and Haverford, respectively, during the five-year period of contesting NDEA 
loyalty provisions. 
     While the power of institutional history, culture, and identity to catalyze political 
action cannot and should not be neglected, neither should the role that can be played by 
effective presidents of residential liberal arts colleges.  One need not subscribe to a 
“Great Man Theory” of history or organizational studies to appreciate the outsized 
influence small college presidents can have on the character, hopes, and values of the 
schools they lead, especially when compared to their counterparts at larger, less coherent 
and nimble research universities with exponentially more stakeholders.
198
  At mid-
century, the leaders at Swarthmore and Haverford were charged with telling the stories of 
their schools, and they did so with enthusiasm.      
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     In 1953, thirty-seven year-old Courtney Smith became Swarthmore’s second post-
Frank Aydelotte president.  Arriving from Princeton, where he had served as English 
professor and director of the American Rhodes Scholarship Committee (the direct 
successor to Aydelotte himself in the position), Smith immediately proclaimed his 
fidelity to Swarthmore’s mission of both scholarship and ethical reflection.  In his 
inaugural address, Smith unequivocally defended his new school’s time-honored 
sensibility:  
We have no intention of relinquishing our academic excellence….  But it is not 
enough to develop intellect, for intellect by itself is essentially amoral, capable of 
evil as well as good.  We must develop the character which makes intellect 
constructive, and the personality which makes it effective….  A balanced 
community requires more than the valedictorian and salutatorian…
199
  
      Though holding a doctorate from Harvard, where he had completed his undergraduate 
degree as well, Smith had also been a Rhodes Scholar, and the well-roundedness 
demanded of such an honorific was apparent in his views on teaching and learning.  
Smith held that higher education should promote development and activity in the social 
and moral realms, as well as the intellectual, and he was thus an outspoken champion of 
the small liberal arts college environment.  Though Swarthmore was renowned for the 
academic rigor of its honors program, Smith was most pleased with its seminar-style 
approach to learning, an approach which emphasized dialogue, encouraged freer thought, 
and demanded that students take a stand behind their ideas.  A large part of collegiate 
curriculum’s aim, he believed, was to prepare students to embrace a life of service, 
leadership, and critical encounters with the moral and political issues of the day.  This 
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required not only a talented, inquisitive student body, but also a faculty that had 
developed and could model intellectual and moral virtues, as well as the vocabulary to 
share them fruitfully with their charges.  At bottom, Smith conceived of undergraduate 
education as a type of ongoing discussion, and when deployed by teachers and students 
who enjoyed close relationships, this exchange would both support and interrogate 
conventional ideas and culture, encourage evaluation and reevaluation, and cultivate 
dispositions of curiosity and conviction.  The liberal arts, properly done, were for Smith 
less a series of subjects than the product of an inclusive community dialogue.
200
  This 
view was entirely congruent with Swarthmore’s longstanding educational approach and, 
despite his status as a born Presbyterian and Harvard alum reared in Iowa, in Smith’s 
personal and educational values “he was squarely in the Swarthmore tradition, more of an 
insider than many at the college.”
201
   
      As Courtney Smith was establishing himself as the inheritor of Frank Aydelotte’s 
philosophical project, Hugh Borton was finding his way back home.  Borton had 
graduated from Haverford in 1926, before entering into a career as an academic and 
expert on East Asia. He started his career at Columbia University as a professor of 
Japanese, and then joined the State Department during World War II, and ultimately 
served as one of the principal architects of the post-war Allied plan for Japan.  After 
concluding his work in Japan, Borton returned to Columbia, where he eventually rose to 
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the post as director of the school’s East Asian Institute, which he led until his 
appointment at Haverford in 1957.
202
   
     Though he may have appeared, at first glance, to be the perfect candidate to lead 
Haverford—he was, after all, both an alumnus and a life-long Friend—Borton’s first days 
in office were not greeted with enthusiasm.  Where Swarthmore’s Smith exhibited an 
almost irresistible sense of youthful vigor and accomplishment, his counterpart at 
Haverford, Borton, seemed more diffident and cerebral by comparison.  Not as young as 
Smith had been upon taking office (Borton was 54 when he was inaugurated), he did not 
project the same aura of inspiration and dynamism that both Smith and Borton’s 
Haverford predecessor, Gilbert White, made essential parts of their presidential personas.  
Though he had lived in such cosmopolitan environs as New York City and Japan, 
Borton’s personality was in keeping with the strict moral code of Quakerism under which 
he had been raised.  His had been a childhood of family Bible study, hours of silent 
worship, and a friend and family circle populated almost exclusively by Quakers.  His 
formal secondary and undergraduate schooling was completed at Friends institutions, and 
it had been the American Friends Service Committee which initially brought Borton to 
Japan in 1928.
203
  While far from sheltered, Borton’s upbringing and early career had 
emphasized quiet service and introspection, and it was not immediately clear to his 
campus constituents that he could provide the out-front leadership that would preserve 
the distinctive institutional culture that had emerged at Haverford during the first half of 
the twentieth century.  
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     This concern was, for some, exacerbated by Borton’s inaugural address on October 
19, 1957, when he stated his interest in gradually expanding the school’s enrollment to 
meet the rising demand for higher education in the wake of the successes of the GI Bill.  
He gently admonished the tendency of old Haverfordians to assert that "the college was 
of ideal size at the time of their graduation," and instead countered that "[t]he ideal size of 
any institution is relative to both internal and external factors.”
204
  Though the expansion 
that Borton proposed was actually rather moderate, and would allow for an enlarged and 




     On the eve of the passage of NDEA, then, the two Main Line schools both enjoyed 
traditions that privileged community, respect for individual conscience, and the pursuit of 
both scholarly and ethical ideals.  At the same time, however, their respective presidents 
seemed to be striking different tones.  Courtney Smith had use his inaugural address to 
outline an educational philosophy that appeared to epitomize the Swarthmore ethos, with 
its emphasis on values, responsibility, and the free pursuit of truth; on the other hand, 
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Borton’s opening speech raised eyebrows on campus, and some wondered if this Friend 
and alumnus was attuned to the culture to which he was returning.  While events would 
soon demonstrate that Smith was indeed an appropriate spokesman for his community’s 
needs, they would also give Borton the opportunity to re-establish himself as an ardent 
defender of Haverford’s best traditions. 
     The NDEA disclaimer controversy that would eventually trouble both schools did not, 
initially, cause profound consternation at either college.  Having been deliberated upon 
over the summer and passed in early September of 1958, NDEA was not attuned to 
rhythms of the collegiate calendar; as a consequence, campus reaction to the law was 
restrained at both Swarthmore and Haverford, as students and faculty channeled their 
energies into more parochial concerns.  At Swarthmore, the student newspaper focused 
on campus building projects, a poison ivy epidemic, and the possibility of playing 
“intellectual” football; Haverford’s opening faculty meeting, meanwhile, saw consensus 
approval of the addition of the assistant director of admissions to the list of those eligible 
for health benefits through the college.
206
  Such understandable focuses on the niceties 
and necessaries of everyday college experience and administration would soon have 
conversational competition, however, as the potential implications of NDEA came into 
sharper relief in administrative, faculty, and student circles. 
     At Swarthmore, consideration of the disclaimer affidavit truly began in earnest in 
November of 1958, and within the community there existed no clear consensus on how to 
proceed.  In the presidential office, the issue had become an area of especial concern after 
one of Courtney Smith’s informal semi-monthly presidential meetings with Hugh Borton 
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and Katherine McBride of Bryn Mawr, shortly after the law’s passage.  McBride had 
pointed out that the loyalty provisions seemed to constitute a threat to both academic and 
moral conversation on college campuses.
207
  While full non-participation apparently was 
never explicitly advocated, McBride did move that the three Quaker schools publicly 
oppose the disclaimer and offer loans to those students not wishing to sign it.  Borton 
agreed, but Smith, however, did not; whatever his sympathies, he sought broader 
conversation on the issue.
208
 Proceeding deliberately but patiently, Smith wrote Theodore 
Distler, Executive Director of the American Association of Colleges (AAC), an advocacy 
group composed principally of small colleges and dedicated to advancing the aims of 
liberal education.   Smith queried Distler about the general level of concern among his 
presidential colleagues regarding the disclaimer affidavit—or if they were even aware of 
it.  When Distler noted that a regional AAC meeting on the NDEA held in early 
November had produced no opposition to Section 1001 (f), Smith probed further.  He 
took the issue to Claude Smith, chair of Swarthmore’s Board of Managers, constitutional 
scholar, and one of Philadelphia’s most esteemed lawyers.  A Swarthmore alum, Claude 
Smith immediately recognized the assault against the college’s sensibility that the 
disclaimer represented, and he indicated an openness to pursuing a repeal of the measure, 
though he sought the support of the broader college community in so doing.
209
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     In his ongoing attempt to find “the sense of the meeting,” Courtney Smith brought the 
issue before the college’s faculty on the first of December.  Among the ranks of the 
professoriate, disapproval of the disclaimer affidavit was unanimous; however, there was 
division regarding the question of Swarthmore’s participation in the NDSL, with many 
faculty members contending that it would be unfair of the school to deny students the 
considerable benefits of the federal program. A week later, on the other hand, the 
Swarthmore student council proclaimed its undivided opposition to the NDEA loyalty 
provisions.  The council drafted a resolution affirming that section 1001 (f) infringed 
upon academic freedom and open inquiry, and mailed the statement to presidents, student 
body presidents, and newspaper editors at nearly 150 colleges nationwide.  Swarthmore’s 
student newspaper, the Phoenix, offered an editorial on December 9 which supported 
those opposed to the disclaimer affidavit, yet also refused to prescribe the form that 
opposition should take.  “It must be resolved,” claimed the editors, “whether the College 




     The task of finding this resolution at Swarthmore fell to an ad hoc committee on the 
disclaimer affidavit, a working group proposed by Courtney Smith and subsequently 
approved by the Board of Managers.
211
 As might be expected at a school that emphasized 
the dignity of all campus members and invited authentic and thoroughgoing community 
deliberation, the committee was ecumenical in composition.  The committee included 
Smith; two deans of the college; two additional professors (with a third added for the 
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final two committee meetings); three members of the Board of Managers, including 
Claude Smith, the chairman; and two students.  Over the course of three meetings in the 
winter of 1958 and 1959, this group would describe the college’s response to the NDEA 
controversy.   
     At the first meeting on December 18, President Smith noted that the committee would, 
in the Quaker tradition, attempt to achieve consensus on the matter, though the tight 
government timetable (NDEA funds would be disbursed in February) might hasten the 
need for compromise.  A sense of campus opinion was offered by Chuck Miller, senior at 
the college, who reported that Swarthmore students generally opposed the disclaimer 
affidavit, but that a majority also favored participation in the program nonetheless, with 
views on student autonomy, the relative mildness of the loyalty statements, and concerns 
about financial need marshaled in defense of the stance.  The group seized upon the 
theme of financial resources, and noted that Swarthmore had $30,000 in available loan 
funds.  The school could use these funds, members contended, as a limited short-term 
surrogate for the monies offered through the NDSL—that is, Swarthmore students who 
petitioned the school for Title II aid would instead be loaned funds directly from the 
school.
212
  Finally, the group articulated a general sense of the arguments for and against 
NDEA participation.  Propositions in favor of participation focused upon the value of 
students and families making their own choices, as well as the foolhardiness of spurning 
the government’s more-or-less direct financial aid to institutions of higher education.  
Opposing points of view emphasized the sacred nature of private belief, the nearly 
unanimous opposition of the Swarthmore community to the disclaimer, the superordinate 
                                                 
212
 This meant, of course, that Swarthmore would bear the full cost of the loan, rather than the one-tenth 
required of schools by NDEA Title II.  In addition to the $30,000 in available funds, Swarthmore also 
enjoyed an endowment of $15 million in 1959. Clark, 165.  
134 
 
relationship of safeguarding academic inquiry to that of student choice, and the 
invidiousness scapegoating of “eggheads” as particularly susceptible to disloyalty.
213
 
     The committee was supplemented prior to its next meeting by mathematics professor 
Phillip Carruth, who Courtney Smith had asked to join to assure better representation of 
those faculty members in favor of NDEA participation.  When the group gathered on 
January 19, 1959, Carruth began the meeting by emphasizing the consistency of receiving 
monies with the universal disapproval of the disclaimer affidavit among the faculty.  The 
college itself would not sign the disclaimer, Carruth continued, and closed by describing 
the affidavit as both innocuous and, in a community so manifestly committed to academic 
freedom, meaningless.  Carruth’s position received strong pushback from the committee, 
and the discussion quickly located a dividing line.  On one side stood Carruth and Board 
member William Ward, who maintained that concerns about means had grown picayune, 
and thus obfuscating the very worthy ends of national need and collegiate access that 
NDEA Title II represented.  The committee’s nine other members expressed in varying 
degrees the other point of view, which privileged principles of free inquiry and 
institutional integrity over student choice.
214
 
     These opposing camps persisted into the third and final committee meeting on January 
23.  To frame the meeting, Claude Smith suggested that four approaches to the affidavit 
were available to the college.  The first involved non-participation in the program, a 
protest of the disclaimer, and the availability of student loans through the college.  The 
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second approach allowed participation in the program, with the college protesting the 
affidavit and supplying loans to those students unwilling to sign the disclaimer. The third 
proposal was simply a variant on the second, but without supplementary loans from 
Swarthmore.  The fourth and final proposal, after a modification by Courtney Smith, 
recommended that the college decline participation for one year, while making loan funds 
available during the period.  In the discussion that followed, most committee members 
asserted that Swarthmore ought to take a moral stance against participation, even if in so 
doing it stripped the possibility of choice away from current and potential students.
215
  
While the committee was never able to achieve the consensus that had been its Quaker 
aim—Carruth and Ward continued to prefer participation in the program while protesting 
the disclaimer affidavit—the meetings had persuaded some members “who initially felt 
that the disclaimer did not raise a sufficiently serious question either of principle or 
practical effect to warrant non-participation” to change their minds.
216
  In the end, the 
three meetings produced a recommendation to the Board of Managers that Swarthmore 
refuse participation in Title II, formally protest the disclaimer affidavit, and use college 
funds as loans to students who would have applied for NDEA monies.   
     The recommendation, which was accepted by the Board and the faculty upon its 
submission, was perhaps less remarkable than the process which produced it.  To be sure, 
Swarthmore was one of a small handful of institutions (joining Bryn Mawr, Haverford, 
and Princeton) which refused the pursuit of federal funds, even on a provisional basis, 
and thus helped establish a vanguard position in the dissent against NDEA.  It is the 
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college’s means for achieving this end, however, which demands proper appreciation, 
especially given the context in which it was practiced.  In the winter of 1958, the residual 
effects of the McCarthy era were persisting in their conspiracy, to both normalize loyalty 
tests and marginalize concerns about academic freedom.  In addition, perceived 
institutional leaders in higher education—Harvard, Yale, Chicago, Pennsylvania, and 
dozens of others—had signaled their willingness to participate in the program, whatever 
the rhetorical reservations of their presidents and faculty.  Finally, the window for 
decision-making was a rather narrow two months during the winter holiday season, a 
constrained period that could have easily encouraged haste or administrative impatience 
with democratic procedure; indeed, with applications for the Title II monies due to 
HEW’s Office of Education by December 31, 1958—though Swarthmore would 
eventually petition for, and be granted, an extension—time was tight.
217
   Faced with the 
necessity of making a politically-charged commitment while negotiating these 
challenges, Swarthmore held fast to its institutional saga by appointing a committee 
which would give voice to an authentic cross-section of the college community.  Such an 
inclusive process would have been impossible to imagine, of course, at schools which 
understood themselves principally as research institutions, or whose faculty separated the 
pursuit of knowledge from the pursuit of value, or whose students were not viewed as 
important interlocutors in an ongoing conversation.  At Swarthmore, however, the NDEA 
controversy became an occasion for a dialogue which represented an enduring, core 
sensibility that had marked college’s culture and practice for decades. The appointed 
committee embarked upon a patient exchange of ideas under conditions where individual 
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voices were valued, but also situated within the moral tradition of the Quaker college; 
indeed, the ultimate recommendation to refuse participation was made to protect the 
community as a site of dignity, moral discourse, and free inquiry, rather than as a more 
libertarian project favoring mere individual choice.  This preference was consonant with 
Swarthmore’s longstanding narrative identity, and was described by community members 
in a relatively unhurried process that revealed Swarthmore’s—and Smith’s—commitment 
to civic participation and value examination. 
     Swarthmore made its stance public through an official announcement on February 4, 
1959.  While finding the loyalty oath “not unacceptable,” the college’s statement—which 
was issued to local media and mailed to dozens of college presidents—did declare its 
sharp opposition to the disclaimer affidavit, a mechanism it described as something 
inimical to the nation’s constitutional tradition.  In addition to sharing its intention to 
provide surrogate loans to students of “established need,” the announcement offered a 
powerful statement of the school’s fundamental civic purposes and cultural 
commitments: 
As an educational institution, Swarthmore College believes that strong citizens in 
a democratic society are produced in an atmosphere where ideas do not need to be 
forbidden or protected.  The College has confidence in its students and in the 




      Both on- and off-campus expressions of support for the college’s stance followed 
shortly thereafter.  On February 8, the student council passed an expected endorsement of 
the Board and faculty decision, with praise for both the college’s non-participation and 
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the rationale which produced it.  The following week, 84 percent of students voting in an 
on-campus referendum demanded that the Student Council take “political action” against 
the NDEA disclaimer affidavit.  Though some few alumni wrote the administration to 
express surprise at Swarthmore’s stance—one suggested that communism “must still 
exert great influence in the management of the college”—most expressed support for the 
school’s protection of freedom of belief as congruent with the college’s Quaker tradition 
and principles.  Finally, Senator Joseph Clark of Pennsylvania, one of the eventual co-
sponsors of a bill to overturn the disclaimer affidavit, lauded Swarthmore for its handling 
of the matter, with particular acclaim for the college’s level of student engagement.
219
   
     Courtney Smith had approached nascent concern about the law’s loyalty provisions as 
an opportunity to perpetuate his institution’s ongoing dialogue about community values 
among all its members.  Hugh Borton, on the other hand, was already involved in related 
moral conversation when the NDEA was passed.  By September of 1958, when the 
National Defense Education Act became law, Haverford’s Board of Managers had 
already spent half a year sorting through the school’s longstanding refusal to participate 
in a different government program.  The college had always declined research contracts 
from the military as incompatible with Haverford’s intellectual and moral culture, as well 
as its commitment to the Friends’ principles of non-violence and peace-seeking.  During 
the 1957-58 academic year, however, chemistry professor Russell Williams had applied 
for and been awarded financial support from the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 
which had offered grants to research scholars since its inception in 1946.   Haverford had 
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not participated in the AEC program because of the agency’s perceived connection to 
military and defense concerns, but Williams’ petition—which involved non-classified 
scientific research—prompted the managers to examine the AEC’s relationship to the 
Department of Defense, and to re-evaluate Haverford’s policy on research relationships.  
In early 1958, an ad hoc committee on research grants was culled from the Board of 
Managers to study the college’s approach to the AEC, and to determine if an adjustment 
was warranted. 
     The committee’s report was clear in describing the moral stakes that attended 
Haverford’s decision.  The dilemma, as the group saw it, involved two Friends’ 
principles—peace-seeking and the supremacy of individual conscience— that were 
brought into tension with one another by the AEC dilemma.  Prior to suggesting a manner 
of reconciling the situation, the committee offered a remarkable statement decrying the 
manner in which non-academic concerns were impinging upon American social and 
educational practices: 
[Y]our committee sees a clear threat to fundamental concepts of freedom, to its 
own religious convictions, and to the principles of the Society of Friends in the 
current encroachment of military influence upon American life in general and 
higher education in particular….  It seems to us hardly appropriate, therefore, for 
Haverford College to accept dependence on a philosophy so far removed from 
that for which it stands, and so inconsistent with the principles of the Society of 
Friends, in order to get money to support its research program.
220
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This articulation of philosophy was no mere preamble to the committee’s report, but 
rather a crucial affirmation of the college’s fundamental mission to protect its community 
ethos, an ethos grounded in certain historical and moral traditions.  Whatever choices the 
college made regarding federal educational policy, the managers were determined that 
these choices were compatible with Haverford’s institutional self-definition.  
      In a report delivered in May, the committee ultimately recommended that while the 
college itself should not apply for research funds from the Defense Department and its 
branches—a violation of Quaker peace commitments—individual faculty members 
would be permitted to seek funds for on-campus research on non-military, non-classified 
subjects, regardless of the source.  In addition, faculty could also pursue off-campus 
research of any sort, from any source, so long as the activities did not interfere with the 
professor’s discharge of his or her Haverford duties.
221
  This revision would allow 
Williams to accept AEC funding, with the school reserving the right to terminate the 
contract if the character of the research changed and crossed into a classified realm.   
     The policy alteration also represented an attempt to harmonize the Friends’ 
commitment to pacifism with its respect for the dictates of individual conscience.  
Despite this bid for comity, the committee remained clear regarding the college’s 
priorities: when the tension between social mores and individual choice became 
irreconcilable, Haverford was to err on the side of community.  Even if an individual 
faculty member was untroubled by the pursuit of military or classified research, for 
example, the committee was adamant that “the violation of the Peace Testimony that 
would be involved in devoting College resources to carrying on ‘military research’ on the 
campus would be so serious as to justify the limitation of individual freedom which its 







  Simply put, the committee defended the idea that the honoring of 
individual conscience could only proceed from within a community of moral integrity. 
     While this principle earned universal approbation from the committee and the Board 
of Managers, the committee members did not unanimously support the report’s final 
recommendations.  A minority, led by alumnus and Friends peace activist Stephen Cary, 
dissented, and instead argued that a Quaker institution should not, in principle, participate 
in any program that associated itself with secrecy and classification provisions, even if 
that participation was undertaken tangentially, through the activities of individual faculty 
members.  In view of this divide, and in the Friends’ spirit of finding “the sense of the 
meeting,” the board attempted to bring together the competing views during monthly 
meetings in September, October, and November.   The committee’s divided report 
precipitated discussion among the full board during monthly meetings in September, 
October, and December, with no consensus reached on the issue.  Given this impasse, and 
to gain a broader sense of the community’s view of the AEC dispute, the Board of 
Managers asked its two faculty representatives, astronomy professor Louis Green and 
philosophy professor Francis Parker, to solicit insights from their colleagues.  A special 
meeting of the Board of Managers, dedicated solely to resolving the conflict over the 
recommendations, was called for December 17.
223
 
     The special meeting’s discussion proceeded in an attempt to answer three questions:  
Should Haverford contract with the AEC on any basis?  If yes, should the college accept 
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the AEC’s normal form of contract?  If the AEC contract was unacceptable, what form of 
contact would Haverford allow?  Board conversation eventually revealed that group 
opinion was strongly in favor of following the committee’s recommendation, as was the 
Haverford faculty (whose position was represented by Green and Parker.) After extended 
discussion, the two managers who remained in opposition to the committee report 
signaled their willingness to affiliate with the majority’s viewpoint.  The board thus came 
to the consensus that AEC research contracts were not by definition invidious, with the 
proviso that the college retained the right to terminate agreements that came to involve 
security regulations.  After over half a year of study and deliberation—itself an exercise 
in Quaker seriousness and patience—Haverford altered its policy on research contracts, 
while still retaining an approach that hewed to the standards of the Society of Friends.
224
  
     With this resolution reached, President Borton extended the meeting through the 
introduction of a related issue:  the NDEA loyalty provisions.  While Borton had become 
aware of the implications of the disclaimer affidavit through his meetings with his 
colleagues McBride and Smith, his managers had not been formally apprised of NDEA’s 
section 1001 (f) (1) and the infringements of personal belief that it entailed.  The 
president emphasized the dangerous constraint on individual conscience that the affidavit 
represented, and further suggested that such mechanisms might become a regular part of 
future federal aid to higher education, if not opposed in this iteration.  Borton concluded 
his remarks with a recommendation that Haverford refuse participation in the NDSL 
program, seek repeal of the offending clause, and offer its own substitute loan program in 
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the interim.  (The school’s endowment stood at roughly $12.1 million.)  The Board of 
Managers gave the recommendation its unanimous approval.
225
  
     This on-the-spot decision may have appeared both abrupt and oligarchic, especially in 
comparison to the more inclusive, three-month process that Swarthmore undertook to 
achieve the same end of non-participation in NDEA Title II; indeed, where Courtney 
Smith built an inquiry committee with members from across his college’s community, 
Haverford’s decision regarding the NDEA disclaimer affidavit was carried out solely at 
the discretion of its Board of Managers.  The college’s approach, however, ought not to 
be seen as a betrayal of its institutional heritage, but rather an important expression of it, 
in two ways.  First, the NDEA decision was made at the conclusion of an extended, deep 
exercise in moral reflection that considered both Haverford’s mission and it relationship 
to a broader American social context.  The school’s months-long conversation regarding 
the compatibility of AEC contracts with vital community values was initiated by 
managers (and supplemented by faculty) and marked by both probity and a capacity for 
drawing nuanced distinctions.  When compared to the ethical dilemmas that the ad hoc 
committee had encountered in studying research contracts—the circumstantial tensions 
between commitments to peace-seeking and to respecting individual conscience—the 
case of the NDEA loyalty provisions was far more straightforward.  For a board 
accustomed to moral deliberation, the choice regarding the disclaimer affidavit was 
apparently a simple one.  Second, while Haverford’s decision processes with both the 
AEC and NDEA may have looked positively paternalistic next to Swarthmore’s more 
democratic approach, the Haverford Board of Managers had a clear sense that certain 
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community goods were, quite simply, inviolate and not subject to discussion.  In the case 
of the AEC, the necessary priority of peace testimony over individual faculty choice on a 
Quaker campus was averred; with NDEA, the college asserted that protection of the 
dignity and free inquiry of all undergraduates must prevail over political and societal 
concerns about subversion.  Though neither choice was the product of an all-inclusive 
campus conversation, each ultimately served Haverford’s mission by encouraging among 
its members both self-reflection and an awareness of the school’s longstanding normative 
commitments.  The varied styles utilized by the Board—the lengthy examination of the 
AEC and the swift decisiveness regarding NDEA— both represented legitimate means to 
attain culturally essential ends. 
      On January 22, 1959, Hugh Borton gave a concise public statement explaining 
Haverford’s stance of non-participation:  “We believe that to file this required disclaimer 
is tantamount to signing away one’s right to freedom of thought as well as encouraging 
government action which makes the individual’s opportunity for education contingent 
upon his [sic] personal beliefs.”  To the college community, Borton delivered a 
Collection talk explaining Haverford’s position.  While acknowledging that the school 
had rules and regulations it demanded that its students obey, the president emphasized an 
important distinction:  “[W]e don’t control your beliefs, we don’t make you follow a 
particular pattern of thought.”  He concluded his remarks with an affirmation of the 
institution’s deeply-held belief that individual education proceeded best in communities 
of trust, integrity, and free conversation.   Paraphrasing the theologian Thomas Merton, 
145 
 
Borton reminded the students and faculty that “man cannot find himself in himself alone, 
but in and through others.”
226
 
      Like Swarthmore, Haverford found immediate popular support, both on campus and 
beyond, for its willingness to refuse participation and its commitment to supply loans to 
applicants affected by the college’s policy.  In a full faculty meeting the day after the 
special Board gathering, the college’s professors had strongly supported the position 
articulated by the managers, and celebrated the dissent as fully congruent with the 
school’s intellectual and moral mission.  After Borton made Haverford’s position public 
in January, a slew of supportive newspaper editorials began to appear in cities as varied 
as Boston, Des Moines, Iowa; Binghamton, New York; San Francisco, and Philadelphia.  
Similarly, a series of opinion statements from the Haverford News praised Borton, the 
faculty, and the Board for the courageous, principled position the college had adopted.  
As with Swarthmore, the wisdom of Haverford’s decision was questioned in some alumni 
and media circles, but in general non-participation won the approbation of students, 
faculty, and alumni alike.
227
 
     Neither the processes nor the actors that led Swarthmore and Haverford to their 
positions on the NDEA disclaimer affidavit in 1959 were identical. Swarthmore, under 
the guidance of a widely-admired president, proceeded carefully in its decision-making, 
and methodically included a variety of campus stakeholders to best establish a Quaker 
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“sense of the meeting” on the issue.  Haverford, on the other hand, reserved primary 
consideration of the NDEA loyalty provisions for its president and Board of Managers, 
and arrived at its decision for non-participation within the course of one meeting.  These 
procedural differences, however, should not distract from the fundamental principle that 
these two schools ultimately expressed; namely, the belief—congruent with the ethics of 
both Quakerism and authentic collegiality—that the silencing of one student, even if self-
imposed, was a threat not only to academic inquiry, but to a community integrity 
essential to both academic and ethical development.      
     Both colleges had long given narrative significance to campus cultures which nurtured 
individual reflection, moral examination, and community participation.  An unstinting 
commitment to these sagas and traditions helped guide both Swarthmore and Haverford 
to moral ground—and to a position of dissent—that it would take larger, more divided, 
and more uncertain institutions a longer time to discover and claim. In his stand against 
participation in the AEC research program, Haverford alumnus and manager Stephen 
Cary had observed that       
[u]nlike most colleges, the Haverford campus community has an atmosphere 
which does affect the values of those who are immersed in it…. [T]he reason is 
surely related to the conscious effort of the Board of Managers, the college 
administration, and the faculty to make Haverford distinctively Quaker, without 
regard to whether or not Quaker principles were popular or unpopular at any 
given moment of time.
228
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Though his point of view regarding the AEC was ultimately defeated, Cary’s assertions 
regarding the meaning of a Haverford education were sound—and they just as readily 
could have been applied to Swarthmore.  By 1958, both colleges had established 
identities and self-understandings as places of intellectual achievement, to be sure, yet 
also of social and moral consciousness.  In refusing participation in NDEA’s Title II, 
Swarthmore and Haverford re-confirmed their belief—increasingly anachronistic and 
countercultural in nature—that colleges were not simply sites of research and 
credentialing, but were more importantly irresistibly moral communities, and thus carried 
ethical obligations to their respective missions, their campus participants, and to society 
as a whole.  The efficacy and the endurance of this belief would be tested, as the 
prevailing concerns of the cold war and university era would continue to challenge the 
ethical, intellectual, and community principles underpinning the distinctive purpose of 






Chapter 7:  “Something Sacred in Our Tradition”—Colleges and the Congress  
     After the flurry of conversation and feedback on the loyalty provisions in the six 
months after NDEA’s passage, the Swarthmore and Haverford campuses settled down to 
the more traditional collegiate business of exam preparation, athletic contests and artistic 
performances, and the usual undergraduate social activity.  There were also ongoing 
moral discussions of localized concern, such as the expulsion of a Swarthmorean who 
had sent a pair of racist letters to a fellow student, and debate among Haverford’s 
students regarding the suppositions of the college’s “social honor system.”
229
  As the 
spring semester of 1959 proceeded apace in the classrooms, dining halls, and athletic 
fields, both Swarthmore and Haverford were seeking allies and cultivating support for 
their position on NDEA.  While resolute in their stand against the disclaimer affidavit, the 
schools also recognized that there were appreciable costs to non-participation.  The 
colleges had not only refused federal monies through the NDSL, but had also pledged to 
assist students who would have otherwise qualified for aid through the Title II program.  
In an era in which colleges and universities did not maintain robust financial aid 
programs, the nobility of this commitment was countered by its inherent lack of 
sustainability.
230
 As a consequence, the colleges tried to rally others to their cause not 
only on the basis of moral and political urgency, but also out of imminent economic 
necessity. 
                                                 
229
 Swarthmore Phoenix, “Prentice Expels Hate-letter Author,” April 28, 1959; Haverford News, “Students 
Vote Against ‘Frats’; Borton to Review Question,” May 8, 1959. 
230
 For a closer examination of the history of financial aid in American higher education, see Robert B. 
Archibald,  Redesigning the Financial Aid System: Why Colleges and Universities Should Switch Roles 
with the Federal Government (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); Lawrence E. Gladieux, 
and Arthur M. Hauptman.. The College Aid Quandary: Access, Quality, and the Federal Role (Washington, 




     Even before the position of his institution had been made public—or even settled—
Courtney Smith had begun to recruit support from friends and colleagues in the worlds of 
academe, politics, and the law.  On December 22 Smith placed a telephone call to Joseph 
Clark, Pennsylvania’s first-term senator and a colleague of Smith’s on the Harvard Board 
of Overseers, to analyze the implications of NDEA’s section 1001 (f) (1).  Together, the 
pair discussed the political steps necessary to overturn the Mundt amendment, with Clark 
encouraging Smith to recruit academic voices from a broad range of institutions to 
support the cause.  Smith also called upon Patrick Malin, executive director of the 
ACLU. Malin was not only an activist, but also deeply attuned to Swarthmore and its 
culture:  he was a devout Friend, a former economics professor at the college, and the 
son-in-law of a Swarthmore manager.  Despite his support of the cause, Malin was far 
less sanguine than Clark about the possibility of overturning the disclaimer affidavit, and 
mused that the chances of repeal were fewer than one in a hundred.  Undeterred, Smith 
also carried his case to Samuel Gould, president of Antioch College and chairman of the 
AAC’s Commission on Academic Freedom and Tenure. Smith shared his twin worries 
that “academic communities [were] perhaps becoming a bit careless about the 
infringements on freedom represented by the [disclaimer]” and that the NDEA involved 
colleges “as agents and administrators of certain portions of the act.”  He urged Gould to 
offer a resolution in opposition to the disclaimer affidavit at the AAC’s annual meeting 
during the first week of the new year.
231
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     Smith was a creature of the Establishment, a figure whose experiences at Princeton, 
the Harvard Board of Overseers, and the American Rhodes Scholar Committee had 
equipped him with bounteous social capital.  He was well-connected, both politically and 
institutionally, and he would call upon these relationships repeatedly and unreservedly 
over the nearly five years of protest against the NDSL loyalty provisions.  The 
comparatively diffident Hugh Borton, on the other hand, was much more restrained in the 
months after Haverford’s announcement of non-participation.  Unlike his colleague at 
Swarthmore, Borton was not a natural at generating political support for the anti-
disclaimer stance.  Though also a veteran of elite institutions (Haverford and Columbia), 
Borton’s unpretentious character and temperament bore the stamp of his strict Friends’ 
upbringing, his experience as a Quaker missionary, and time spent assisting the post-
World War II rebuilding of Japan.
232
  He neither occupied nor desired the same nexus of 
influence that Smith enjoyed; as a consequence, while Smith was blanketing the nation 
with letters to create enthusiasm for a burgeoning NDEA protest, Borton searched for 
support of Haverford’s stance in more limited, lower-key precincts—and was effective, 
in his understated way.  In January of 1959, he, like Smith, also brought deep concerns 
about Mundt’s amendment to the AAC annual meeting.   Speaking as a new member of 
the Commission on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Borton led a lengthy discussion of 
the nascent controversy, which in turn helped lead the AAC to formally poll its 
membership on the perceived implications of the loyalty provisions.
233
  He also spent a 
great deal of time in the first half of 1959 explaining the school’s stand to Haverford 
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alumni, as the president enlisted their financial assistance in mustering the necessary 
funds to support students affected by the school’s non-participation in the NDSL 
program.  Borton’s efforts were rewarded, as donors contributed enough to the cause to 
enable Haverford’s non-participation for the 1959-60 academic year.
234
 
     The resistance efforts of both Swarthmore and Haverford were augmented on January 
29, 1959, when Senator John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts announced Senate Bill 819 
[S. 819], co-sponsored by Clark, to repeal the disclaimer affidavit.  Kennedy—like Clark, 
a colleague of Smith’s on Harvard’s Board of Overseers—declared the provision had 
been given insufficient attention during NDEA’s initial passage, and worried that the test 
oath was actually working against the stated purposes of the bill by alienating the nation’s 
most talented students from study that could contribute to national defense.   In contrast 
with the Soviets, Kennedy mused, the United States could not “take steps to keep our 
brightest minds in scientific careers—but we can take steps that keep them out.  That is 
the danger of this provision—and I hope this Congress will strike it.”
235
  Swarthmore and 
Haverford, of course, articulated a different rationale for defeating the loyalty measure.  
The colleges were concerned about the corrosive effects of a belief test, administered by 
schools themselves, would have on the meaning of a residential liberal arts community, 
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and Kennedy also recognized the threat; indeed, he noted that “to submit to [the loyalty 
provisions] is to submit to an insupportable invasion of educational autonomy, which has 
grave implications for the integrity of our educational system.”
236
  Kennedy’s worries, 
however, were not merely academic.  He also had more instrumental concerns, as he 
pondered not only the state of higher education, but also of national defense.  It was 
crucial, too, that the Kennedy-Clark measure sought to eliminate the entirety of Section 
1001 (f), which contained both the disclaimer affidavit and the loyalty oath.  Swarthmore 
and Haverford were not opposed to the loyalty oath, but rather the disclaimer affidavit, 
which was Section 1001 (f) (1).
237
  This confusion was not, perhaps, fatal, but it would 
eventually provide rhetorical ammunition—and the capacity to label repeal advocates as 
“disloyal”—to those who opposed the measure in subcommittee hearings and in full 
Senate debate.       
      Despite the subtle difference in motivation and the lack of concord regarding which 
was the truly obnoxious element of 1001 (f), the possibility of political repeal provided 
an attractive common cause for both the schools and the senators:  the colleges needed to 
muster what political pressure they could, especially given their financial circumstances, 
while the legislators needed expert witnesses to support their bill.  This partnership 
between academe and Washington would attempt to shepherd the Kennedy-Clark bill 
through the Subcommittee on Education, part of the Senate’s Committee of Labor and 
Public Welfare. 
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     In the wake of Kennedy’s announcement, Courtney Smith redoubled Swarthmore’s 
efforts at outreach.  Now equipped with his college’s statement of non-participation, 
Smith sent copies to friends, colleagues, and associates throughout the country.  In so 
doing, he opened correspondence with schools such as Wilmington (OH) and Beloit (WI) 
Colleges, schools that would withdraw from Title II participation prior to hearings on the 
Kennedy-Clark bill.  While it is unlikely that the sharing of Swarthmore’s stand 
represented the sine qua non which allowed Wilmington and Beloit to follow suit, it did 
perhaps provided succor to the leadership at these schools, and Smith was quick to 
congratulate and encourage his colleagues in taking their stands.
238
  More often, however, 
Smith encountered setbacks in his efforts at building a network, with nationally-
recognized private universities such as Johns Hopkins and smaller colleges like Earlham 
(IN) offering sympathetic ears, but also an unwillingness to withdraw their NDEA 
participation.
239
  Despite the lack of tangible results, however, Smith was committed to 
the process of advertising and advocating for Swarthmore’s position.  As he noted in a 
letter to a supportive judge in Baltimore, shortly after the college’s public declaration 
against the disclaimer: 
I have sent the same statement [of Swarthmore’s non-participation] that I sent to 
you to a number of interested congressmen, our own congressional 
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representatives, to the newspapers and press services, and to a good many other 
college presidents.  I think that those of us who feel this way need to strengthen 
the resolve of others, and the more educators speak out the more hope there is that 
the public will understand our position.  If only a few of us speak out our stand 
seems to some quixotic.
240
 
     This mindset was evident, too, in Smith’s communication with Kennedy and Clark in 
the months prior to the S. 819 hearings.  The president was in regular telephone contact 
and exchanged several letters with both lawmakers in the late winter and early spring of 
1959, as Smith both attempted to gauge the political chances of the bill and also offered 
his services in recruiting academic witnesses to testify before the Senate’s education 
subcommittee.  Through these conversations, it became apparent to Smith that S. 819 
stood as the best legislative opportunity for repeal, as similar bills in House were almost 
certainly to be torpedoed by Graham Barden, a staunchly-committed conservative North 
Carolina Democrat who chaired the junior chamber’s Committee on Education and 
Labor.
241
  Clark promised to cultivate support for repeal among his Senate colleagues, 
while Kennedy encouraged Smith to solicit the testimony of his fellow administrators, 
particularly those from South Dakota—residents of Karl Mundt’s home state.  Smith 
responded by recruiting the participation of the college presidents of the University of 
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South Dakota, Augustana, and Yankton Colleges (though scheduling difficulties would 
ultimately preclude their attendance at the hearings in Washington).
242
    
     As Courtney Smith broadened his circle of associates in preparation for the 
subcommittee hearings, the more reticent Hugh Borton continued to tend to unpretentious 
matters peculiar to Haverford—the day-to-day issues of faculty compensation, 
curriculum review, and student prizes—rather than proselytizing on behalf of the NDEA 
repeal movement.  Still, whatever his reluctance to assume a larger public profile, Borton 
remained committed to appearing in front of the Senate subcommittee; indeed, in the 
weeks before their testimony, he reached out to both Smith and Katharine McBride, his 
Main Line colleagues, and suggested they share copies of their respective statements and 
disclose the supporting materials they would be bringing to Washington.
243
  In their own 
ways, then, both Smith and Borton had prepared for their appearances at the Capitol. 
     On April 29, 1959, Senators Kennedy and Clark convened subcommittee hearings on 
S. 819.  The stated purpose of the sessions—to interrogate Section 1001 (f), both in terms 
of principle and of consequence—was reified with the senators’ opening statement, 
which noted that “[t]here is no precise way in which we can measure the harm this 
section is causing.  At least seven colleges have refused to participate in the student loan 
program solely because of the affidavit requirement.”
244
  This rhetorical gambit was 
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followed by statements from several luminaries within higher education that were read 
into the record.  The introductory declaration came from Harvard’s Nathan Pusey, who, 
while acknowledging his institution’s participation in the NDSL, emphasized the 
discriminatory nature of the affidavit:         
This requirement appears to them a direct personal affront.  It also seems to them 
that, in adding it, the legislators have shown a lamentable lack of faith in 
American youth….  To make this requirement of our young people—and of no 
others in our country—demanding affidavits that they are good loyal Americans 
before they may borrow money from the Government or enjoy the Government’s 
fellowships seems both rude and unworthy of the Congress….  Harvard has 
accepted its relatively small apportionment of loan fund money and has been 
pleased to have it.  Harvard students have complied with the law.  But their 
compliance, and that of students elsewhere, has been obtained at the expense of 




In the same vein, President Robert Goheen of Princeton submitted a statement which 
denounced the addition of “a cumbersome ritual to carefully administered programs,” as 
well as the affidavit’s intimation “that selected young persons upon whom this country 
depends for its future leadership are peculiarly liable to be disloyal to their country.”  
Briefer but similar statements followed from the presidents of Amherst, Drexel (PA), and 
Colorado College, all of whom declared their objection to subsection (f) (1) of section 
1001, and its implication that higher education was especially susceptible to treachery. 
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The statement of Yale’s Whitney Griswold and the testimony of Pennsylvania’s Gaylord 
Harnwell (a 1924 graduate of Haverford) both broadened the administrative critique of 
the disclaimer affidavit by noting the manner in which it fundamentally compromised the 
free exchange of ideas necessary for higher education.
246
    
     Finally, Katharine McBride of Bryn Mawr extended the day’s critiques by decrying 
not only the discriminatory nature of the loyalty provisions and the intrusion on free 
thought and inquiry, but also the deleterious effects they would have on collegiate 
communities that placed a premium on student-faculty interaction: 
The requirement of an oath is a disservice to all members of the educational 
community, in schools, colleges or universities….  Our relationship with our 
students is one of trust.  To say that we value this relationship highly is not really 
a strong enough statement.  The relationship is basic to the quality of instruction 
and education at the college.
247
  
In her emphasis on the profound violation of culture that the NDEA disclaimer affidavit 
signified, McBride identified the manner in which the loyalty provisions were 
particularly hostile to smaller learning communities such as Bryn Mawr.  McBride drew 
attention to the essential mission of the residential liberal arts college—to provide an 
optimal undergraduate learning experience.  This point of view was affirmed by the sole 
student statement read into the record on the session’s opening day, which came from 
Swarthmore’s student council president, Robert Mayberry.  Speaking for the council, 
Mayberry called for the repeal of the disclaimer affidavit “[i]n order to safeguard 
adequately the academic freedom of students benefitting from the provisions of the act,” 
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and reported that Swarthmore’s student body had urged “‘(1) that the present oath 
requirement be repealed and (2) that the future Federal-aid-to-education programs be free 
of such clauses.’”
248
  While a great deal of thoughtful dissent was shared with the 
subcommittee on the first day of hearings, the emphasis on preserving the integrity of 
collegiate culture most clearly emerged from the leader of Bryn Mawr—like Swarthmore 
and Haverford, a Main Line residential liberal arts school in the Quaker tradition—and 
the students of Swarthmore.  This emphasis, which had animated the community dissent 
at both Swarthmore and Haverford since the early days of NDEA, set the stage for the 
testimonies of Courtney Smith and Hugh Borton the following week.     
     On May 5, Smith sat as the subcommittee’s first witness, and used his opening 
statement to make clear the distinction, often misunderstood outside the halls of academe, 
between pledging allegiance to the nation and disclaiming belief, the latter of which he 
represented as “shortsighted and unwise,” and the governing reason for Swarthmore’s 
non-participation in the NDSL.  He further asserted that the affidavit was un-American, 
anti-intellectual, and deleterious to the spirit of democracy.
249
  Finally, in terms redolent 
of the school’s announcement of its non-participation, Smith spoke to his institution’s 
philosophy of using academic inquiry to develop not only scholarship, but also engaged 
citizens and ethical leaders: 
Is not our real question, the fundamental question, the question with which those 
who favor section 1001 (f) would surely agree, how are strong and capable and 
constructive citizens produced in a democratic society?  Section 1001 (f) is not, in 
my judgment as an educator, conducive to this end….  As an educational 
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institution Swarthmore College believes that strong citizens in a democratic 
society are produced in an atmosphere of freedom where ideas do not need to be 
forbidden or protected.  The college has confidence in the efficacy of free inquiry 
and debate to reveal error.  Section 1001 (f) is, therefore, in my opinion, contrary 
to the intent and the spirit of the act as a whole, contrary to anything I know about 




     Borton followed Smith, and his testimony proclaimed the same concerns and themes 
as his counterpart’s.  While challenging the affidavit’s fundamental violation of academic 
freedom, Borton gave special attention to its incongruity with the nature of higher 
education and the character of undergraduate culture.  Noting that “[s]tudents, even more 
so than perhaps any other single group, cannot be coerced into believing a certain set of 
beliefs or dogma,” Borton averred that students were most likely to internalize “sacred” 
values in a community which refrained from “placing restrictions upon them or stating 
dogmatically what we believe their beliefs should be.”
251
  He then framed the issue of an 
institution’s relationship with its students in explicitly moral terms:  
These [students] are the very people upon whom our spiritual, intellectual, and 
physical survival depend.  Either we have faith that in their search for truth, truth 
will prevail over evil dogma and vicious propaganda or we are admitting that we 
have already lost faith in ourselves and in our youth and the future which is in 
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their hands.  If we are fearful because they are evil and may defeat us, we have 
lost something sacred in our tradition.
252
 
The “tradition” Borton referenced was, in this case, the central tenet of the American 
project, a belief in the capacity of a free, enlightened citizenry to safeguard its own 
democracy; however, his argument just as readily applied to that which was sacred in a 
related tradition—the relationships of trust, intellectual engagement, and free moral 
discourse that formed the foundation of the residential liberal arts college experience. 
     Borton concluded his testimony by having five editorials from newspapers across the 
nation read into the record.  These commentaries gave full-throated support to 
Haverford’s non-participation in the NDSL, and called further attention to the principled 
stand made by the school (and by Swarthmore) in the earliest days of the program.  
Borton was followed by HEW Secretary Arthur Flemming; William Fidler, the general 
secretary of the AAUP;  and Senator Richard Neuberger of Oregon, who in his lengthy 
testimony included a statement from Reed College’s student council, which opposed the 
disclaimer affidavit.
253
  (As an institution, Reed had applied for aid upon NDEA’s 
passage in 1958.  It turned down the awarded grant of $3,349.00 in early February of 
1959.)
254
  Over the course of two sessions, then, an alliance of lawmakers, government 
officials, college presidents and faculty, and—in the cases of Swarthmore and Haverford, 
among others—higher educational institutions themselves made the case against the 
disclaimer affidavit  to the subcommittee.         
     For all the argumentation on behalf of the Kennedy-Clark bill, however, the final word 
in subcommittee hearings was given to Senator Karl Mundt, the original author of section 
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1001 (f) (1).  Mundt contended that the removal of either the loyalty oath or the 
disclaimer affidavit would recklessly compromise the law if not supplemented by 
language which would subject any applicant enrolled in a “subversive” organization to a 
$1,000 fine and up to one year in prison.
255
  When Kennedy countered that Mundt’s 
compensatory language would still enable the government’s discrimination against 
students, which was the real issue at hand, Mundt marshaled the language of cold war 
anxiety and patriotism in response:  
No, the issue is a matter of defense.  I do not believe we should stand before the 
people and say we have an act that provides for our national defense and are not 
going to do anything to prevent its being used as an offensive mechanism by the 
communist apparatus using our tax money trying to destroy the country by 
making this money available to students whose loyalties are demonstrably to 
some other country than our own.
256
 
     In addition, while the statements and witnesses from academia were virtually uniform 
in their opposition to the disclaimer affidavit, not all adopted a stance of dissent.  
Norwich (VT) University, as well as the colleges at Wheaton (IL), Del Mar (TX), 
Alliance (PA), and Mercy (MI), all voiced their antagonism to S. 819’s attempt at 
repealing the Mundt amendment.  Other, non-academic organizations such as the 
American Farm Bureau Federation, the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, the 
American Legion, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars also declared their continued 
support of NDEA’s anti-subversive test.
257
  Indeed, despite the enthusiasm generated by 
Smith, Borton, McBride, and others, those legislators sympathetic to the anti-disclaimer 
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movement would face a challenge in their attempt to dislodge the prevailing political 
discourse of loyalty, conformity, and acceptance that had produced the Mundt 
amendments in the first place.   
     S. 819 would come to full Senate debate on July 23, 1959.  After several statements of 
incredulity from senators that colleges would object to taking a common loyalty oath, 
supporters of repeal clarified that it was the disclaimer affidavit which was unacceptable 
to protesting institutions.  In the course of debate, Senator Mundt introduced an 
amendment—first suggested during the subcommittee hearings—which preserved the 
loyalty oath, but also imposed specific criminal penalties against advocates of forceful 
overthrow of the Government or members of organizations advocating overthrow.  In a 
moderating measure, Senator Jacob K. Javits, a New York Republican, introduced a 
surrogate for Mundt’s new amendment.  Javits’ amendment proposed retaining the 
loyalty oath, but made penalties for violation apply under an existing statute, Section 
1001 of Title 18 of the United States legal code.  The Senate approved this proposal—
which would effectively eliminate the objectionable affidavit while retaining the loyalty 
oath—as an amendment to S. 819.  Despite this approval, after further debate, the full 




     S. 819 had failed, and its banishment back to committee functionally killed the 
proposal, a fact which Kennedy drily noted in subsequent remarks on the Senate floor.  
Senator Everett Dirksen, an opponent of both the original Kennedy/Clark measure and 
the Javits amendment, responded:     
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That may be true, but if it is true, I am sure the columns in this Chamber will not 
tremble.  I do not believe there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth on the sun 
kissed shores of California or in the waving wheat fields of the Great Plains.  I 
doubt if under the fair skies of Florida there will be weeping if the bill fails to see 
the light of day again in this session.  We have lived with the present law thus far.  
I think it deserves a further chance.
259
 
This dismissal of the disclaimer affidavit protest as an issue of marginal concern was not 
the isolated posturing of an ardent cold warrior like Karl Mundt, or a dyed-in-the-wool 
conservative such as Graham Barden.  Dirksen’s sense that section 1001 (f) (1)—the 
disclaimer affidavit—was something that Americans could “live with” seemed to have 
support not only in the commercial and military organizations of the nation, but also 
within the great majority of higher education itself.  While many leaders and faculty in 
academe were happy to oppose the NDEA’s loyalty provisions rhetorically, in practice 
the largesse put forward by the federal government was too generous for most institutions 
to resist.  Of all the NDEA programs, it was Title II—the NDSL—which was the most 
prominent in terms of institutions served, students subsidized, and money spent.  Over 
1,200 schools applied for a total of $62 million in grants, a dollar figure more than twice 
what the NDSL was able to offer.  By August of 1959, the month after Dirksen’s 
statement of blithe disregard, the Office of Education announced that it had increased the 
total monies available under the NDSL by 25 percent, and nearly 150 new colleges and 
universities had joined the hundreds who had previously sought aid, for a total of 121,000 
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  Simply put, if students and schools were troubled by 
the implications of the disclaimer affidavit, this discomfiture was not precluding their 
participation in the NDSL. 
     It would be incorrect, however, to assert that the political efforts of Swarthmore, 
Haverford, and others had been for naught.  While some legislators and community 
leaders wanted to position the apprehensions about academic freedom and community 
integrity as the provincial worries of left-leaning eggheads and their boutique colleges, 
the appearances and messages delivered by Smith and Borton, among others, were crucial 
in establishing the NDEA non-participants as mainstream educators with legitimate, 
reasonable concerns.  More significantly, the congressional testimonies of Smith and 
Borton gave greater visibility to the institutional resistance that Swarthmore and 
Haverford had undertaken.  Though the disclaimer affidavit had been an early target of 
individuals such as Arthur Flemming and Whitney Griswold, and had earned the 
disapprobation of professional organizations like the AAUP, only a miniscule number of 
campuses asserted themselves through refusal or withdrawal of participation in the NDSL 
prior to the congressional hearings in the spring of 1959.  The proclamation of that 
institutional resistance to the very lawmaking body it was resisting carried important 
symbolic and, in the coming years, political freight.  Though other colleges and 
universities may not have enjoyed the distinctive institutional sagas and missions that 
both Swarthmore and Haverford had consistently nurtured and expressed, they 
nonetheless could draw inspiration from the Quaker schools’ example of non-
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participation, and the clarity and civility with which Smith and Borton defended that non-
participation in front of the Senate subcommittee.
261
   
     This inspiration was made manifest in the decision of several institutions to divest 
themselves of Title II participation after the failure of S. 819.  Schools which had 
participated in the NDSL on a provisional basis had been keen observers of the hearings 
and debate surrounding the Kennedy-Clark bill.  When it became clear that legislative 
relief was not forthcoming in the summer of 1959—when the thoughtful positions of 
Swarthmore, Haverford, and others failed to carry the day—provisional participants were 
forced to reevaluate their tactical approach to NDEA.  As Courtney Smith confided to 
Kennedy after the hearings, at least three school presidents had told him their schools 
would withdraw participation if Section 1001 (f) was not overturned.  Schools would 
soon make good on these promises, as Harvard, Yale, Oberlin, and a half-dozen others 
dropped out of the NDSL by the end of 1959, with scores more registering official 
protests in the wake of the legislative failure.
262
      
     In the months before their journey to Washington and in front of the Subcommittee on 
Education itself, Swarthmore and Haverford had defined their understanding of the 
purposes and priorities not just of academic freedom, but of collegiate community; 
                                                 
261
 This is not to say that the Swarthmore and Haverford camps were necessarily satisfied with all aspects 
of their Washington experience.  Reflecting upon the legislative defeat, Swarthmore professor (and member 
of the college’s ad hoc committee on the disclaimer affidavit) Charles Gilbert would assign considerable 
blame at the feet of the Quaker colleges’ congressional allies: “[T]he cause was poorly handled by 
Kennedy and Clark—and by all others on ‘our’ side…It didn’t seem to me that Kennedy or Clark had a 
grasp of the issues we thought were of principal importance—this, rather than poor statement or tactics, 
seems to me to have been the problem on our side….  Senator Mundt and others opposed to amendment 
were able to argue without being contradicted that the issue was of minor importance—too minor for the 
time being consumed in debate.” Gilbert to Smith, September 28, 1959, “NDEA 1959 February-December” 
folder, box 54, Smith Papers.  
262
 Smith to Kennedy, May 12, 1959, “NDEA Senate Hearings 1959 January-April” folder, box 56, Smith 
Papers; Oberlin Today 17, no. 4 (Fourth Quarter 1959): 1-6; Anthony Lewis, “Eisenhower Hits Student Aid 
Oath,” New York Times, December 2, 1959; “Repeal of the ‘Non-Communist’ Affidavit in the Education 
Act To Be a Lively Issue in Congress,” 488.   
166 
 
moreover, the two schools had tacitly invited other colleges and universities to move past 
public pronouncements and rhetorical commitments to their students, and instead to act 
on behalf of an idea that preserved the dignity of the collegiate experience.  To be sure, 
the two Philadelphia schools were not alone in this effort—some few other colleges, plus 
the lobbying efforts of the AAUP and the stands of high-profile presidents (if not their 
institutions themselves) had played a crucial role in strengthening resolve and 
heightening awareness in higher education—but the statement that Swarthmore and 
Haverford contributed to the conversation was clear, decisive, and vital.  In declaring 
certain aspects of their institutional traditions and narratives inviolate, these schools and 
their leaders won support that was not only national—witness the increasing number of 
schools withdrawing from and protesting the NDSL—but also local.  At Swarthmore, an 
alum captured the prevailing community satisfaction with his alma mater’s effort: 
“Whether or not the stand the college has taken, with others, results in a reversal of this 
foolishness matters less, in my opinion, than that you took it.”  Similarly, Haverford’s 
student body saluted the principled stand of the school and belatedly praised its quiet, 
serious president in the pages of the 1959 yearbook.  Reflecting upon the year, the 
student editors acknowledged that  
critics were forced to admit that some of their criticism [of Borton] had been 
unfocused.  There was even deserved praise for his stand on loyalty oaths for 
government fellowships…  Thus it gradually becomes apparent, as Hugh Borton 
finishes his second year at Haverford, that he is not like [past presidents] “Uncle 
Billy Comfort” or Felix Morley or Gilbert White.  He is like Hugh Borton.
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     The repeal efforts of the Quaker colleges in 1959 were the natural outgrowth of 
relentless commitments to long-standing institutional narratives.  These narratives linked 
similar beliefs about college community, moral heritage, and respect for individual 
conscience, and though they were shared in ways specific to the leadership styles at their 
respective schools, they ultimately brought the colleges to the same moral and political 
stands.  While not universal, the approval that the colleges had earned from their 
respective expressions of these stands—Swarthmore largely through activism; Haverford, 
through quiet resolve—was crucial in nourishing further activism.  Though the political 
action of the two colleges had not produced removal of the most obnoxious NDEA 
loyalty provisions, it did engender enthusiasm on their home campuses, at schools across 
the nation, and in the halls of Congress.  This enthusiasm helped sustain political action 
over the next three years, and would in due course bring about the elimination of the 







Chapter 8:  Eliminated Disclaimer, Enduring Controversy 
 
     In commenting on the death of S. 819, bill opponent Senator Richard Russell of 
Georgia pointed out that no students in his state had seen fit to write him in support of the 
protest.  Similarly, Joseph Clark reflected that “[i]t made a considerable impression [on 
the Senate] that not many students had even heard of the loyalty provision, and only a 
few cared enough to write their Senators or Congressmen.”
264
  While this picture of 
student ignorance and apathy could not be justly applied to their campus climates in late 
1958 and 1959, students at both Swarthmore and Haverford nonetheless seemed to take 
this senatorial criticism to heart   At Swarthmore, the student council responded by 
forming a “Special Committee on the Disclaimer Affidavit,” which in turn urged their 
peers to embark upon a letter-writing campaign to win the support of their elected 
representatives.  This expression of student engagement at Swarthmore was undergirded 
by extensive coverage of the enduring controversy in the pages of the Phoenix, where a 
series of editorials and essays appeared throughout the 1959-60 academic year.
265
  
Haverford students, on the other hand—perhaps aping the style of their newly-embraced 
president—were more circumspect in their attention to the matter.  They did not establish 
a campus-wide movement to correspond with legislators, but the students did express 
their continuing support both for Haverford’s educational project, and the stand that this 
project had produced.  The Haverford News noted that through its small size and close 
relationships, the college had maintained fidelity to its longstanding “moral 
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responsibility” to and for the students in its charge.  The editors also re-affirmed their 
enthusiasm for the stance the school had taken in early 1959, and hoped that the college’s 
leadership would help bring about repeal of the Mundt amendment in 1960.
266
  As 
student activity on both campuses suggests, though the legislative defeat of the Kennedy-
Clark bill surely caused disappointment on the Main Line, it was not sufficient to quell 
community enthusiasm for NDEA resistance. 
     This enthusiasm was also spreading to other precincts.  At Harvard, student interest 
was beginning to catch up with that of its faculty, as in late 1959 the Crimson published a 
pro-repeal pamphlet (“Worse Than Futile”) with an introduction by Kennedy.  Like 
Swarthmore, Harvard began its own letter-writing campaign, with similar efforts 
beginning at Antioch, the University of Chicago, and Wellesley.  The number of 
institutions formally protesting the affidavit grew to nearly forty, and even President 
Dwight Eisenhower signaled his dissatisfaction with the disclaimer affidavit, first at a 
news conference, and a month later as part of his national budget message.  Declaring the 
loyalty oath “sufficient,” Eisenhower empathized with students who were “resentful” at 
the imposition of a separate affidavit.
267
     
    In this climate of burgeoning support for political action, both Senators Kennedy and 
Clark reintroduced legislation to eliminate the affidavit in late January of 1960.  Along 
with co-sponsor Jacob Javits, the pair put forward S. 2929, a virtual replica of the 
previous year’s bill, with the notable exception that it asked repeal only of Section 1001 
(f) (1)—the disclaimer affidavit—rather than the entire section itself.  With the modified 
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language, the backing of the popular President Eisenhower, and enhanced cooperation 
from leaders in higher education, supporters of the bill were optimistic that S. 2929 stood 
a better chance of passing than its predecessor had.
268
 
     There were, of course, still camps which remained implacably opposed to the removal 
of any of the NDEA’s loyalty provisions.  Pushing back against the strengthening student 
resistance to the affidavit, undergraduate organizations at the University of Houston and 
Ohio State officially endorsed the disclaimer, and a reactionary lobbying group (the 
National Student Committee for the Loyalty Oath) was hastily formed in early 1960.  Of 
real concern to those seeking repeal, however, was not the comparatively thin ranks of 
student retrenchment, but rather the political power of the organizations and lawmakers 
who would frame the debate on the proposed bill in the Manichean terms of the cold war 
loyalty discourse.  Both the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars 
continued their advocacy on behalf of the disclaimer affidavit, and the legislative path 
through the House would inevitably be blocked by Education and Labor committee 
chairman Graham Barden, who had promised to resist any attempts at repeal “with every 
energy that is in me.”  Even in the upper chamber, the most prominent opponents of S. 
819—Everett Dirksen, Arizona’s Barry Goldwater, and Karl Mundt himself—promised 
contentious debate on the matter when it reached the Senate.
269
  
     The floor fight which ensued on June 15, 1960, produced the expected lines of 
division.  Richard Russell of Georgia gave a lengthy disquisition against American higher 
education, with the suggestions that academicians were insufficiently troubled by “the 
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system of collectivism and communism that prevail[ed] behind the Iron Curtain;” thought 
themselves above American oath-taking farmers, professionals, and merchants; were 
elitists bent on discriminating against the poor students to whom loans would not be 
available; and were engaging in protest simply to “join the class of Yale, Harvard, and 
Princeton.”  Styles Bridges, a Republican from New Hampshire, claimed to have letters 
from over 3,700 college students who had taken a stand in favor of the disclaimer 
affidavit.  Finally, Florida Democrat Spessard Holland suggested that the protests of 
Swarthmore and Haverford should be discounted by trying to attach the schools’ dissent 
not to the relevant issues of community integrity and freedom of belief, but rather to the 
Quaker peace testimony of both colleges.
270
  Despite this rhetorical bombast, however, 
those in favor of repeal continued to correct the misimpressions and misdirection of those 
asserting that rejection of the disclaimer was tantamount to disloyalty.  These efforts, 
coupled with the lengthening rolls of non-participating, withdrawn, and disapproving 
schools and faculty (over 130 in all), helped preserve sufficient enthusiasm for the bill.  
The measure was also made more palatable to fence-sitting lawmakers through the 
addition of a modification by Vermont Republican Winston Prouty.  Prouty believed 
“loopholes” would remain for subversives if the disclaimer was simply eliminated; as a 
consequence, the so-called “Prouty Amendment” excised the affidavit of belief, but also 
substituted a provision which criminalized those who would apply for NDSL monies 
while retaining membership in a “subversive” organization within five years of the 
application.  This measure placated senators concerned that the Kennedy-Clark-Javits bill 
did not do enough to punish those who would undermine the government, and also 
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attempted to mollify academicians who did not want responsibility for administering and 
executing loyalty tests to their students.  On a voice vote, the Senate passed the amended 
S. 2929 and thus moved to abolish the disclaimer affidavit.
271
        
     The bill was sent to the House, where its supporters hoped that the Prouty amendment 
would protect the proposal from the assaults of Graham Barden and his allies.  In the end, 
however, Barden made good on his vow to obstruct any repeal measures, those in 
opposition marshaled enough support in his Education and Labor Committee to kill the 
amended bill as the Eighty-sixth Congress drew to a close.  Before it died, though, the 
bill managed to generate further interest in and extensive debate about repeal among its 
advocates.  Questions regarding the appropriateness of the Senate measure, the contrasts 
(or lack thereof) between the Prouty and Mundt amendments, and the viability of 
discovering “subversive” sympathies among applicants animated discussion in political 
circles and on college campuses in late 1960 and into 1961.  The ACLU moved swiftly, 
with its membership voting on June 20—even before the House killed the Senate 
measure—to oppose the amended Kennedy-Clark-Javits bill.  In a letter to college 
presidents, ACLU Executive Director Malin and former Columbia dean Louis Hacker 
asserted that the Prouty amendment was not an appreciable improvement on Mundt’s 
loyalty measures, and sent letters to over one hundred protesting institutions urging 
continued activity in resisting the legislation of belief.  Similarly, the AAC attempted to 
keep the issue alive among its membership, with a declaration that even had it become 
law, S. 2929 was wholly intolerable in principle, and “[i]n order to leave no doubt in the 
public mind about the attitude of the Association… the time [was] ripe for the adoption 
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of a formal resolution asking the Congress to limit the requirements of the [National 
Defense Education] Act to the simple oath of loyalty.”  Finally, the AAUP also rejected 
Prouty’s amended Senate bill.  Like the AAC, while the AAUP found S. 2929 preferable 
to existing law, the new measure still offered inadequate definitions of  what constituted 




     At the same time, key figures in the repeal movement indicated a willingness to accept 
the amended bill.  Whitney Griswold of Yale, author of the much-esteemed New York 
Times essay on academic freedom, gave an endorsement of the amended bill to a 
Congressional subcommittee, and Harvard’s Nathan Pusey offered his own public 
support of the measure.
273
  These stands were noted at Swarthmore, where the persistent 
financial pressure of maintaining an independent loan program was beginning to take its 
toll.  In reflecting upon the Senate bill, William Prentice, college dean and one of 
Courtney Smith’s closest counselors, confided that he “would be willing to consider 
continuing to refuse the money, but the new law seems to me to have certain advantages 
over the old,” and further wondered if “continued refusal to participate in the [NDSL] 
program [was] the proper way” for Swarthmore to make its point about the sanctity of its 
college community. Mindful of the opportunities that accepting the Prouty amendment 
might bring to the college, Smith nonetheless responded as he had in 1958 by calling for 
an investigatory committee composed jointly of administrators, managers, faculty, and 
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students.   The group retained seven members from its 1959 iteration, with two new 
student members selected from seven applicants, and discussed the issue during its only 
meeting on December 16, 1960.  While the prevailing sentiment was for maintaining 




     The ad hoc committee would not have this clarifying discussion, as the House laid to 
rest the Senate bill before the committee could schedule its second gathering.  While 
Swarthmore’s activity in the autumn of 1960 may seem unremarkable—the college had 
one academic discussion on a bill that would never escape its House committee—the 
continuity of the school’s approach to questions of cultural and ethical importance must 
not passed unnoticed.  Faced with increasingly challenging financial commitments and 
the very real possibility that the Prouty amendment would represent the best and final 
attempt at altering NDEA legislation, Swarthmore held fast to its norms of careful 
deliberation and community participation.  In a circumstance where expedience or 
political weariness may have carried the day, Swarthmore remained ready to explore 
what implications the acceptance of S. 2929 might have for the college’s institutional 
self-narrative.  That the bill ultimately failed before this process could be fully enacted 
should not detract from the school’s expression of moral purpose. 
      Across the Main Line, Haverford was honoring its own standard approach to the 
disclaimer question.  Just as Swarthmore elected to hew to the procedures which had 
carried them through the first NDEA controversy in 1958-59, Haverford maintained its 
posture of quiet resolution as the Kennedy-Clark-Javits bill moved its way through the 
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Congress.  Where Courtney Smith’s campus was alive with debate and preparation, Hugh 
Borton presided over calmer circumstances; indeed, neither the Board of Managers nor 
the administration apparently saw the proposed legislation as an occasion for debate.  
Though this might be read as an indication of community lassitude, Haverford’s past 
performances and contemporary concerns suggest otherwise.  During the period of the 
Prouty debate, Haverford continued to express a culture of moral engagement in a variety 
of ways: students marched in demonstrations in solidarity with civil rights sit-ins; 
Thurgood Marshall was invited to speak at the college’s weekly Collection, which grew 
into an extended dialogue with the community; and the students initiated a successful 
partnership with the administration to explore the possibility of expanding the school’s 
honor code to include self-scheduled final examinations.  In addition, both Borton and the 
faculty remained attuned to the political conversation surrounding the NDEA 
controversy, and the president continued to update the faculty on his abiding support for 
AAC and AAUP resistance to the disclaimer.  In short, though it did not produce the 
same formal inquiry into the Kennedy-Clark-Javits bill that Swarthmore had, Haverford 
was no less dedicated to moral conversation and meaningful community relationships 
fundamental to Quaker and residential liberal arts identity; rather, it simply did not find 
the Prouty controversy persuasive enough to challenge these norms.
275
   
     While interest in the disclaimer affidavit persisted, even after the fall of S. 2929, the 
Eighty-seventh Congress did not present an obvious opportunity for seeking repeal.  
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NDEA had been authorized through FY 1963, but was eligible for renewal as soon as 
1961.  With this opportunity, all manner of groups began lobbying for additions and 
revisions to the law, which had provided federal funding to all levels of American 
education, and thus was generally very popular.  Subcommittees in both the House and 
the Senate were subject to testimony throughout the summer of 1961 from an assortment 
of constituencies, who advocated for a variety of measures—federal loans to independent 
schools, expansion of graduate fellowships for all disciplines (not just those with a short-
term “defense” orientation), establishing summer teaching institutes for secondary school 
teachers of the humanities, and so on.  Overall, the Senate and House Subcommittees on 
Education together received over 1,750 pages of testimony from those seeking new or 
continued funding.  While Senator Carl Elliott (one of the champions of the original 
NDEA) offered a bill (S. 1726) that would strike Section 1001 (f) (1) from the renewed 
law, his proposal was crowded out by competing bills from other legislators eager to 
appease their constituents.  In this climate of heightened attention and activity 
surrounding the NDEA, summoning the requisite political will and organization to 
attempt a third foray against the disclaimer affidavit proved too difficult a charge.  When 
S. 2393 was passed on September 12, 1961, it extended funding for the NDEA an 
additional two years, but also left the loyalty provisions intact.
276
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      Disappointment was once more felt in the ranks of those seeking repeal, but 
Swarthmore and Haverford adhered to their stands of non-participation.  Swarthmore was 
typically vociferous:  having received its pro forma invitation to apply for Title II 
funding, the college’s vice president, Edward Cratsley, fired off a polite but firm 
rejoinder expressing his frustration to HEW’s Chief of Student Loans, and reminded that 
his school’s “attitude regarding this matter remains constant” while noting his “hope that 
some change in the particular requirement can be effected at the earliest possible date.”  
Haverford, for its part, gave no sign of abandoning its commitment either to NDEA 
protest or the necessity of value consideration in its community; indeed, rather than wring 
its hands over congressional intractability, the school occupied itself with higher-order 
moral debates about other aspects of the military-industrial complex, such as the school’s 
position on the nation’s burgeoning nuclear arsenal.  Despite the political setbacks and 




     The rewards for this persistence would arrive sooner than expected, and from an 
unanticipated source.  In 1958, HUAC was investigating the “colonization” of the Gary, 
Indiana steel industry by the Communist Party, and a steelworker, Edward Yellin, was 
identified as a Communist by investigators. Called to a public interrogation by the 
committee, Yellin (who had renounced with Party membership, but remained 
antagonistic to HUAC) refused to cooperate; he was summarily charged with contempt of 
Congress, and sentenced to a year in prison.  Yellin began serving his prison term in 
March of 1960, after having finished an undergraduate degree in engineering.  Upon his 
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release from jail in 1961, Yellin applied for and was awarded a two-year fellowship for 
graduate study through the National Science Foundation.  When legislators were made 
aware that a convicted criminal with communist sympathies had been granted $3,800 
from the federal government, they furiously convened hearings of the House Committee 
on Science and Astronautics to begin amending the security provisions of the National 
Science Foundation Act.  As the hearings revealed, Yellin had in fact signed Section 16 
of the NSFA—its disclaimer affidavit—but had still been granted federal monies.  While 
NSF officials noted that their fellowships were given solely on the basis of intellectual 
merit and thus did not require disclosure of a criminal record, the principal lesson 
committee members drew from the episode centered on the ineffectuality of disclaimer 
affidavits as a mechanism for “catching” subversives.  In response, the committee 
chairman, Congressman Overton Brooks of Louisiana, introduced H.R. 8556 to the full 
House on August 8, 1961.  The bill eliminated the disclaimer affidavit of the NFSA, but 
also strengthened the security provisions of the law to necessitate the disclosure of 
criminal records by applicants and punish those found to be “subversive” with up to five 
years in prison and/or a $10,000 fine.  The bill easily passed on September 6, and was 
sent to the Senate, whose Committee on Labor and Public Welfare held jurisdiction over 
NSF legislation.
278
   
     During the floor debate over H.R. 8556, Congressman James Corman of California 
had suggested that just as the disclaimer affidavit made little sense as a security measure 
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in the NSFA, so too would it fail as a prevention mechanism in NDEA legislation.  While 
not a novel argument—indeed, this position had been widely articulated since the original 
hearings on the Mundt amendment in 1959—senators who had supported the repeal of 
Section 1001 (f) (1) now saw an opportunity to use the enthusiasm for the revised NSFA 
in their favor.  Noting that the NDEA loyalty provisions were initially modeled on those 
of the NSFA, the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee recommended extending 
the NSFA amendments to include NDEA.  At the same time, unwilling to risk pushback 
from hard-line senators or the even more obstinate cold warriors in the House, supporters 
of the amended H.R. 8556 arranged to have the measure come to a vote late in the busy 
closing days of the legislative session, and under conditions where the bill could be 
passed by unanimous consent, without the necessity of either debate or roll-call vote.  
Using such delicate means, both the Senate and House approved an updated H.R. 8556 
by voice votes, and President Kennedy signed the bill into law on October 17, 1962.  




      This final removal, of course, was not without some irony.  For all the attention given 
to the NDEA, the final push for removing its disclaimer affidavit originated from an 
unlikely source: the Yellin controversy.  Similarly, the disclaimer was defeated in large 
measure because of its ineffectuality, not because of its obnoxiousness to traditions of 
college community and academic freedom.  That said, the contributions made by the 
protests of the academic community, and particularly the complete non-participation of 
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schools like Swarthmore and Haverford, must be neither discounted nor minimized.  
While the resolution of the controversy may not have come about in the manner 
institutions had hoped for, this resolution would not have been realized at all were it not 
for the part they played in recruiting support for repeal, demanding appropriate political 
attention, and—most importantly—defending fundamental collegiate ideals.  Absent the 
leadership positions taken and sustained by schools like Swarthmore and Haverford, there 
is no guarantee that the NDEA disclaimer affidavit would have attracted sufficient 
attention to warrant attachment to the revised NSFA.  No matter its origins, or the slow 
and desultory response of the political system, the repeal served to vindicate the 
courageous stands of the two Quaker schools.  
     In an effort to communicate their abiding interest in receiving federal monies, many 
schools had maintained provisional applications to participate in the NDSL, upon the 
lifting of the affidavit. With the affidavit’s removal in 1962, the provisional applicants 
immediately signaled their interest in joining the program for the 1963-64 academic year. 
Institutions like Amherst, Antioch, Harvard, Oberlin, Mills, Princeton, Smith, and others 
all proclaimed the acceptability of the new legislation, and Yale’s typically eloquent 
Whitney Griswold captured the group’s collective sensibility with his claim that the 
amended acts constituted a “long step in the right direction.”
280
  Still, enthusiasm for the 
repeal of the affidavit was not full-throated.  Both the ACLU and the AAUP retained 
deep reservations about the legislation.  Following the NSFA, the NDEA’s new 
provisions made it a crime for any member of a Communist organization, as defined in 
the Subversive Activities Control (SAC) Act of 1950, to apply for or to use a scholarship 
                                                 
280
 Walsh, 1381; Yale University News Bureau, “Statement of Participation in NDSL Program,” news 
release, October 19, 1962, “NDEA 1962 January-October” folder, box 54, Smith Papers.  
181 
 
or a fellowship, with violators facing a fine of up to $10,000, and/or imprisonment for up 
to five years.  For the ACLU, these requirements were “not worse than the disclaimer 
affidavit, but certainly no better.”  The AAUP thought the new law an improvement on 
both the initial NDEA, with its disclaimer affidavit, and even the Prouty amendment to S. 
2929, which would have required disclosure of past associations; still, the organization 
critiqued the federal statute for, among other things, continuing to embody an invidious 
suspicion of students.
281
  For schools like Swarthmore and Haverford, whose institutional 
identities were rooted in a culture of intellectual and moral seriousness, the issues raised 
by the ACLU and AAUP were of particular concern, and entry into the reformed NDSL 
was by no means a fait accompli. 
     Prior to the passage of H.R. 8556, Swarthmore had filed a provisional application for 
the 1963-64 NDSL, so that the school might be prepared in case legislative action 
eliminated the disclaimer affidavit.  Even with the new law, however, matters at the 
school were not at all settled, as the campus renewed the debate over the implications of 
loyalty provisions for its collegiate culture.  Within a week of President Kennedy’s 
signing of the statute, students began lobbying Courtney Smith for a voice in the school’s 
response to the NDEA revision, and Smith immediately recalled the ad hoc committee 
assembled in late 1960 to discuss the Kennedy-Clark-Javits bill, with two new students 
added to replace their graduated peers.  While the government deadline for NDSL 
application was November 15, Smith—as ever, not wanting to rush the deliberative 
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process—made a pro forma petition for an extension from HEW, which granted 
Swarthmore an additional two weeks for institutional discussion.
282
   
     With this increased time, Swarthmore once more became the site of considerable 
debate on the NDEA controversy.  On the administrator-manager-faculty-student 
committee, those in favor of the college’s participation pointed to the elimination of the 
disclaimer of belief, and a contention that restrictions on organizational membership were 
not the same as infringements on belief.  Supporters of the new NDSL also noted that the 
college no longer had the obligation to administer an oath of any kind, and thus to refuse 
participation under the new law would simply prevent students from making clear-eyed 
applications for government loans which could help both the students and the college 
alike; indeed, Swarthmore had allocated about $25,000 of loans to students for the 1962-
63 academic year, and the hoped-for NDSL award of $10,000 would certainly aid the 
institution’s bottom line.  Finally, a series of editorials appeared in the Phoenix which 
attempted to rally support for the revised NDEA, with essayists pointing out that the 
college could withdraw from the program at any time if the SAC Act began to intrude 
upon on-campus freedom of belief, and that the new loyalty provisions did not interfere 
with the community’s search for meaningful values.
283
  
     Those opposed to participation in the NDSL, on the other hand, contended that 
refusing monies to members of organizations registered with the SAC Board constituted 
as much an infringement upon freedom of belief and association as the original NDEA.  
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Some also worried that the SAC Board, which presently identified a small band of 
“subversive” groups, could be indefinitely expanded in a replay of the McCarthyist 
excesses of the previous decade.
284
  When the Swarthmore student council voted on 
November 25 to support participation in the revised NDSL, students immediately began a 
petition drive in opposition, with the assertion that the recommendation had been made 
before adequate student consideration could be heard.  Over 400 Swarthmore students 
signed the petition, which led the student council on November 27 to rescind its previous 
position and ask the administration for more time for deliberation.  The administration 
responded by again petitioning HEW for an extension past the November 30
th
 deadline, 
an extension which the department granted.  While December votes of both the ad hoc 
committee and the Swarthmore faculty recommended that the college join the NDEA 
Title II program, the Board’s final decision was held in abeyance pending a full student 
referendum on the matter, which had been scheduled for early January of 1963.
285
   
     With the new year came the final resolution of the issue.  The student plebiscite, 
which was marked by a strong turnout, saw those in favor of NDEA participation carry 
the day by a vote of 349 to 300.  Similarly, Swarthmore’s student council again endorsed 
joining the NDSL program, with the qualification that Swarthmore should “make a strong 
protest to the objectionable provisions of [NDEA]” while stating publicly that it would 
withdraw from the program if the revised act was “administered or interpreted in such a 
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way as to seriously discourage free inquiry.”
286
  Soon after, the college was ready to 
make its position public.  On January 28, 1963, Courtney Smith issued Swarthmore’s 
announcement: 
Swarthmore College is deeply gratified that the Congress in amending the 
National Defense Education Act of 1958 has eliminated the disclaimer affidavit of 
belief.  The College is now electing to participate in the undergraduate loan 
program made possible by the Act.  This participation should not be taken to 
imply approval of all the provisions of the Act, but the College has decided to 
participate in the program on the assumption that the new legislation will not be 
so interpreted or so administered as to limit freedom of inquiry or belief.  For 
many years the College has been enabled by the generosity of alumni and others 
to maintain its own loan program to assist students with established financial 
need.  All students, including foreign students and those who may in conscience 
have concerns about the National Defense Education Act, will of course continue 
to be eligible to apply for loans from the already established funds at the same 
rate of interest as in the government’s program.
287
 
At the time of the announcement, Swarthmore had not reached consensus within its 
meeting, but it had—once again—confronted a moral dilemma by enlisting the opinion 
and discussion of all members of its campus.  In the end, a majority of those involved in 
deliberation saw the revised NDEA as appreciably different from its predecessor in terms 
of the constraints it placed upon members of a Quaker community of inquiry, and this 
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view was expressed in qualified terms, which could be seen both rhetorically 
(“participation should not be taken to imply approval of all the provisions of the Act”) 
and materially (with the continuation of the college’s own loan plan to dissenting 
students).  As with its initial stand against the NDEA, the college had no guarantee that it 
had “gotten it right;” that is, those arguing against participation in the revised act had 
themselves claimed reputable moral ground.  What cannot be denied, however, was that 
the seriousness and deliberate manner in which Swarthmore went about making its 
decision was firmly within the narrative tradition it had established for itself, both in its 
nineteenth century founding and throughout the NDEA period.  When Swarthmore 
collected $8,215.00 in NDEA funds for the 1963-64 academic year, it did so without 
betraying its longstanding saga as a school of intellectual and moral significance.
288
     
     Haverford, while expressing a similar heritage and sense of place, charted a different 
course than Swarthmore in 1963.  As had been the case with the original NDEA and the 
unrealized revision of the act in 1960, the school saw little in the revised NDEA that 
would catalyze the same type of activity which characterized matters at its neighbor, 
Swarthmore.  Haverford had not filed a provisional application to participate in the 
program, and thus was not in a rush to meet the November deadline when Kennedy 
signed the new NDEA into law.  In December, Haverford’s faculty deputized its chapter 
of the AAUP to review the effect that the repeal of the affidavit might have on the 
school’s position of non-participation.  Similarly, the student council created a joint 
student-faculty conference on the issue, printed an NDEA “information sheet” which it 
distributed to the student body, and on February 25, 1963 sponsored a referendum on the 
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college’s potential participation in the revised act.  After their respective discussions and 
attempts to educate on the matter, though, faculty and student opinion on the new NDEA 
was deeply divided, and the lack of consensus seemed to offer little way forward.
289
  
     As with the original NDEA, however, Haverford’s Board of Managers saw itself as 
the principal curator of the college’s intellectual culture and moral heritage, and—seeing 
no clear “sense of the meeting” on campus—once more sought a solution through its own 
investigative efforts.  (On this matter, the Board’s investigative committee was wryly 
transparent:  “While we have been very glad to have the views of faculty and students, 
we feel that a matter of principle is involved and that the Board of Managers must make 
its own decision without too much regard to the opinions of other groups.”
290
)  Yet again, 
the managers’ deliberation on NDEA issues was preceded by an examination of the 
propriety of faculty research grants emanating from the defense industry.  John Chesick, 
a new chemistry professor, had won a research grant from the United States Air Force 
while at Yale, his previous institution, and wished to “carry” the grant with him to his 
new college home.  While the project itself was described as “pure science,” the 
managers cited the college’s policy of forbidding on-campus research sponsored by 
military entities, even if the research in question was non-classified or non-martial; as a 
consequence, Chesick’s request was denied.  At the same meeting, the Board called for a 
study of the revised NDEA, which would be signed into law the next day.  This task was 
handed to a trio of managers—Harold Evans, Garrett Hoag, and Richard Wood—who 
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were charged with submitting a recommendation on Haverford’s participation policy with 
regard to NDEA, now that the objectionable affidavit had been eliminated from the act.
291
  
Having just reaffirmed the college’s position regarding on-campus faculty research 
conducted via military funding, the Board of Managers now chose to hold the line on 
NDEA as well, in spite of the elimination of the disclaimer affidavit.  While 
acknowledging that their one-time partner Swarthmore had elected to participate in the 
NDSL, Haverford’s managers emphasized that under the new act, it was still the college, 
not the government, which was making the loans to applicants.  If the college would not 
have been willing to make student loans from its own funds under the conditions of the 
new loyalty provisions—and, as its moral and cultural tradition revealed, it would not—
then the managers saw no reason for Haverford to depart from its previous stance.  On 
March 29, 1963, the school announced its continued non-participation: “While we are 
gratified that the disclaimer affidavit of belief has been eliminated, other provisions of the 
NDEA regarding student loans are so objectionable that it is our considered judgment 
that a College with the tradition and ideals of Haverford should not participate in the 
program as it now exists.”  In essence, Haverford would not abandon the position it had 
adopted in 1958, and would maintain its own loan program to assist those who might 
otherwise have applied for NDEA funds.
292
  
     On the Philadelphia Main Line, Haverford was not alone in refusing to join the revised 
NDSL in 1963.  Bryn Mawr remained a notable non-participant as well, but the 
program’s financial incentives would eventually move the college to participate in the 
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NDSL during the 1964-65 academic year.
293
 Haverford, however, remained persistent in 
its stance, and would continue to do so throughout the decade.
294
   Campus activism 
across the nation would be radically transformed during the 1960s, of course, as the 
comparatively apolitical 1950s gave way to the tumult of the 1960s, with its embrace of 
the civil rights movement and protests of American military involvement in Southeast 
Asia.
295
  While some schools—Columbia, Cornell, Wisconsin, and many others—would 
find student militancy met by administrative and civic pushback, these movements for 
justice and peace readily segued into Haverford’s collective self-understanding as a 
community of open inquiry and mutual respect, and the school would not miss 
opportunities to affirm its commitment to the inherent importance of all its members.   
      Presiding over these opportunities, and the very continuity of Haverford’s narrative of 
intellectual and moral purpose, was its new president, John Coleman.  Coleman, an 
economist, had taught at both the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Carnegie 
Institute of Technology, before assuming the role of Associate Director of Economic 
Development and Administration at the Ford Foundation in 1965.  He held this position 
until 1967, when he replaced Hugh Borton and became Haverford’s first non-Quaker 
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president.  A professed Unitarian, Coleman would join the Society of Friends during his 
Haverford tenure, and his emphasis on the school’s Quaker mission matched that of his 
predecessor, the devout Borton.  He spoke often of the institution’s responsibility for 
engagement in both ethical dialogue and positive action, and reaffirmed the crucial place 
of student presence and voice in the college’s community through a series of cutting-edge 
changes:  the inclusion of students in the procession of scholars at his own inauguration, 
the addition of two student observers at Board of Managers sessions, and the invitation 
made to nine students to sit in on faculty meetings.  Later, Coleman would be at the 
vanguard of academic protest against the Vietnam War, and in 1972 arranged for 
Haverford’s entire student body to bus down to Washington to converse with political 
and religious figures about the nation’s military excursions into Cambodia.
296
   
     Like Borton, Coleman was also unafraid to engage in principled opposition to 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into Haverford’s cultural project.  A clear example 
emerged in 1969, when the Pennsylvania state legislature passed a bill requiring all 
colleges receiving financial aid from the state Higher Education Assistance Agency 
(PHEAA) to report students who contributed “to the disruption of the activities of the 
institution.” Marshaling logic similar to that used by Borton in protesting the NDEA in 
the previous decade, Coleman noted that the legislation made Haverford responsible for 
policing student behavior according to the norms of the capitol, not the collegiate 
community.  Accordingly, the school refused to sign an agreement with PHEAA, and 
instead challenged the constitutionality of the legislation in federal court.  In 1971, the 
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courts ruled in Haverford’s favor, and the school was able to again receive state monies 
without acting as informant about the personal affairs of its students.
297
  
     That Haverford would seek to protect the integrity of its community was not 
surprising, given both its mission and its leadership, but it was not done without cost.  By 
1970, when the school refused participation in the newly revised PHEAA Act, it had also 
been conducting its own surrogate loan program for the dozen years of NDEA non-
participation.  Though Haverford was still, by almost any objective measure, a well-
resourced educational institution, this additional financial outlay was beginning to cause 
internal strains, as the administration at Swarthmore had noted in 1963.  In a series of 
exchanges beginning around the time of the school’s PHEAA victory, Haverford’s 
directors of admissions and financial aid both attempted to persuade Coleman that a re-
evaluation of the school’s NDEA policy was in order.  Faced with massive building 
projects to accommodate increasing enrollment, rising salaries for a growing faculty, and 
enlarged operational costs, Haverford’s financial position—even with its $25 million 
endowment—was not as strong as it had been when it had inaugurated its NDEA non-
participation; indeed, in both 1970 and 1971 the school had run a deficit in its operations 
budget of over $575,000.   As admissions official William Ambler put it, bluntly:  “Times 
have changed.  We need the money….  The money received [from NDSL participation] 
could replace some (not all) of the money we now use for loans and free that money for 
other uses.”
298
  Coleman, for his part, did not rise to the rhetorical bait, and left the 
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possibility of joining NDSL unmentioned in either faculty or board meetings throughout 
the 1971-72 academic year.  Whether he was prescient or merely fortunate, political 
developments in Washington would soon deliver Coleman from the tension between 
enduring moral commitments and tightening fiscal realities, as legislators moved to 
amend 1965’s Higher Education Act during the Ninety-second Congress.  The Education 
Amendments of 1972, as Public Law 92-318 would be known, have since been most 
closely identified with Title IX of the statute, which prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of sex in educational institutions receiving federal aid.  Receiving less fanfare—but more 
significant to Haverford’s story—was the modification in how government programs 
provided financial aid to students through the erstwhile National Defense Student Loan 
program.  Though the school remained the lender, the rationale for aid was no longer 
affiliated with national defense, but rather with generally expanding access to 
postsecondary education.  Through these adjustments, the need for both loyalty 
provisions and institutional participation in the loan process was eliminated, and the 
“National Direct Student Loan” program (today known as the “Federal Perkins Loan 
Program”) was thus born on June 23, 1972.
299
 
     Seeing its opening, Haverford moved quickly.  The school’s provost, Gerhard 
Spiegler, noted in a letter to Coleman that the “new” NDSL had eliminated any oaths of 
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belief from its administration, and pointed out the opportunity for financial relief that had 
emerged.  When Haverford returned to classes in the autumn, the president proposed that 
the college enter into the amended NDSL, and both the faculty and Board of Managers 
roundly approved the suggestion.  On September 19, 1972, Coleman sent a memo to 
William Shafer, Ambler’s deputy in the admissions office, with the happy declaration 
that “the Board of Managers unanimously approved our entry into NDSLP [National 
Direct Student Loan Program]. You are now free to move ahead with our application just 
as rapidly as you find possible and wise.”
300
  Like its counterpart, Swarthmore, Haverford 
had become a full participant in what had once been the National Defense Education Act 
of 1958, and—again, like Swarthmore—the college had enacted this participation in a 
way that affirmed its enduring and essential institutional narrative.  
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Chapter 9:  Conclusion—Affirming the Liberal Arts College Ideal 
     As the twenty-first century marches into its second decade, the “Age of the 
University” appears disturbed, if not departed, and to speak of the post-war “Golden 
Age” of American higher education sounds like the nostalgic recollection of an 
antiquated time.  Not fifty years after Laurence Veysey’s The Emergence of the American 
University celebrated the university’s emergence from its purported anti-intellectual 
roots, the language of deficit, decay, and decadence has come to mark discussion of the 
nation’s contemporary enterprise in higher education.  Critiques of the politics, 
detachment, and costliness of the academy and its professoriate are not new, of course.  
As the historian Richard Hofstadter has noted, these rhetorical broadsides have been a 
prominent part of American discourse so long as increased access to higher education has 
been an aim of American politics, from snide dismissal of “eggheads,” to polemics 
against the epistemological lassitude of the academy, to the political and moral radicalism 
of its scholars.
301
  Today, however, the breadth of critical assessment has expanded, and 
is no longer the province of right-wing moralists, or of neo-Marxists describing higher 
education as representative of a capitalist superstructure; rather, university education is 
regularly assailed not only by mainstream thinkers outside its precincts, but also by those 
who work within it.  Concerns about the state of affairs center on issues of accountability, 
skyrocketing costs, access, governance, graduation rates, and quality instruction, and 
critics worry that the system as currently constructed cannot speak adequately to the 
nation’s intellectual, civic, and economic needs.  The overall picture described is one of a 
system unable, or unwilling, to fix itself, and faced with existential threats in new 
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technologies, spiraling expenditures, and for-profit competitors.
302
  While it would be 
reckless to pronounce the American university irretrievably broken—such haste would be 
redolent of those so ready to dismiss the liberal arts college in the twentieth century—
both the tone and the extent of the apprehension expressed by contemporary critics is 
striking.    
     The writer perhaps who may most thoroughly express the narrative of higher 
educational decline is Derek Bok, who has produced a trio of works examining the 
present state of American universities.  Though willing to salute areas of success, in the 
main Bok, a former president of Harvard, finds much to criticize in what he sees from the 
postsecondary project.  In the modern university, he finds that the chase for research 
dollars and capital funding—begun in the late nineteenth century and accelerated during 
the cold war—has continued apace, as has the attendant degradation of the college as an 
inclusive community of scholars.  Bok asserts that students are not taken seriously as 
thinkers, as moral actors, or as civic participants, largely because these are no longer the 
clear purposes or missions of institutions of higher learning.  If anything, the emphases 
established by the “Age of the University” now matter more than ever; indeed, the 
prestige of a school is marked by the influence of its faculty’s research, the size of its 
endowment and building projects, and the social networking of its alumni, all of which is 
endorsed and embraced by a segment of the public eager to rank its institutions and claim 
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the credentials they put on offer.
303
  For Bok, higher education desperately requires an 
extended conversation, prompted by critics both internal and external, to rediscover and 
clarify its fundamental purposes, and to consider what kinds of institutions can best 
address serve those purposes. 
      In a fashion, of course, Bok’s concern about the motley and superficial aims of a 
large segment of American higher education is not new.  Clark Kerr anticipated much of 
Bok’s worry during the “Golden Age” of post-World War II academic growth, when Kerr 
observed that the modern research university—what he termed the “multiversity”—
risked institutional incoherence in the effort to accommodate multiple interpretations of 
its mission.  With the benefits of research specialization, campus growth, and financial 
ties to government and industry of course came the concomitant erosion of the school-as-
community.  As Kerr initially wrote in 1963: 
These several competing visions of true purpose, each relating to a different layer 
of history, a different web of forces, cause much of the malaise in the university 
communities of today. The university is so many things to so many different 
people that it must, of necessity, be partially at war with itself.
304
  
This observation was both trenchant and prescient, as the present-day university has 
remained a site of competing purposes, with little to suggest that the modern research 
institution is a “community” in any meaningful sense. 
     On the one hand, this loss of the college as a unified “community” should not be over-
romanticized.  Surely, there have long been rival versions of institutional aims articulated 
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on campus as long as there have been campuses.  Even prior to the emergence of modern 
universities, colleges founded as sites of moral education were employed by the upwardly 
mobile as places to cultivate status and ensure socioeconomic reproduction.  In addition, 
as Kerr noted, the shift to a more comprehensive and broad-ranging institution has not 
been without its compensations, such as increased access, diversified curriculum, 
improved faculty research, expanded government funding, and decentralized governance.  
There remain purposes that higher education serves well.
305
   
     Even so, what is lost when a school ceases to be a more-or-less coherent, singular 
community ought not to be underestimated.   With its size, with the balkanized cultural 
and curricular experiences of its students, and with its faculty incentivized to research 
rather than teach, the modern university (notwithstanding ceremonial events like 
commencement and athletic contests) has ceased to be a “community” in a meaningful 
sense, and is better described as a “society.”  Moral philosopher John Macmurray 
captures nicely the distinction between the two:  whereas a community “is a unity of 
persons as persons,” Macmurray, notes, a society “is an organization of functions.”  
Institutions of higher education today are largely places where social groups occupy 
similar space to pursue exclusive, external aims.  While there are certainly smaller 
communities within this higher educational society, they are incidental to the primary 
purposes sought by most campus constituents:  research and publication (faculty), 
institutional prestige and fund-raising (administration), and credential acquisition to 
enhance future earnings (students).
306
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        Certainly, the aims of higher education may be myriad, and one can appropriately 
and comfortably marshal a reasonable defense for including both the creation of new 
knowledge and the transmission of marketable skills among these legitimate aims.  If 
found persuasive, Laurence Veysey’s thesis—that the modern university has consolidated 
around the treble aims of research, utility, and liberal culture—is not inherently 
problematic; indeed, it seems to leave available a “big tent” idea of higher educational 
purpose, one which could accommodate a notion of “collegiate community” under the 
auspices of “liberal culture.”  What is congenial in theory, however, so often falls apart in 
practice, and mere liberal curriculum cannot produce within the university the overall 
educational experience of a residential liberal arts college. 
      When the traditional view of the campus as an authentic community is discarded 
either by neglect or by design, some of the customary purposes of such institutions, such 
as moral and civic education, often go along with it.  In an “organization of functions,” 
transacting “liberal culture” regularly involves the efficient acquisition of commoditized 
answers, rather than a dialogue informed by values, consciousness, and abiding 
questions.  At the same time, when moral deliberation and civic engagement—efforts 
which are decidedly enhanced by the humanizing influence of the “unity of persons as 
persons”—are surrendered as legitimate institutional aims, the capacity of a school to 
enact a sense of community is stunted, and the campus inevitably drifts toward a 
disassociated functionality.  As a consequence, potentially important purposes of higher 
education, as appropriate and defensible as those of research and job-training, are 
decisively crowded out of contemporary academic discourse. 
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     The NDEA disclaimer affidavit controversy serves as an object lesson in this regard.  
Surely, the American higher educational project would have survived without the 
dissenting efforts of Swarthmore and Haverford, and the principle of academic freedom 
would have found a way to endure, whether through organizations such as the AAUP or 
via particularly attuned university leaders and faculty.  This recognition, however, should 
not discount the very real, very important role that Swarthmore and Haverford enacted 
during this period, and the significance that the resolution of this seemingly minor dispute 
can have for the structure of postsecondary learning. 
     In the late 1950s, Swarthmore and Haverford were not the nation’s final institutional 
redoubts of civic virtue, but they did represent a very specific idea about what constituted 
meaningful higher education.  These schools asserted that education is an irresistibly 
moral enterprise, and recognized that all schools, even those pretending toward the 
“neutrality” of research and knowledge-creation, express views not only on what is worth 
knowing, but also on what kinds of people they should graduate.   This assertion was an 
essential part of both institutions’ internal narratives and sagas, the stories that they told 
about themselves; consequently, both schools continued to emphasize the primacy of 
community, the necessity of ethical engagement, the possibility of “safe” dissent, and the 
importance of encouraging campus culture and practices that would support such aims.  
Because of these emphases, which remained consistent over time, Swarthmore and 
Haverford were possessed of the clarity of moral vision and institutional identity to resist 
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     The point is not that these schools were perfect; indeed, their respective histories are 
punctuated with moments of both professorial and student disengagement, and confusion 
or inconsistency in their expressions of purpose.  In addition, structural factors almost 
certainly contributed to the schools’ efforts to maintain the integrity of their particular 
institutional narratives.  For example, at mid-century both Swarthmore and Haverford 
possessed (and, today, continue to possess) a certain social, economic, and cultural 
security; indeed, throughout the twentieth century, these schools maintained healthy 
enrollments, found favor with alumni and philanthropic organizations, and developed 
social capital as Friends’ colleges situated in the cradle of American Quakerism.  Having 
negotiated the tremors of the “Age of the University,” both Swarthmore and Haverford 
were comparatively prestigious institutions, even as liberal arts schools, on the eve of the 
NDEA controversy.  This prestige surely gave both colleges more latitude in engaging 
with the disclaimer affidavit than other, less secure schools might have enjoyed.  
Swarthmore and Haverford became elite schools, in part, through persuasive institutional 
narratives, but this elite status, once cultivated, enhanced the schools’ capability to retain 
these same narratives. 
      Structural factors, then, may have aided the efforts of Swarthmore and Haverford to 
protect their institutional stories and relationships.  What cannot be ignored, however, is 
that these schools made such efforts, and that their relevant sagas remained 
fundamentally intact over extended periods of time.  Though each school had periods of 
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charismatic leadership, these leaders acted to extend and enhance the extant internal 
narratives, not to renovate them.  While each school evolved to meet changing demands 
and circumstances, they did so within their traditions, not in opposition to them.  Though 
other schools (Yale, Princeton, Wellesley, Chicago, Dartmouth, etc.) attempted to retain 
stories of their distinctiveness, they did so with less conviction and less success in their 
collision with the homogenizing university ethos of the twentieth century.  Swarthmore 
and Haverford were not reactionary, conservative institutions that refused to grow; rather, 
they were schools that told a clear story of what had historically made them both unique 
and effective, and they enlisted all campus actors as participants in this ongoing narrative.  
This effort paid dividends not only to both schools, but to higher education in general 
during the struggle over the NDEA disclaimer affidavit.
308
       
     Within today’s higher educational landscape, however, it seems that there is great 
difficulty in sustaining such narratives, especially those which privilege notions of 
community, moral engagement, and conscience.  If institutional stories are told, they are 
most usually stories of research and utility, not those of liberal culture and its attendant 
understanding of ethical and civic purpose.  Once more, there is surely nothing wrong 
with research, with the creation of new knowledge per se; indeed, it is an easily 
legitimated function of contemporary higher education.  What is worrisome, however, is 
the ease with which this effort is decoupled from questions of value, responsibility, and 
meaning.  When the professoriate sees itself (and is incentivized to see itself) as 
belonging principally to a disciplinary community rather than an institutional one, there is 
an associated cost.  When universities prioritize faculty research over engagement with 
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students, there is an associated cost.  When administrators of an institution are 
encouraged to model positions of value neutrality, there is an associated cost.  A campus 
emptied of authentic moral leadership and engagement impoverishes the student 
experience, and limits the possibility of a community that transcends the rituals of 
sporting and social events.  While improved access to higher education has been one of 
the signature efforts of American politics and society over the last seventy years, it has 
not been complemented by institutional narratives about the significance of both 
reflecting upon and practicing decency, prudence, and civic virtue.  There have been 
episodes during this period where students and campuses have risen to the moral 
occasion—the civil rights movement and anti-war protests stand as prominent 
examples—but higher education should not take solace in these activities.  As the NDEA 
disclaimer affidavit controversy made clear, moral stakes are not always obvious, and it 
seems that contemporary academic institutions, for all their collected intellectual talent 
and curiosity, have not constructed narrative identities sufficient to subtler (yet 
significant) instances of ethical concern.  
    Similarly, the modern university’s emphasis on utility has been unhelpful to the 
development or conservation of institutional sagas that emphasize community and ethical 
engagement.  Postsecondary institutions increasingly emphasize not their internal stories, 
but their “brands,” as they insist upon their relevance in (and training for) a dynamic 
marketplace.  In a globalized economy and under conditions of technological 
triumphalism, one of the real consequences of the “making of the modern university” 
appears to be a willingness of schools to position themselves, observes one professor, as 
“career-networking centers for a global managerial work force that answers to no 
202 
 
republican polity or moral code.”  In the past decade, Princeton University (ranked first in 
2013’s U.S. News rating of national universities) has sent between 33 and 46 percent of 
its employed graduates into the financial services industry.  While Princeton should 
certainly not stand as proxy for American higher education in general, and though its 
graduates are surely entitled to pursue the employment they wish, one might wonder if a 
school populated with so many resources and fascinating, talented people might be 
missing a cultural opportunity to broaden the ambit of its charges.
309
  
    The point, again, is not that higher education should divest itself of research and job-
training; rather, it must reclaim the legitimacy of civic and moral education as appropriate 
functions of postsecondary instruction.  It must also recognize that these functions are 
best discharged within institutions where questions of value cannot readily be decoupled 
from questions of scholarship, and where these institutions consciously and consistently 
identify themselves—especially to campus constituents—as such learning communities.  
As Burton Clark observed (in remarks that remain as perceptive as they are trenchant): 
“All colleges have roles, but only some have missions.”
310
 
     Of the varied institutions in American higher education, it seems that the residential 
liberal arts college is the one best disposed to serve as site of this reclamation.  Recent 
scholarship has postulated that any college or university can, with sufficient 
organizational and administrative will, create a culture that places student learning at the 
center of the institutional experience.  Perhaps, but present data also suggests that schools 
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committed both to educating undergraduates and to selecting and rewarding faculty 
primarily for their teaching are in short supply.  Rare is the postsecondary institution that 
does not offer some sort of “general education” or “liberal arts” curriculum, to be sure, 
but curricular offerings alone are insufficient to produce the type of outcomes—improved 
moral reasoning, purposefulness, citizenship, civility, and intellectual engagement—
traditionally sought after, and realized by schools who create a learning environment 
which privileges peer and student-faculty engagement around issues of intellectual, 
political, and ethical consequence.  Institutional mission and campus culture are, by far, 
the most critical elements in meeting these aims, as Swarthmore and Haverford 
demonstrated throughout the NDEA disclaimer affidavit controversy.  Though 
Quakerism was important to these schools, effective mission and culture need not be 
denominational—but they must be central to the school’s narrative understanding and 
expression of itself.  It is the enduring institutional story, not the ephemeral “brand,” 
which helps schools graduate students prepared to provide the type of scholarship, 
leadership, and citizenship necessitated by an increasingly interrelated and multipolar 
world.
311
    
     “Going to college” in the United States has seldom, if ever, connoted a singular, 
universal experience.  Instruction for the ministry, cultivation of gentlemanly status, 
reintegration of war veterans, education for graduate study, preparation for the 
workforce—these purposes, and others, have, at one point or another, informed the 
American rationale for higher education, and this diversity has represented a great 
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strength of the system.  This diversity is also threatened when the residential liberal arts 
college is marginalized in conventional educational discourse as an extravagant, 
impractical use of time and resources.  Such schools are not a good fit for every student, 
to be sure, and all colleges and universities must be attuned to industry concerns about 
affordability, access, and attainment.  At the same time, a higher educational project 
which does not allow sufficient space for the mission-driven college, for the institution 
informed by an internal narrative or saga, cannot fully protect the intellectual and civic 
health of its polity.  Such schools are not, of course, the only way to bolster the nation’s 
education and citizenship, but they do have a role to play, however subtle.  The actions of 
Swarthmore and Haverford during the NDEA disclaimer affidavit controversy did not 
stave off constitutional crisis, but they did confirm the value of respectful dissent, civility, 
and community obligation at a time when both American democracy and higher 
education, in thrall to narrow norms of loyalty and consensus, seemed to require the 
reassertion.  If and when either the republican ethos or academic freedom is similarly 
threatened, one hopes there will still be institutions equipped with the sense of purpose 
and identity to provide the necessary defense of essential ideals.        
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Appendix B:  Timeline of Events 
September 2, 1958  National Defense Education Act (NDEA) signed into law 
 
January 20, 1959 Haverford announces its non-participation in NDEA Title 
II,  the National Student Loan Program (NDSL) 
 
January 29, 1959 Senators John F. Kennedy and Joseph Clark introduce 
legislation (S. 819) to eliminate disclaimer affidavit 
 
February 5, 1959 Swarthmore announces its non-participation in the NDSL 
 
May 5, 1959 Presidents Courtney Smith and Hugh Borton appear before 
Senate Subcommittee on Education 
 
July 23, 1959 Senate returns Kennedy-Clark legislation to committee 
 
January 27, 1960 Senators Kennedy, Clark, and Jacob Javits reintroduce 
legislation (S. 2929) to eliminate disclaimer affidavit 
 
June 16, 1960 
 
 




September 6, 1961 
 
September 27, 1962 
 
 
October 2, 1962 
 
October 16, 1962 
 
 
January 28, 1963 
 




September 19, 1972 
S. 2929, amended by Senator Winston Prouty, passes the 
Senate; House of Representatives does not consider the bill 
 
Representative Overton Brooks introduces legislation (H.R. 
8556) to amend the National Science Foundation Act of 
1950 
 
House of Representatives passes H.R. 8556 
 
Senate amends H.R. 8556 to include elimination of NDEA 
disclaimer affidavit 
 
Houses passes amended H.R. 8556 
 
Public Law 87-835 signed, eliminating the NDEA 
disclaimer affidavit 
 
Swarthmore announces its participation in the NDSL 
 
Public Law 92-318 signed, amending the Higher Education 
Act of 1965 and providing federal aid monies directly to 
students 
 
Haverford announces its participation in National Direct 
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